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Chapter 1
General Introduction
This dissertation consists of three self–contained papers, which contribute to differ-
ent strands of the literature on industrial organization and microeconomic theory.
In Chapter 2, I analyze the sustainability of price collusion in two-sided markets
that are characterized by indirect network externalities between the two distinct
customer groups. Chapter 3, which is joint work with Johannes Koenen, examines
the incentives to innovate in a 3-player vertical industry structure with overlapping
product generations. Chapter 4 empirically investigates the existence of compro-
mise effects when people choose their main course from a restaurant’s menu. It
has been written jointly with Pia Dovern-Pinger. The appendix of this dissertation
contains the appendices of the respective papers including mathematical proofs,
model extensions, data description and regression tables. References of all chapters
are found in the bibliography at the end of this thesis.
Chapter 2:
Platform Collusion in Two-Sided Markets
This chapter analyzes price collusion between platforms in a two-sided market mo-
del. Given that media markets such as newspapers or TV channels have been
particularly prone to collusion, I use Armstrong’s (2006) well-established model of
platform competition as the stage game of an infinitely repeated price game where
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defection from coordinated behavior will be punished using grim-trigger strategies.
I show that higher indirect network externalities have two opposing effects on the
sustainability of a cartel. First, if one side values members on the other market side
more highly, Nash prices fall because competition for this side gets harsher. As a
consequence, punishment profits are a falling function of increasing network effects.
In addition, consumers’ utility from platform participation increases if they enjoy a
larger benefit from the presence of platform members on the opposing market side.
Hence, two-sided platforms make larger gains from collusion as network external-
ities grow. Second and countervailing, however, platforms also earn larger profits
from deviation as network effects become stronger - a result which is due to the fact
that indirect network externalities induce a feedback loop leading to more sensitive
demand reactions in response to a price decrease. Comparing these opposing effects,
I show that the latter effect always dominates in Armstrong’s (2006) model. The
reason being that a platform benefits more strongly from the existence of higher
network effects under defection because of the resulting asymmetric platform sizes.
In addition to this main result, I show that firms also have an incentive to col-
lude only on one side of the market, contradicting the hypothesis of Evans and
Schmalensee (2008). In particular, if platforms fix prices on the market side where
consumers enjoy higher network effects, they compete away some, but not all, of
the supra-competitive profits by setting prices below the competitive level on the
other side. If, however, platforms are able to form a cartel on the side of the market
that suffers from negative externalities, they might actually make larger additional
profits than under cartelization of both market sides.
Chapter 3:
Complementary inputs and the incentives for up-
stream firms to patent and innovate
This chapter studies the impact of patent protection on upstream innovation incen-
tives in a vertical industry with complementary inputs and consecutive investment
periods. In more detail, we investigate a contract theoretic setting in the spirit of
3Grossman and Hart (1986) and Hart and Moore (1990), in which two upstream
firms make investments into components that are perfect complements to produce
a final product in each of the two periods. As a new twist, the final product to
be sold in the second period can be composed of one of each components from
either period - that is, a new component of one type can be substituted by the
old component of the same type. We show that in case of non-cooperative, fixed-
order sequential bargaining between the two suppliers and the downstream firm,
ironclad intellectual property rights that protect first period investments lead to
a complete breakdown of investments into components due to hold-up problems,
despite full bargaining power of the investing parties. Knowledge diffusion that
allows the downstream firm D to buy an older version of the component from a
competitive fringe at period two is thus beneficial for all firms. In particular, know-
ledge diffusion generates an endogenous outside option for D in the second period,
allowing each of the upstream firms to claim a part of the total surplus that corre-
sponds to the value of their contributions to the respective coalition with D. The
ability of the residual claimant to exploit the holdup-situation is thereby reduced.
As a robustness check, we show that allowing for a stochastic bargaining sequence
alleviates the complete hold-up under patent protection. Yet, upstream innovation
might still be higher under knowledge diffusion.
In addition to these main findings, we show how our setting with two complemen-
tary investments in two periods relates to more ”standard” investment setups by
studying the effects of both vertical and horizontal integration. Partial vertical
integration of D with one of its suppliers does not solve the hold-up with ironclad
patents, but leads to higher investment levels than non-integration in case of tech-
nology diffusion. Finally, the only situation leading to first-best investment levels is
when both upstream suppliers merge and first-period innovations are protected by
long-lasting IP rights, a solution which resembles the classical result of Grossman
and Hart (1986).
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Chapter 4:
The Compromise Effect in Action: Lessons from a
Restaurant’s Menu
Standard discrete choice analysis assumes that consumers behave rationally when
choosing an option from a given set, implying that a change in choice set composi-
tion does not lead to choice reversal between options available in both sets. Many
laboratory experiments, however, have shown that individuals do not necessarily
behave according to standard theory when facing changes in the choice set. In
particular, one of the most well-known context effects is the so-called ”compro-
mise effect”, documented first by Simonson (1989). It refers to a situation where a
choice alternative gains market share when it moves from being an extreme option
to a compromising or middle option with respect to all relevant choice attributes.
This article contributes to the existing literature by being the first to provide ”real
world” evidence for the existence of a compromise effect. To this end, we construct
a completely new and unique data set from raw data provided by a German spe-
cialties restaurant. Overall, we observe more than 88,000 individual choices of main
courses from 21 different menus offered over a period of more than 7 years. Varia-
tion in price, position and number of items presented within 6 different main dish
categories from one menu to another allows us to investigate the effects of several
”pure” cases of choice set expansion as well as to estimate various discrete choice
models. Our findings indicate that the compromise effect prevails both in descrip-
tive and regression analyses. It is more pronounced when an alternative switches
from being the most expensive item (instead of being the lowest-price item) in the
choice set to being a compromise option. Moreover, our results show that control-
ling for confounding factors such as the background context of individual decision
makers is important, as it can change the size of the compromise effect.
Chapter 2
Platform Collusion in Two-Sided
Markets
2.1 Introduction
Price-fixing cartels have been observed in various two-sided industries.1 For in-
stance, the two major arts auction houses Christie’s and Sotheby’s fixed both seller’s
commission fees and trading conditions for buyers for almost seven years until their
cartel was uncovered by competition authorities.2 The practice of payment card
associations to fix interchange fees has steered the focus of various antitrust author-
ities. In the Netherlands, for example, the joint venture Interpay and its member
banks were fined for ”charging excessive rates” in 2004. Moreover, both the Reserve
Bank of Australia (in 2002) and the Banco de Mexico (in 2004) forced payment card
issuers to reduce their interchange fees after thorough investigation of the industry
(for details see e.g. Negr´ın (2005), Weiner and Wright (2005)). Even the academic
1See Evans and Schmalensee (2008) for a summary of antitrust cases in two-sided markets.
2The European Commission stated that agreements were foremost related to the conditions
applicable to sellers, but they also showed that conditions for buyers were included in the cartel
rules. Hence, both sides of the market were involved in the collusive practice. After a detailed
investigation, the European Commission considered both auction houses guilty of a serious in-
fringement of Article 81(1) of the EC Treaty, which by its very nature led to an important
distortion of competition to the exclusive benefit of the participating companies and to the detri-
ment of customers. In effect, an initial fine of over EUR 40 million was imposed, but - due to
leniency program application - reduced to zero fines for Christie’s and around EUR 24 million for
Sotheby’s. For further details on the case, see European Commission (2002).
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market is prone to collusion. In fact, 23 U.S. universities colluded on financial aid
awards for students for over 40 years. Their practices eventually ended after the De-
partment of Justice charged the participating Ivy League universities and the MIT
of illegal price fixing in 1991 and an out-of-court settlement forbidding discussion of
and coordination on prospective awards was signed by all members. An interesting
detail which makes this case a suspect for cartelization on both sides of the academic
job market is that press reports and evidence presented in court indicated that col-
lusion on faculty salaries may have occurred as well.3 Finally, joint price-fixing
has been observed in various media markets. For instance, the two dominating
players in the German private TV market, ProSiebenSat1 and the RTL-Group,
have repeatedly been under investigation for coordinated behavior in the advertis-
ing market. In 1999, after a striking convergence of advertisement prices and the
simultaneous announcement of a price increase which was justified by almost iden-
tical wording, the German competition authority opened a first investigation (see
Budzinski and Wacker (2007) for details). In 2007, ProSiebenSat1 and the RTL-
Group had to pay high fines and change the pricing of their commercial airtime
after an investigation by the Bundeskartellamt (2009). Another case involved three
German nationwide newspaper publishers that planned to build a common agency
for employment advertisements.4 Their contract included fixed prices for employ-
ment ad space and explicit profit sharing rules.5 Moreover, newspaper cartels that
were fixing cover prices have been reported in Australia and Switzerland (Merrilees
(1983), Wettbewerbskommission der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft (2000a,b)).
Finally, newspapers both in the Netherlands and the U.S. were legally allowed to fix
both cover and ad space prices jointly under the Dutch Newspapers Publishers As-
sociation and the Newspaper Preservation Act, respectively (see Van Kranenburg,
Palm, and Pfann (2002); Van Kranenburg (2001); Romeo, Pittman, and Familant
3For more details see e.g. Masten (1995) or Salop and White (1991). I would like to thank
Patrick Rey for mentioning this example of a two-sided cartel to me.
4Those publishers were Su¨ddeutsche Zeitung GmbH, Druck- und Verlagshaus Frankfurt am
Main GmbH and Axel Springer Verlag AG.
5The German competition authority banned the common agency. After Axel Springer Verlag
AG dropped out of the agreement, the final court of appeal allowed the remaining parties to
form the joint agency. For more details on the case, consider the report of the German compe-
tition authority (Bundeskartellamt, 1999) or an article in the ”Handelsblatt” from July 22, 2002
(Handelsblatt, 2002) which summarizes the proceedings of the investigation and the final court
decision.
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(2003); Picard (1995)).
As these cases indicate, there is scope for different forms of collusive behavior in
two-sided markets. Especially in case of media markets, one can observe both
collusion on just one side of the market, either readers or advertisers, as well as
”full” collusion on both sides. Moreover, it might be that platforms cannot choose
on which side to collude, e.g. in case of free-to-air TV channels which earn all
profits by selling air time to advertisers. The unifying element of all these indus-
tries, however, is that their pricing strategies are influenced by the presence of two
distinct consumer groups interrelated via indirect network externalities. In order
to understand how and when price collusion is possible in two-sided markets, this
paper analyzes the effects of these indirect network effects on collusive stability.
Given that media markets seem to be very prone to price collusion, I will take a
first step in understanding the incentive to collude in presence of indirect network
externalities using Armstrong’s (2006) model of two-sided competition, which has
become the workhorse model for investigating pricing and antitrust issues in media
markets.6 Furthermore, the simple, yet very general structure of this model al-
lows me to analyze different setups such as single- versus multi-homing consumers,
paying versus non-paying readers or viewers, and collusion on just one versus both
sides of the market. Taking Armstrong’s (2006) model as a stage game and as-
suming grim trigger punishments in case of defection from the collusive agreement,
I find that increasing network externalities have two opposing effects on collusive
stability in all setups.7 First, stronger network effects raise platforms’ incentive
to collude, namely by increasing the difference between collusive and Nash profits.
If one market side values members on the opposite side more highly, Nash prices
fall because competition for this side gets harsher. At the same time, consumers’
utility from platform participation increases if they benefit more from the pres-
ence of platform users on the opposing market side. Consequently, platforms can
earn larger collusive profits by setting monopolistic cartel prices when utility grows
with rising network externalities. Second and countervailing, however, platforms
6See, for example, Kaiser and Wright (2006); Peitz and Valletti (2008); Choi (2010) for an
application of Armstrong’s framework to media markets.
7Please note that this means that increasingly negative externalities have the opposing effect.
In other words, whenever I speak of ”stronger” network effects, I do not refer to network effects
in absolute value.
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also gain larger profits from deviation when network effects become stronger - a
result which is due to more sensitive demand reactions when both market sides
are interlinked by indirect externalities. In fact, deviation becomes more attractive
because rising network effects allow the defector to steal more and more consumers
from its competitor on both sides when lowering his prices. Comparing those two
opposing effects and solving for the critical discount factor, I show that the latter
effect always dominates in my model. In other words, collusion becomes harder
to sustain as network externalities between the market sides grow. Furthermore, I
find that an increasing asymmetry in the network benefits between both sides of
the market has a negative impact on collusive sustainability in case that both sides
single-home, whereas an increasing asymmetry makes it easier to collude if one side
multi-homes.
My results confirm Evans & Schmalensee’s (2008) hypothesis that collusion is gen-
erally harder to sustain in two-sided markets. Their argument, however, is that
successful cartels need to coordinate prices on both sides of the market which asks
for more agreements and monitoring and makes it more difficult to form an effective
cartel. My paper shows that two-sided collusion becomes harder to sustain even
without increased monitoring or coordination costs. A second point made by Evans
& Schmalensee concerns collusion only on one of the two market sides. They argue
that such one-sided agreements do not constitute an alternative collusive scheme
since all supra-competitive profits earned on the colluding side would be competed
away on the other one because of feedback effects in demand.8 Given my frame-
work, however, I cannot bear out their statement. Although some of the collusive
profits might be competed away on the remaining competitive market side if net-
work effects are symmetric on both sides or if platforms are forced to collude on
the market side that imposes lower external benefits, platforms still benefit from
such a one-sided cartel.9 Even more surprisingly, collusive profits might even be
higher than under two-sided collusion if platforms are able to form a cartel on the
market side that imposes higher indirect externalities. Finally, depending on which
side platforms decide to collude on, the critical discount factor might be higher or
8Note that this statement is also falsified by the existence of one-sided collusion in real world
examples, see above.
9This result is also confirmed by Dewenter, Haucap, and Wenzel (2011) for a different two-sided
market model.
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lower than under two-sided collusion.
This paper adds to the growing body of literature on two-sided markets that origi-
nates from seminal contributions by Rochet and Tirole (2003, 2006), Caillaud and
Jullien (2003) and Armstrong (2006). In particular, it enriches a strand which
focuses on the impact of indirect network externalities on well established com-
petition policy results,10 providing the first theoretical investigation of collusive
sustainability in two-sided markets. In parallel work, however, Dewenter, Haucap,
and Wenzel (2011) analyze welfare implications of collusion in media markets. They
show that collusion only on advertisement slots might actually increase total wel-
fare because it leads to less advertising and lower copy prices. Welfare implications
of collusion on both market sides (readers and advertisers) are ambiguous, although
it might still be possible that welfare increases. In contrast to the model used in
this paper, they completely ignore the question of cartel sustainability. Moreover,
their model makes the simplifying assumption that firms first choose advertising
quantities and then compete in newspaper copy prices instead of choosing prices
simultaneously for both sides. Finally, there exists one empirical paper by Argen-
tesi and Filistrucchi (2007) that tests for the presence of collusion in media markets
using a structural model. They analyze the Italian newspaper market and address
the question whether observed price patterns are consistent with profit-maximizing
behavior by competing firms or instead driven by some form of (tacit or explicit)
coordinated practice. Their model encompasses a demand estimation for differenti-
ated products on both sides of the market and allows for profit maximization by the
publishing firms taking into account the possible interconnections between readers
and advertisers. In order to simplify the analysis, they assume that readers do not
care about the amount of advertisement to be found in newspapers, i.e. indirect
network effects are present only in one direction. They derive hypothetical markups
under the two alternative conjectures of competition and joint profit maximization
and compare them with actually observed ones. Using this method, they find an
10Areas of competition policy that have been covered by recent papers include mergers, ty-
ing and bundling, exclusive contracts and price discrimination. See, for example, Chandra and
Collard-Wexler (2009), Armstrong and Wright (2007), Rochet and Tirole (2008) or - for an
overview - Evans (2003), Evans and Schmalensee (2008) as well as Rysman (2009). Moreover,
White and Weyl (2010) propose a general framework for imperfect platform competition allowing,
e.g., first-order merger analysis.
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indication of joint profit maximization for cover prices, whereas the advertising
market is closer to competition, a result which they claim to be consistent with
anecdotal evidence of the Italian newspaper market.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: In the next section, I will outline
the framework and describe the collusive game. Section 2.3 presents and discusses
the effects of increasing network externalities on collusive stability if both sides
of the market single-home, i.e. buy from just one platform. To this end, I first
consider the case where platforms have the possibility to fix prices on both market
sides (see subsection 2.3.1), before turning to the analysis of so-called one-sided
collusion where platforms coordinate only on one side of the market (subsection
2.3.2). Section 2.4 is devoted to the analysis of collusion when consumers have the
possibility to join multiple platforms at the same time, i.e. when they are able to
multi-home. Finally, section 2.5 concludes.
2.2 The Model
The stage game of my infinitely repeated collusive setup is based on the refined
version of Armstrong’s (2006) famous two-sided market model, as presented in
Armstrong and Wright (2007). The framework fits well to media markets in gen-
eral and - to some extent - even to the academic market example given in the
introduction.11 In particular, pricing for the service offered by a platform is based
on membership fees rather than on a transaction-based payment. In case of me-
dia markets, this corresponds to the fact that readers and advertisers ”meet” in
a newspaper or magazine, but the price that they pay for getting access to the
other side does not (directly) depend on how many agents they will actually reach.
Furthermore, the imposed network externalities interconnecting both market sides
are assumed to be purely membership-based, i.e. each consumer on one market
11Although Armstrong’s model fits the Ivy League cartel in most aspects, I have to admit that
the indirect network benefits that students or faculty members enjoy at a certain university are
not purely membership-based. Instead, the academic excellence of university members on either
side of the academic market highly matters. Such a quality dimension, however, is not included
in Armstrong’s framework.
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side values the per-se presence of members on the other side.12
There are two platforms, e.g. newspapers or TV channels, denoted by A and B,
which are located at the endpoints of a Hotelling line with unit length. These
platforms serve two types of customers, group 1 and group 2. Each group has a
unit mass of agents who are uniformly distributed along the unit line. Each agent
is interested in purchasing a single unit from a platform. If a customer of group
i located at x ∈ [0, 1] decides to join platform A or B, she receives the following
respective utility:
uAi = k + ain
A
j − pAi − tx ; uBi = k + ainBj − pBi − t(1− x) (2.1)
with i 6= j; i, j ∈ {1, 2}
where k is the intrinsic benefit from joining a platform, e.g. the utility that a
reader or viewer enjoys from content provided by a newspaper or TV channel.13
Further, ai with i ∈ {1, 2} is the benefit that an agent of group i enjoys from the
presence of each agent on the other market side,14 while pji describes the lump-sum
price that an agent of group i pays to platform j ∈ {A,B} when she joins and t
is the transportation cost parameter measuring horizontal product differentiation
between the two platforms.15
In the following sections, I will investigate the effects of collusion in two different
demand setups. First, I will consider the case where agents from both groups single-
home, i.e. where they can either buy from A or B. In line with Armstrong (2006),
I assume k to be high enough to guarantee that all agents on either market side
wish to subscribe to a platform in equilibrium, which implies that nA1 = 1 − nB1
12There exist other forms of network externalities which might be present in two-sided markets
(see e.g. Weyl (2010)). Moreover, a platform might apply alternative payment schemes. Thus, my
analysis is only a first step in understanding the sustainability of collusive practices in two-sided
markets.
13I assume that the intrinsic utility of joining a platform is identical on both market sides. My
main results, however, are robust to a generalization with different intrinsic utility levels on each
side. A detailed proof is available upon request.
14For a possible micro foundation of this reduced-form network benefit structure, see Belle-
flamme and Peitz (2010).
15The results presented in section 2.3.1 are robust against both a switch to quadratic transport
costs as well as to allowing for different transport costs on each market side.
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and nA2 = 1 − nB2 .16 As a result, the number of agents from each group that join
platform i under single-homing follows from solving for the indifferent consumer on
each side:
ni1 =
1
2
+
a1(2n
i
2 − 1) + (pj1 − pi1)
2t
; ni2 =
1
2
+
a2(2n
i
1 − 1) + (pj2 − pi2)
2t
(2.2)
i, j ∈ {A,B} ; i 6= j
Given the price pairs (pA1 , p
A
2 ) and (p
B
1 , p
B
2 ) offered by the platforms A and B,
respectively, these simultaneous demand functions solve for the following market
shares:
ni1 =
1
2
+
a1(p
j
2 − pi2) + t(pj1 − pi1)
2(t2 − a1a2) ; n
i
2 =
1
2
+
a2(p
j
1 − pi1) + t(pj2 − pi2)
2(t2 − a1a2) (2.3)
i, j ∈ {A,B} ; i 6= j
Second, I turn to the case where one market side is allowed to buy from both
platforms while the other side still single-homes.17 In order to make this setting
both comparable to the single-homing setup and as tractable as possible, I will
assume that a multi-homing agent’s utility simply corresponds to uAj + u
B
j . In
consequence, her decision boils down to buying from platform i if uij ≥ 0.18 Platform
A faces the following demand on the multi-homing side:
nAi =
k + ain
A
j − pAi
t
with i, j = {1, 2}, i 6= j (2.4)
16The exact assumption on k will be stated later on.
17As pointed out by Armstrong (2006); Armstrong and Wright (2007), if agents on one side
multi-home, there is no incentive for agents on the other market side to do so as well.
18While I simply assume that agents can either single- or multi-home, Armstrong and Wright
(2007) show that it depends upon the size of network benefits relative to transport costs if con-
sumers actually wish to multi-home. A restriction of their multi-homing framework, however,
is that it is not directly comparable to the single-homing setup with respect to transport costs
and intrinsic utility. In particular, they assume that t = 0 on the multi-homing side and that
consumers receive k only once even if joining both platforms. In consequence, there are only four
possible demand configurations on the multi-homing side: all agents multi-home, all single-home
either on platform A or B or no agent joins any platform. Moreover, their setup is problematic
in so far as there are ranges of prices where more than one of these configurations are consistent.
Hence, multiple Nash equilibria might arise.
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while demand for platform B is given by:
nBi =
k + ain
B
j − pBi
t
with i, j = {1, 2}, i 6= j (2.5)
The number of multi-homing agents on side i will therefore be equal to the maxi-
mum of {(nAi + nBi − 1), 0}.
In line with Armstrong (2006), I will make the assumption that network externa-
lity parameters a1 and a2 are small enough in comparison to the differentiation
parameter t such that a market-sharing equilibria always exists. In other words,
the following sufficient and necessary condition must be fulfilled to guarantee that
both platforms will be active in the competitive equilibrium instead of having one
platform attracting all agents:
Assumption 2.1 4t2 > (a1 + a2)
2
Finally, I will assume that platforms’ costs of production on either side are normal-
ized to zero to focus on collusive sustainability as a function of indirect network
effects only.
Given the above described stage game, I analyze a standard infinitely repeated price
game where platforms choose their prices on both sides simultaneously in each pe-
riod and discount their profits with a common discount factor δ. To evaluate the
sustainability of collusion, I derive the critical discount factor above which a collu-
sive agreement on monopoly prices can be supported by a grim trigger strategy.19
In case of two-sided markets, such a grim-trigger strategy implies that platforms set
monopoly prices on one (”one-sided collusion”) or even both market sides (”two-
sided collusion”) and stick to them as long as no deviation is observed. In case
of defection, Nash reversion on both market sides is assumed. Thus, the critical
discount factor δˆ equates the profits earned from sticking to the collusive agreement
every period and the profit stream in case of defection, namely the sum of the opti-
mal defection profit in the period of deviation and the stream of Nash profits in all
19As introduced by Friedman (1971), this strategy states that firms set prices at the monopoly
level in period 1 and stick to these prices in all following periods as long as both firms adhered
to the agreement in the past. If either firm deviates from this collusive price, both immediately
revert to the static Nash equilibrium in prices and stick to it forever.
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periods afterwards. Formally speaking, δˆ solves the following incentive constraint
of a colluding platform i:20
1
1− δpi
C
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
present value of collusive profits
≥ piDi +
δ
(1− δ)pi
N
i︸ ︷︷ ︸
present value of optimal defection
⇔ δ ≥ δˆ ≡ (pi
D
i − piCi )
(piDi − piNi )
i ∈ {A,B} (2.6)
For all discount factors bigger than δˆ, platforms will find it more profitable to
collude on monopoly prices than to deviate. Hence, if δˆ increases in response to an
increase of indirect network externalities, then collusion becomes harder to sustain
as consumers on one side value consumers on the other side more strongly. It is
important to note that the overall effect of ai on δˆ needs to be disentangled to fully
understand its mechanism. Therefore, I will separately look at the effect of ai on a
platform’s gain from colluding and on its incentive to deviate.
2.3 Single-Homing
Let me start my analysis by investigating different forms of coordinated behavior
in a setup where both consumer groups single-home. The empirical relevance of
single-homing has been investigated by Kaiser and Wright (2006). Testing different
versions of Armstrong’s model on data for the German magazine market, they
concluded that competition between platforms is prevalent on both market sides.
Put differently, the assumption of multi-homing on the advertisers’ side does not
provide a good fit of the German magazine market. Instead, both readers and
advertisers opt for just one magazine. In a broader sense, real-world examples
of single-homing environments might also be motivated by indivisibilities, limited
resources or contractual restrictions. Thus, this setup matches both the Ivy League
case as well as the cartel of German nationwide newspaper publishers mentioned
in the introduction.
20Note that for a one-sided market, i.e. two horizontally differentiated firms selling only one
product to one group of customers, this collusive game has been analyzed by Chang (1991) and
Ha¨ckner (1995).
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In the following, I will first investigate collusive sustainability in case that platforms
coordinate their pricing on both market sides before turning to the situation where
collusion is possible only on one of the two sides.
2.3.1 Two-Sided Collusion
Given the infinitely repeated game described in section 2.2, each platform’s pun-
ishment profit is equal to its stage game Nash profit. Using market shares as given
in (2.3), platform i’s profit is equal to pii = p
i
1n
i
1 + p
i
2n
i
2. Maximizing profits with
respect to pi1 and p
i
2 and rearranging first order conditions, I obtain:
pN1 = t−
a2
t
(
a1 + p
N
2
)
; pN2 = t−
a1
t
(
a2 + p
N
1
)
(2.7)
Note that the classical Hotelling price on each side, which would be equal to t,
is reduced by the external benefit that a platform enjoys from attracting one ad-
ditional consumer on this side. Solving those two simultaneous equations yields
the symmetric Nash equilibrium prices pN1 = t − a2 and pN2 = t − a1. Thus, one
side of the market will be targeted more aggressively than the other if that side’s
consumers impose larger external benefits on the other side’s consumers than vice
versa.
In order to guarantee that both market sides are fully covered given the Nash equi-
librium prices of the stage game, I will make the following assumption throughout
the remaining analysis:21
Assumption 2.2 k ≥ max{3
2
t− a1
2
− a2, 32t− a22 − a1}
Under this assumption, each platform gains a fifty percent market share on both
sides and Nash profits are given by:
piN =
1
2
pN1 +
1
2
pN2 = t−
a1 + a2
2
(2.8)
21If assumption 2.2 is fulfilled, all consumers will find it optimal to join one of the two platforms
under Nash prices, given that their utility of not joining a platform is normalized to zero.
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Hence, punishment profits fall as network externalities a1 or a2 increase, while they
increase in product differentiation t.
The maximum collusive prices platforms can set in a cartel correspond to those
prices that set the indifferent consumer’s utility equal to zero on both sides. Since
platforms are located symmetrically, monopoly prices differ only with respect to
network externality parameters, namely pCi = k − t2 + ai2 with i = 1, 2. Collusive
profits follow directly as symmetrically located firms will split both market sides
equally:
piC =
1
2
pC1 +
1
2
pC2 = k −
t
2
+
a1 + a2
4
(2.9)
Summing up, it is easy to see that a platform’s gain from colluding (piC − piN) is
increasing in both network externality parameters and the following lemma can be
stated.
Lemma 2.1 A two-sided platform’s incentive to collude (piC−piN) becomes stronger
if ai, with i ∈ {1, 2}, increases. First, a higher ai reduces Nash prices and profits
to be earned on the opposing market side j. Second, a higher benefit ai allows for
a higher maximum collusive price and thereby higher profits earned on market side
i.
In the newspaper industry, this result would imply that competing newspapers
earn higher collusive profits if network effects grow, because market cartelization
enables them to skim away all utility from readers and advertisers. The more an
advertiser cares about the number of readers seeing his advertisement, the higher
his reservation price. The less readers dislike ads (or the more they like them) the
higher is the cover price they are willing to pay. In contrast, competitive Nash
profits are decreasing in the indirect network effects because platforms price in
any external benefit that they earn from attracting additional consumers. If, for
example, readers become more valuable to advertisers, newspapers will demand a
lower cover price in order to attract more readers. Overall, newspapers’ incentives
to collude are higher the more advertisers and readers value each other.
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Countervailing the incentive to collude, firms always have an incentive to deviate
from the collusive agreement in order to earn larger stage-game profits. The optimal
defection strategy of platform i is given by its price reaction functions Ri1 and R
i
2:
Ri1 =

pj1+t
2
+ a1
(
pj2−pi2
2t
)
− a2
t
(
a1+pi2
2
)
if pj1 < p
j
1
pj1 − t+ a1a2t + a1t (pj2 − pi2) if pj1 ≥ pj1
(2.10)
Ri2 =

pj2+t
2
+ a2
(
pj1−pi1
2t
)
− a1
t
(
a2+pi1
2
)
if pj2 < p
j
2
pj2 − t+ a1a2t + a2t (pj1 − pi1) if pj2 ≥ pj2
(2.11)
with i, j ∈ {A,B} ; i 6= j ; pj1 = 3t− (a1+a2)
2
2t −
(a1+a2)(t+a1+p
j
2)
2t ;
pj2 = 3t− (a1+a2)
2
2t −
(a1+a2)(t+a2+p
j
1)
2t
First, note that the reaction function of platform i on side 1 depends on both
prices of her competitor as well as on her own price on the opposite market side.
Furthermore, both reaction functions consist of two parts as it might be an optimal
reaction for platform i to monopolize one or even both market sides when prices set
by the competitor are high enough. In case that monopolization is optimal, platform
i will choose the lowest price that allows her to gain a market share equal to one on
the corresponding market side. In the following, I interpret these reaction functions
in more detail to shed some light on the influence of network effects on the optimal
defection strategy. Since the reaction functions are symmetric, interpretation will
be limited to the side-1 reaction function only.
Case 1 - No market monopolization If the competitor’s prices pj1 and p
j
2 are
low enough, platform i’s optimal reaction corresponds to the first line of equation
(2.10). The first part of this term,
pj1+t
2
, is equal to the classical Hotelling reaction
function, i.e. the optimal price platform i imposes on side-1 customers depends
positively on the differentiation parameter t and the price of her competitor on
this side. In addition, however, the optimal side-1 price is influenced by the second
market side via the existing indirect network externalities. Assume for a moment
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that network externalities a1 and a2 are both positive. Then, the second term of
equation (2.10), a1
(
pj2−pi2
2t
)
, indicates that an increase in the price differential be-
tween platform i and her competitor on the opposite market side increases i’s price
on side 1. First, a price advantage of (pj2 − pi2) > 0 increases demand for i on side
2 by 1/2t. This, in return, raises a consumer’s utility on side 1 by a1 times the
demand increase. Hence, platform i can charge its customers on side 1 a higher
price when it is less expensive than her competitor on side 2. The third term in
equation (2.10) measures the external benefit of a decrease in pi1. Suppose that
pi1 is decreased exactly by the amount that causes an additional type-1 consumer
to join i. In return, this will attract a2/t additional type-2 consumers.
22 Those
additional type-2 consumers will generate an extra revenue of pi2 times a2/t. Fur-
thermore, they increase a type-1 consumer’s utility by a1 and thus the revenue to be
extracted on side 1. Wrapping up, the larger the external benefit a1 becomes, the
smaller will be the optimal price reaction on side 1. If network externalities are both
negative, then the second term of equation (2.10) will be negative if (pj2 − pi2) > 0,
i.e. a price advantage on market side 2 will decrease the optimal price on side 1.
The overall influence of the third term - the external benefit - is ambiguous and
depends on the size of a1 and p
i
2. In general, the first part of equation (2.10) shows
that platforms’ best responses on one side might depend positively or negatively
on its own price set on the opposite market side. For given rival’s prices, Ri1 will be
decreasing in i’s side-2 price if the total external benefit (a1 + a2) that consumers
enjoy is positive. In contrast, when consumers’ total network benefit is negative,
i.e. when (a1 + a2) < 0, then the price reaction function for side 1 is increasing in
pi2. Hence, a positive network externality a1 of consumers on market side 1 implies
that Ri1 is an increasing function of prices set by the competitor, but it will only
increase in pi2 if consumers on side 2 have a negative externality which is larger
than a1 in absolute terms. If consumers on side 2 also have a positive indirect
network valuation, then platform i will always reduce its side-1 price in reaction to
an increase in pi2.
Case 2 - market monopolization If the competitor’s prices are so high that
monopolization of market side 1 is the best response, then the second line of equa-
22This can be seen by differentiating ni2 with respect to n
i
1 in equation (2.2).
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tion (2.10) indicates the optimal price choice. Its first part, pj1 − t, is once again
equal to the classical Hotelling reaction function. The second part, however, in-
dicates that the maximum price that guarantees market monopolization on side 1
depends on the other market side as well. If a1 and a2 have the same sign, then p
i
1
will be increased by a1a2/t in comparison to a market without network externali-
ties. In addition, a positive network effect on side 1 allows to further increase the
optimal price if platform i’s price on side 2 is lower than the one of her competitor.
As it has been the case for the optimal reaction without market monopolization, a
better price on market side 2 increases demand on this side, which in return allows
i to charge higher prices on side 1, too. Finally, if a1 > 0, then the side-1 reaction
function of platform i is decreasing in pi2, i.e. if side-1 consumers have a positive
network benefit, then a price increase on market side 2 which causes the number
of customers on this side to fall, has to be compensated by a price decrease on side
1 to avoid that the latter consumers also switch to the competitor because of their
loss in utility.
From the above remarks on optimal deviation strategies, it is easy to see that
the impact of network externalities on deviation prices and the resulting deviation
profits is not as clear cut as its effect on collusive and Nash profits. Instead,
equations (2.10) and (2.11) imply that deviation prices might be increasing or
decreasing in a1 and a2. To figure out if deviation profits will effectively rise or fall in
response to a change in network effects, the following two-step procedure is chosen:
First, focus will be on the simple case when network externalities are symmetric,
namely when a1 = a2 = a. Taking the results for symmetric externalities as
a benchmark, the second step will be to investigate the impact of an increasing
asymmetry between network effects on deviation incentives.
2.3.1.1 Symmetric Externalities
When network externalities are symmetric, i.e. when a1 = a2 = a, solving both
reaction functions simultaneously under the assumption that the rival platform
20 CHAPTER 2. PLATFORM COLLUSION IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS
sticks to collusive prices pCi yields the following optimal deviation strategies:
RDi (p
C
i ) =

pCi +t
2
− a
2
if k < k
pCi − t+ a if k ≥ k
with i = 1, 2 ; k = 7
2
(t− a) (2.12)
In essence, the standard Hotelling price reaction is decreased by the external benefit
from attracting an extra agent on the opposite side. The influence of prices on the
other market side as shown in equations (2.10) and (2.11), however, fully cancels
out in case of symmetric externalities. Note that if collusive prices are high enough
or, as stated in equation (2.12), if the intrinsic utility k is low enough compared to
the difference between transport costs and network benefits, a deviating platform
will find it profitable to monopolize both market sides by choosing its deviation
price exactly such that an agent located at the position of the rival platform is
indifferent.
Plugging those prices as well as monopoly prices for the rival platform into the
demand equations given in (2.3), deviation profits are derived as follows:23
piDSE =

(
k + t
2
− a
2
)2
4(t−a) if k < k
2k − 3t+ 3a if k ≥ k
(2.13)
Equation (2.13) is an increasing function of the network externality parameter
a. In other words, if consumers on one side value consumers’ presence on the
other side more highly, platforms earn higher profits from optimal defection. The
effect is rather intuitive when recalling how demand functions depend on indirect
network benefits. From equation (2.2), it is easy to see that keeping prices on
side 2 fixed, an extra group-1 consumer joining the deviating platform attracts a
further a/t group-2 agents to the platform. These additional group-2 agents have
once again a positive effect on demand of group-1 agents. Therefore, a feedback
loop is started once deviation prices are slightly smaller than monopoly prices. In
consequence, an optimal defection strategy leads to deviation prices that fall by
23Note that for symmetric network effects, Nash and collusive prices are identical on both
market sides, namely pN = t− a and pC = k − t2 + a2 . Hence, Nash and collusive profits are just
given by their respective prices, i.e. piNSE = t− a and piCSE = k − t2 + a2 .
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less than demand for the deviating platform increases when a gets bigger. Overall,
deviation thus becomes more profitable as a increases because the demand effect
always dominates. Summing up the analysis of optimal defection, it is easy to
show that a platform’s one-time gain from defection (piD − piC) is increasing in the
indirect network externality a if assumption 2.1 is fulfilled. I can therefore state
the following lemma:
Lemma 2.2 Given that network benefits are symmetric, i.e. a1 = a2 = a, a
platform’s gain from defection (piD− piC) increases in a. Deviation prices fall in a,
but at the same time demand reacts with stronger positive feedback loops leading to
an increase in deviation profits that outweighs the increase in collusive profits due
to stronger network effects.
Recalling Lemma 2.1, I find that increasing network benefits have two opposing
effects. In consequence, the overall impact of an increase in a on collusive sus-
tainability depends on whether the increased deviation incentive is dominated by
larger gains from colluding or vice versa. Solving for the critical discount factor
δˆSE above which monopoly prices can be sustained as a collusive strategy in case
of symmetric externalities yields:
δˆSE =
(piDSE − piCSE)
(piDSE − piNSE)
=

2k−3t+3a
2k+5t−5a if k < k
2k−5t+5a
4k−8t+8a if k ≥ k
(2.14)
As comparative statics show, δˆSE is increasing in a if k > 0.
24 I can therefore sum
up the above analysis with the following proposition.
Proposition 2.1 Suppose that assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are fulfilled and indirect
network externalities are symmetric, i.e. a1 = a2 = a. Then,
∂δˆSE
∂a
> 0. As a
increases, the rising incentive to collude is always dominated by larger gains from
optimal defection.
24Since assumption 2.1 simplifies to t2 > a2 in case of symmetric externalities, it follows directly
from assumption 2.2 that k > 0.
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Figure 2.1: critical discount factor for symmetric externalities
For k = 50 and t = 36, the critical discount factor δˆSE is plotted as a function
of a in figure 2.1. The vertical line named ”RF switch” refers to the value of a
at which the optimal defection strategy switches from market sharing to market
monopolization, namely when k = k.
As this graph illustrates, δˆSE increases monotonically in a. At the lowest possible
value of a that still satisfies assumption 2.2 (market coverage), maximum collusive
profits are equal to Nash profits and, as a natural consequence, sustainable for all
discount factors between 0 and 1. Hence, δˆSE is equal to zero. The maximum
feasible value for a is given by assumption 2.1 which guarantees existence of a
market sharing equilibrium. In case of symmetric externalities, this assumption
simplifies to t > |a|. For a → t, δˆSE converges to the critical discount factor
for homogeneous goods Bertrand competition, δˆSE → 12 . Finally, the impact of
symmetric network externalities on the sustainability of collusion is decreasing in
the other model parameters k and t. In other words, if the intrinsic utility of
platform participation grows or if both platforms become more differentiated, δˆSE
responds less strongly to an increase in network effects.
In a nutshell, an increase in indirect network externalities has two opposing effects
on two-sided collusion. First, if one side values members on the other market side
more highly, Nash prices on the latter side fall because competition for this side
gets harsher. As a consequence, punishment profits are a falling function of growing
indirect network effects. In addition, consumers’ utility from platform participation
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increases if they enjoy a larger benefit from the presence of platform members on the
opposing market side. Hence, two-sided platforms can earn larger collusive profits
as network externalities grow. Therefore, the collusive gain (piC − piN) is a positive
function of indirect network effects. Second and countervailing, however, two-sided
platforms also earn larger profits from deviation as network effects become stronger
- a result which is due to self-enforcing demand reactions in presence of interrelating
network effects. Comparing these opposing effects, it is straightforward to see that
consumers do not enjoy additional network benefits when platforms move from
Nash competition to collusive prices because market shares stay at 1/2 in both
scenarios. Thus, platforms’ gains from collusion follow solely from higher monopoly
prices. In case of defection, however, market shares of the defector increase above
1/2 on both sides. Therefore, consumers receive a higher network benefit from
joining the defecting platform. The deviator exploits this effect by lowering his
prices just enough to induce a very profitable feedback loop. Solving for the critical
discount factor that balances the gains from collusion and optimal defection, it is
thus intuitive that the latter asymmetric defection scenario always dominates the
symmetric cartel. Collusion becomes harder as symmetric network externalities a
increase.
2.3.1.2 Asymmetric Externalities
Having in mind the result of the previous subsection, the question is whether collu-
sion will also be harder to sustain as network externalities grow if those externalities
are asymmetric. To this end, I assume from now on that a1 = a+∆ and a2 = a−∆
with a,∆ > 0. In the newspaper example, this would imply that advertisers (on
side 1) care more about readers than readers do care about ads. If ∆ is large
enough, i.e. if ∆ > a, it might even be true that readers dislike advertisements.
Given this network effects specification, equations (2.10) and (2.11) yield the opti-
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mal defection prices pD1 and p
D
2 as functions of collusive prices p
C
1 and p
C
2 :
25
pD1 =

pC1 +t
2
+
(a+∆)(pC2 −pD2 )
2t
− a−∆
t
(
a+∆+pD2
2
)
if k < k1
pC1 − t+ (a+∆)(a−∆)t + (a+∆)t (pC2 − pD2 ) if k ≥ k1
(2.15)
pD2 =

pC2 +t
2
+
(a−∆)(pC1 −pD1 )
2t
− a+∆
t
(
a−∆+pD1
2
)
if k < k2
pC2 − t+ (a+∆)(a−∆)t + (a−∆)t (pC1 − pD1 ) if k ≥ k2
(2.16)
with k1 =
7
2
(t− a) + ∆(t− a)
2(t+ a)
; k2 =
7
2
(t− a)− ∆(t− a)
2(t+ a)
; k2 < k1
From equations (2.15) and (2.16), one can easily see that it might be the case
that k2 < k < k1. Then, the defecting platform finds it optimal to conquer all of
market side 2 while still sharing market side 1 with its rival. The opposing case,
however, is never optimal. Hence, three different defection scenarios might arise.
First, if k < k2, the defector will share total demand on both market sides with its
competitor. Second, if k ≥ k2, the deviating platform will set pD2 to the maximum
possible price that still guarantees a deviation demand of one on this market side,
i.e. the price which makes the group-2 agent located at the location of its rival
indifferent.26 Given this price pD2 , the deviation price on side 1 then follows from
maximizing the deviation profit piDASE = n
D
1 p
D
1 + p
D
2 with respect to p
D
1 . Thus,
pD1 =
1
2
(t − a + 3∆ + pC1 ) and nD1 = 14t(3a − ∆ + pC1 + t) in this second deviation
scenario. Finally, for k ≥ k1,27 deviation demand on side 1 will also be equal to
one. In this third possible scenario, optimal defection leads to full conquest of both
market sides by the defector. Summing up, optimal deviation prices and demands
are given as follows:
25Given a1 = a + ∆ and a2 = a − ∆, collusive prices are equal to pC1 = k − t2 + a+∆2 and
pC2 = k − t2 + a−∆2 .
26Note that demand in case of optimal defection results from plugging pD1 and p
D
2 as well as p
C
1
and pC2 into equation (2.3).
27The threshold k1 follows from setting n
D
1 =
1
4t (3a−∆ +pC1 + t) = 1 and solving for k. Hence,
k1 =
7
2 (t− a) + ∆2 .
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pD1 =

1
4
(
2k + t− a+ ∆2
t+a
+ 2k∆
t−a
)
if k < k2
2k+t−a+7∆
4
if k2 ≤ k < k1
2k−3(t−a−∆)
2
if k1 ≤ k
pD2 =

1
4
(
2k + t− a+ ∆2
t+a
− 2k∆
t−a
)
if k < k2
4kt−6(t2−a(a−∆))+(a−∆)(2k−t+a−∆)
4t
if k2 ≤ k < k1
2k−3(t−a+∆)
2
if k1 ≤ k
nD1 =

1
8
+ k
4(t−a) − ∆8(t+a) if k < k2
2k+t+7a−∆
8t
if k2 ≤ k < k1
1 if k1 ≤ k
nD2 =

1
8
+ k
4(t−a) +
∆
8(t+a)
if k < k2
1 if k2 ≤ k
Given these findings, the deviation profit can be easily calculated as a piecewise
function depending on the model parameters k, t, a and ∆:
piDASE =

(2k+t−a)2
16(t−a) +
∆2
16(t+a)
if k < k2
(2k+7a−∆)2+2t(18k−a+7∆)−47t2
32t
if k2 ≤ k < k1
2k − 3t+ 3a if k1 ≤ k
It is easy to show that deviation profits are non-decreasing in ∆ and a over the
whole range of k. More specifically,
∂piDASE
∂∆
> 0 if k < k1, while deviation profits do
not depend on the asymmetry of network externalities at all if deviation demand
is equal to one on both market sides. Furthermore, deviation profits are falling
in the differentiation parameter t, whereas their derivative with respect to k is
non-negative.28
In order to draw a conclusion concerning the total effect on collusive sustainability,
28The exact partial derivatives of the deviation profit are relegated to appendix A.1.
26 CHAPTER 2. PLATFORM COLLUSION IN TWO-SIDED MARKETS
it is important to note that collusive and Nash profits did not change compared
to the symmetric case. This is due to the fact the the overall externality or total
network benefit (a1 + a2) stays constant for all ∆. Nash prices, however, are now
given by pN1 = t− (a−∆) and pN2 = t− (a + ∆), while maximum collusive prices
have changed to be equal to pC1 = k +
a+∆
2
− t
2
and pC2 = k +
a−∆
2
− t
2
. As a
consequence of these constant Nash and collusive profits, a platform’s gain from
collusion (piC − piN) is not different from the one under symmetric externalities.
The possible gain from defection (piDASE − piC), however, changes if ∆ > 0. In order
to investigate if asymmetric network externalities make defection more desirable
for a given total network benefit (a1 + a2), it suffices to analyze the difference in
deviation profits (piDASE − piDSE):
piDASE − piDSE =

∆2
16(t+a)
if k < k2
(2k+7a−∆)2−49t2
32t
+ 7(2k+∆)
16
− k2
4(t−a) if k2 ≤ k < k
(2k−7(t−a)−∆)2
32t
if k ≤ k < k1
0 if k1 ≤ k
Using assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 and taking into account the thresholds implied by
the piecewise functions piDASE and pi
D
SE, it is easy to show that the difference in profits
is bigger than zero unless both deviation demands equal one. As can be seen in
figure 2.2 for given values of t, a and ∆, the difference in profits falls as the intrinsic
utility k increases and becomes zero if k ≥ k1. In addition, (piDASE − piDSE) is a
non-negative function of the asymmetry ∆ and non-increasing in the total network
benefit a, but first decreases and then increases in t.29
Summing up the above analysis, I conclude that the gain from deviation increases
as the network externalities between the two market sides become more asymmetric
if k is not too large. Hence, for the incentive constraint as stated in (2.6) to be
valid, the critical discount factor δˆASE has to be larger than δˆSE as long as k < k1.
For k ≥ k1, deviation demand on both sides amounts to one and does no longer
29The partial derivatives of (piDASE − piDSE) are given in appendix A.2.
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Figure 2.2: difference between deviation profits in case of asymmetric vs. symmetric
externalities (for t = 12, a = 4 and ∆ = 10)
depend on ∆. As a consequence, δˆASE is identical to δˆSE in that case.
δˆASE =

−9a3−(∆2+(2k−3t)2)t+a2(−12k+9t)+a(∆2−4k2+9t2)
15a3+a2(4k−15t)+a(∆2−4k2−15t2)+t(−∆2−4k2−4kt+15t2) if k < k2
49a2+∆2−4k∆+4k2+14∆t+4kt−31t2−2a(7∆−14k+9t)
49a2+∆2−4k∆+4k2+14∆t+36kt−79t2+a(−14∆+28k+30t) if k2 ≤ k < k1
2k−5t+5a
4k−8t+8a if k1 ≤ k
As can be seen from above, δˆASE is an intricate parametric function.
30 Therefore,
the following figures are provided to shed some light on its behavior with respect
to the size and asymmetry of indirect network externalities. For given values of t
and k, namely t = 36 and k = 50, both critical discount factors δˆASE and δˆSE are
drawn as functions of the total network benefit a. In all three graphs, the leftmost
dashed vertical line corresponds to k = k2, the one in the middle corresponds to
k = k, and the rightmost indicates where k = k1. Going from figure 2.3 to 2.5, the
asymmetry between network externalities a1 and a2 is increased.
The first thing to note is that both discount factors increase in a over their respec-
tive domain ranging from the minimum total benefit needed to fulfill assumption
2.2 up to the maximum threshold for a implied by assumption 2.1, i.e. a < t.31
30The derivatives of δˆASE with respect to the model parameters are omitted for the sake of
shortness.
31The red vertical line indicates the minimum level of a needed for assumption 2.2 to be fulfilled
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Figure 2.3: critical discount factor for asymmetric and symmetric externalities
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Figure 2.4: critical discount factor for asymmetric and symmetric externalities
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Figure 2.5: critical discount factor for asymmetric and symmetric externalities
(∆ = 60)
Furthermore, both functions completely overlap to the right of the last dashed line
(i.e. k = k1) and converge to 1/2 for a → t. In this segment of δˆASE, optimal de-
fection leads to full market conquest on both sides and the difference in deviation
prices due to ∆ exactly cancels out. Hence, the asymmetry no longer creates a
higher incentive to deviate. To the left of the above mentioned dashed line, δˆSE is
always smaller than δˆASE, and the size of the difference for a given total benefit a
increases in ∆ as one moves from figure 2.3 to 2.5. A last detail worth mentioning
is that the domain of δˆASE narrows down as ∆ grows. In consequence, it might be
the case that optimal defection implies market conquest of one or even both sides
over the whole range of a that fulfill assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 for given values of k
and t.
To conclude this section, the following proposition summarizes the effect of asym-
metric externalities on the sustainability of a two-sided cartel.
Proposition 2.2 Suppose that assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 are fulfilled and externa-
lity parameters can be described as a1 = a+ ∆ and a2 = a−∆. Then, the following
holds true:
• ∂(piDASE−piN )
∂∆
≥ 0 and ∂(piC−piN )
∂∆
= 0, i.e. the incentive to deviate from the
collusive agreement increases while the gains from collusion stay constant as
in case of ∆ = 0 while the green vertical line marks the minimum level of a for assumption 2.2 to
hold true in case of ∆ > 0 as given in the subtitle of the respective figure.
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∆ gets larger. Thus, ∂δˆASE
∂∆
≥ 0.
• The size of this asymmetry effect is decreasing in the total network benefit
and the intrinsic utility parameter: ∂
2δˆASE
∂∆∂a
≤ 0, ∂2δˆASE
∂∆∂k
≤ 0.
• For k ≥ k1, ∂δˆASE∂∆ = 0, because nD1 = nD2 = 1 and the asymmetries between
the two sides exactly balance each other out.
• The critical discount factor increases in the total network benefit (a1+a2) = a:
∂δˆASE
∂a
> 0.
Starting out with symmetric network externalities in 2.3.1.1, I have shown that
collusion becomes harder to sustain as these network effects increase. If one now
allows for an increasing asymmetry between both sides for a given total network
benefit a, this will have a negative impact on collusive sustainability if the intrinsic
utility from joining a platform is not too high. The driving force for this result is
that the external benefits of a price decrease are smaller when network externalities
are asymmetric rather than symmetric. In detail, the deviation price on side 1
increases by a larger amount than the deviation price on side 2 falls after an increase
of the network benefit parameter a1 by ∆ and an equally sized reduction in a2. In
contrast, demand reactions to ∆ are perfectly symmetric if k < k2. Deviation
demand on side 1 falls while side-2-demand increases by the same amount. For
k2 ≤ k, deviation demand on side 2 is equal to one as all consumers on this side are
sufficiently subsidized to overcome their transportation costs. Deviation demand
on side 1, however, is still smaller than one as long as k < k1. In consequence, the
external benefit of a price decrease becomes slightly smaller up until k = k1, the
point where the asymmetry no longer biases the incentive to deviate because both
market sides are completely overtaken by the defector. In sum, deviation profits
in case of asymmetric externalities are larger than or equal to deviation profits
in presence of symmetric network effects while collusive and Nash profits do not
change in ∆.
The results presented in 2.3.1.1 and 2.3.1.2 are in line with Evans & Schmalensee’s
hypothesis that collusion is harder to sustain in two-sided markets. In contrast to
their argumentation, however, my findings do not hinge on increased monitoring
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or coordination costs. The bottom line that collusion becomes harder as indirect
network effects grow rather follows from balancing two opposing effects. While it
might be due to the chosen linear Hotelling framework that the deviation effect
always dominates, I would like to emphasize that the existence of these two coun-
tervailing effects caused by network externalities in a two-sided market, namely
higher gains from colluding as well as larger benefits from defection, is of a more
general nature.
Another way to interpret my results would be to compare the impact of indirect
network effects in my framework to a situation where platforms are perfectly com-
patible.32 In the latter case, users on one market side enjoy a network benefit from
all consumers on the other market side independent of their platform choice. In
consequence, a platform’s market share on one side of the market does not influ-
ence consumers’ decision making on the other - the only two things that matter
are a consumer’s location on the respective Hotelling line and the price he faces on
his market side. A platform’s incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement is
much smaller in case of such a compatibility because of the lacking feedback effects.
Thus, collusion will always be harder to sustain in case of no compatibility whereas
the scope for collusion is larger when platforms do not have to compete for indirect
network externalities.
2.3.1.3 Extension: One-Sided Pricing in a Two-Sided Market
To complete the section on two-sided collusion, let me check if my results carry over
if platforms can only charge positive prices to one group of customers, as it is the
case for the free-to-air TV channels ProSiebenSAT1 and RTLGroup mentioned in
the introduction. More generally speaking, I investigate whether collusion is harder
to sustain as network effects increase in those two-sided markets where platforms
have to earn all their money from advertisers, as it is also true for free newspapers
or yellow pages. In these industries, advertisers gain utility from a large viewer-
or readership. Thus, their network parameter is positive and they are willing to
pay a positive price for accessing readers. Readers or viewers, on the other hand,
32See Katz and Shapiro (1985) for a seminal contribution on network externalities and compat-
ibility.
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very often dislike ads in these markets.33 As a consequence, newspapers or TV
channels would sometimes like to subsidize them in order to attract enough readers
or viewers to maximize profits gained from advertisers. Negative prices, however,
are seldom feasible. Thus, if prices on the viewers’ market side are fixed to be zero,
this might add an additional twist to the effect of indirect network externalities on
collusive sustainability.
I will shortly analyze the collusive game described in section 2.2 under the additional
assumption that w.l.o.g. a1 > 0, a2 < 0 and p
A
2 = p
B
2 = 0.
34
Given these assumptions, demand simplifies to:
ni1 =
1
2
+
t(pj1 − pi1)
2(t2 − a1a2) ; n
i
2 =
1
2
+
a2(p
j
1 − pi1)
2(t2 − a1a2) (2.17)
i, j ∈ {A,B} ; i 6= j
Note that demand on both sides is influenced by the price difference on side 1.
While platforms can earn profits only on the advertiser side 1, they have to take
into account the positive external benefit an additional consumer on side 2 imposes
on side-1 consumers when making their pricing decision. Nash prices in this special
case of the framework are equal to pN1 = t− a1a2t and profits amount to piN = t2− a1a22t .
Hence, in case of zero prices on side 2, the external benefit simply amounts to the
additional benefit a1 that each side-1 agent enjoys from one more agent on the
other side, i.e. the extra revenue a TV channel can extract from its advertisers
when attracting one more viewer. This amount is multiplied by the fraction a2/t
of viewers who are lost by one more ad displayed on TV. Thus, the price that
advertisers have to pay increases the more viewers dislike seeing advertisements.
Collusive profits follow from symmetric market sharing and setting pC1 equal to
k− t
2
+ a1
2
and thereby extracting all utility from the indifferent advertiser on side 1
and are given by piC = k
2
− t
4
+ a1
4
. Thus, collusive profits increase if advertisers value
readers more highly, as it was the case in the previous subsection. The effect of a
33See, for example, Wilbur (2008) who finds that consumers are strongly advertising averse in
the television industry.
34Note that Armstrong and Wright (2007) also analyze the case when non-negative prices are
not allowed and find Nash prices similar to the ones presented below. They assume, however,
that network externalities are both positive.
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higher viewership valuation on Nash profits, however, differs from the general case.
For a given negative externality that ads impose on viewers, the Nash price that a
newspaper or TV channel demands from advertisers rises in a1. As a consequence,
the gain from colluding only increases in advertisers’ benefits from viewers a1 if
viewers do not dislike ads too much. On the other hand, the gain from colluding
always decreases if viewers object to ads very strongly. In this case, TV channels
can demand a higher competitive ad price while collusive prices stay constant.
Turning to the incentive to deviate from the collusive agreement, deviation prices
can be inferred from a platform’s optimal reaction function which is given as follows
if a2 > −t:35
pD1 =

pC1 +t
2
− a1a2
2t
if pC1 <
3(t2−a1a2)
t
pC1 − t+ a1a2t if pC1 ≥ 3(t
2−a1a2)
t
(2.18)
Plugging both collusive and defection prices into equation (2.18) yields deviation
profits:
piD =

(a1(t−2a2)+t(2k+t))2
32t(t2−a1a2) if k < k
k + a1
2
− 3
2
t+ a1a2
t
if k ≥ k
(2.19)
with k = 7
2
t− a1(t+6a2)
2t
It is easy to show that the deviation price is non-monotonic in both network effects.
Moreover, deviation demand on side 1 increases in the difference between collusive
and defection prices. Due to the negative network benefits of viewers, however, the
more advertisers are attracted by the defector the less viewers are willing to stay
with her. As a consequence, the gains from defection (piD−piC) fall in the absolute
35Note that if the negative externality of readers is too large, i.e. if a2 ≤ −t, then deviation
demand on side 2 will be equal to zero at some point. If this is the case, platforms’ optimal
defection would no longer depend on a2. Thus, I focus on the situation where readers do not
dislike ads too much. If a2 > −t, deviation demand on side 1 increases faster than deviation
demand on side 2 falls as the defector lowers its price and attracts more advertisers. Thus, it will
be the case that nD1 = 1 if a1 is large enough. At that point, the optimal defection price is chosen
such that the defector just covers the market on side 1. Given nD1 = 1, deviation demand on side
2 does no longer change because viewers already suffer from the maximum number of ads. In fact,
side-2 deviation demand will then only converge to zero if a2 → −t.
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value of a2. The impact of advertisers’ benefits from viewers a1 on gains from
collusion, on the other hand, is only positive if the negative externalities a2 that
viewers have to incur are not too large in absolute value. Summing up the previous
findings on the incentives to collude or to deviate, I expect the critical discount
factor δˆPF to be non-monotonic in the network externality a1, too. In other words,
if one price is fixed to be equal to zero, it might be the case that collusion becomes
easier to sustain as network externalities become stronger.
Noticing that δˆPF is given by the following equation,
δˆPF =

2k − 3t+ a1 + 2a1a2t
2k + 5t+ a1 − 6a1a2t if k < k
2k − 5t+ a1 + 4a1a2t
4k − 8t+ 2a1 + 6a1a2t if k ≥ k
(2.20)
it is easy to see that δˆPF increases monotonically in a2, while being non-monotonic
in a1. If a2 < t
2/(t − 2k), then δˆPF falls in a1, whereas it increases in a1 for
a2 > t
2/(t − 2k). Put differently, the less viewers dislike ads, the harder it is for
TV channels to collude. Further, if viewers’ distaste of ads is not too high, then
collusion is less likely when advertisers gain a larger utility from their readership.
If, however, viewers hate to watch ads very much, collusion actually becomes easier
when advertisers’ valuation of viewers increases, because the negative impact of
readers’ distaste for ads on gains from deviation is larger than its negative influence
on gains from collusion. The following remark summarizes these findings:
Lemma 2.3 If a1 > 0, −t < a2 < 0 and pA2 = pB2 = 0, collusion might become
easier to sustain as a1 grows as long as the negative network externality a2 is large
enough in absolute value, i.e. ∂δˆPF
∂a1
> 0 if a2 > t
2/(t − 2k) and ∂δˆPF
∂a1
< 0 if
a2 < t
2/(t− 2k).
The intuition for this result, which differs from the one presented in propositions 1
and 2, hinges on the fact that viewers cannot be priced. Thus, newspapers or free-
to-air TV channels have to earn all their money from advertisers. When viewers
dislike ads, they will prefer to watch a channel that shows fewer ads. Hence, as a1
increases, TV channels might prefer to collude and share the number of advertisers,
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rather than to deviate and loose viewers. The result, however, is driven by the fact
that full market coverage is assumed for both market sides, i.e. viewers always
watch one of the two channels no matter how much they dislike the advertisements
they will have to face. This could be rationalized by the fact that viewers strongly
like both TV channels for their program, i.e. for k, such that they still prefer
watching TV over not watching.
2.3.2 One-sided Collusion
Some of the cartel cases described in the introduction imply that platforms could
possibly find it more profitable to collude only on one market side. Consider,
for example, the case of German nationwide newspapers that planned to form a
common agency for selling job ad space. They decided to collude on prices on the
advertiser side. The newspaper cartels detected in Switzerland and Australia, on
the other hand, were fixing cover prices. One should therefore ask if collusion only
on one side of the market might actually be easier to implement or yield higher
profits than full collusion on both sides under certain conditions. Furthermore,
analyzing one-sided collusion allows for an evaluation of Evans and Schmalensee
(2008)’s claim that all supra-competitive profits earned on the cartelized market
side will be competed away on the other and therefore one-sided collusion will not
be profitable at all.
2.3.2.1 Symmetric Externalities
Let me start by analyzing the symmetric case of a1 = a2 = a > 0 and assuming
w.l.o.g. that platforms collude on side 1. If firms collude on the highest possible
price given that markets are equally split, they will set pOC1 = k + a/2 − t/2.
On side 2, they will now maximize profits separately taking into account pOC1 ,
which yields prices equal to pOC2 = t − at (a + pOC1 ). Recalling assumption 2.2, it
is easy to show that pOC2 is always smaller than p
N
2 = t − a. Thus, platforms do
compete away some of the supra-competitive profits earned on side 1 as Evans
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and Schmalensee (2008) expected it to be the case.36 Actually, the collusive profit
amounts to piOC = (t−a)
2t
(t+ a+ pOC1 ) =
(t−a)
4t
(2k + 3a+ t), which is always smaller
than the collusive profit when platforms collude on both sides. Nevertheless, it is
still beneficial to collude for all feasible parameter values. In contrast to section
2.3.1.1, however, the gain from colluding is no longer monotonically increasing in
a, but instead falls for k > 3(t− a).
Lemma 2.4 If a1 = a2 = a > 0 and platforms collude only on side 1, some of the
supra-competitive profits earned on the colluding market side will be competed away
by setting prices below pN2 on the opposite side. Yet, one-sided collusion is always
profitable, i.e. (piOC − piN) ≥ 0, but ∂(piOC−piN )
∂a
≥ 0 only if k ≤ 3(t− a).
Turning to a platform’s incentive to deviate, it is important to note that it is never
an optimal reaction for the defecting platform to fully conquer market side 2, where
firms are already competing. Instead, optimal defection prices on side 2 are now
actually higher than pOC2 . While it is optimal to decrease prices on market side 1,
which in return raises market shares on this side, the deviation price on side 2 is
increased by such an amount that the corresponding market share of the defecting
platform stays constant at 1/2. Hence, reaction functions and deviation profits are
given as follows:
RD1 (p
OC
1 ) =

pOC1 +t
2
− a
2
if k < k˜
(t2−a2)
t2
(pOC1 − t+ a) if k ≥ k˜
with k˜ = 7
2
t− 3
2
a
RD2 (p
OC
2 ) =
pOC2 + t
2
− a
2
∀k
piDOC =

15(t2 − a2) + 2t(t− a) + 4k(k + t− a)
32t if k < k˜
4kt− 4t2 − 2ka+ 5at− 3a2
4t if k ≥ k˜
(2.21)
36This finding is also in line with Armstrong and Wright (2007). They shortly discuss the
implications of inflated prices and conclude that platforms gain relatively little from price fixing
on a single side (see p. 360).
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One can easily show that the gain from deviation (piDOC − piOC) is an increasing
function of a. Hence, the larger the network externalities a become, the more
profitable it is for a platform to deviate from the one-sided collusive agreement.
Moreover, comparing optimal defection strategies with those under two-sided col-
lusion (see equation (2.12)), it turns out that price reactions are identical if k < k˜.
Yet, collusive prices differ under the two different collusive practices. In addition,
the defection price on side 1 will be a less strong, but still positive function of the
collusive price on side 1 when k ≥ k˜, i.e. when the defector attracts all consumers
on side 1.
Balancing the gain from deviation and the incentive to collude gives me the critical
discount factor δˆOC above which monopoly prices on market side 1 can be sustained
in presence of symmetric externalities:
δˆOC =

2k + 3a− 3t
2k − 5a+ 5t if k < k˜
t(2k + 3a− 5t)
t(2k + 3a− 5t)− a(2k + 3a− t) if k ≥ k˜
(2.22)
Comparing this discount factor to the one for two-sided collusion as given in equa-
tion (2.14), one sees that they are identical if k < k. In other words, when network
externalities are small compared to transport costs and intrinsic utility levels, it is
not harder to sustain collusion on both sides rather than only on side 1. If network
externalities become large enough such that k ≥ k, however, it is even harder to
sustain collusion only on one side. The intuition for this result follows directly from
platforms’ incentives to collude. While a firm always benefits more from colluding
as a increases in case of price fixing on both market sides, this is not true for one-
sided collusion. Instead, a platform earns less and less from colluding on side 1 if
consumers enjoy higher network benefits because this enforces price competition on
the remaining side.37 In consequence, more and more of the collusive profits earned
on side 1 will be lost on side 2. Gains from deviation, on the other hand, always
increase as network benefits become stronger both under one-sided and two-sided
collusion.
37This is exactly the case when k > 3(t− a).
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Figure 2.6: critical discount factor for one- and two-sided collusion (∆ = 0)
For k = 50 and t = 36, critical discount factors δˆOC and δˆSE are plotted as a
function of a in figure 2.6.38
The following proposition sums up the above findings for symmetric externalities:
Proposition 2.3 Suppose that a1 = a2 = a > 0 and platforms collude only on
side 1. Then, one-sided collusion is harder to sustain than collusion on both sides
if network effects are large, i.e. δˆOC > δˆSE if k > k. If k < k, δˆOC = δˆSE.
2.3.2.2 Asymmetric Externalities
In case of asymmetric externalities a1 = a + ∆ and a2 = a − ∆, platforms’ gains
from cartelization depend on which side they decide to collude on. Given that they
are free to choose a market side, collusion will take place on side 2 because the
gain from collusion is always greater or equal to zero if platforms cartelize on the
side that imposes higher indirect externalities. For media markets, it seems very
reasonable to assume that advertisers benefit more from readers than vice versa.
Thus, newspapers can earn the higher profits when colluding on cover prices instead
of ad prices. It is therefore unsurprising that the newspaper cartels in Australia
and Switzerland did so.
Coming back to my model, I find that platforms will set pOC22 = k − t2 + a−∆2 on
the colluding market side 2 and pOC21 = t− (a−∆)t (a+ ∆ + pOC22 ) on the competitive
38The label ”RF switch” indicates the value of a at which k = k.
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side 1, which results in the following collusive profit:
piOC2 =
1
2
pOC21 +
1
2
pOC22 =
(t− a+ ∆)(2k − t+ a−∆)
4t
+
t2 − a2 + ∆2
2t
Note that the optimal reaction on the still competitive side 1 will lead to a price
pOC21 below Nash only if the asymmetry is relatively small compared to the overall
network benefit, namely if ∆ < a. This means that both network effects a1 and a2
need to be positive in order to have fiercer price competition on the non-colluding
side 1. In other words, platforms will only compete away parts of the supra-
competitive profits to be earned on side 2 if ∆ < a. If ∆ ≥ a, however, side-2
agents actually dislike side-1 agents. Yet, platforms still want them to join because
they know that these side-2 agents impose large positive network benefits on the
other group. Hence, in case of Nash competition, consumers on side 2 will be
subsidized by paying price pN2 < t. Side-1 agents, on the other hand, are targeted
much less aggressively and pay a price pN1 > t for having access to side 2. In
case of collusion on side 2, platforms can extract all intrinsic utility from side-2
agents. They have to diminish the collusive price, though, by transport costs and
the negative externality a2 that the indifferent consumer at 1/2 receives from type-1
agents joining the platform. By assumption 2.2, this collusive price pOC22 is always
larger than the Nash price. Hence, platforms make supra-competitive profits on
side 2. On side 1, the optimal price reaction is a positive function of collusive
prices pOC22 .
39 Thus, competition for side-1 consumers is actually attenuated. In
sum, collusion only on side 2 might therefore lead to higher collusive profits than
two-sided collusion. In fact, for ∆ ≥ t + a, the collusive profit piOC2 will be bigger
than piC (see equation (2.9)) for all valid ranges of k.
Turning a platforms gain from colluding on side 2 only,
piOC2 − piN = (t− a+ ∆)(2k − 3(t− a) + ∆)
4t
I find that it is always profitable to collude just on market side 2. Therefore, the
following lemma can be stated.
39It is easy to see from equation (2.10) that
∂Ri1
∂pi2
> 0 if a2 < 0.
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Figure 2.7: One-sided collusion on side 2 (∆ = 8)
Lemma 2.5 If a1 = a+∆ and a2 = a−∆, platforms prefer colluding on side 2 over
colluding on side 1. Collusion only on side 2 is always profitable, i.e. (piOC2−piN) ≥
0. Moreover, if a2 is strongly negative, i.e. if ∆ ≥ t+ a, then piOC2 > piC.
Turning to a platform’s optimal defection strategy, one has to note that deviation
demands do not balance each other out as it was the case in section 2.3.1.2. Instead,
deviation demand on side 1 increases faster with falling deviation prices if ∆ ≥ t+a,
while deviation demand on side 2 does so if ∆ < t + a. In consequence, prices,
demand functions and profits on both market sides in case of optimal defection are
quite intricate and therefore omitted for the sake of shortness at this point.40 The
critical discount factor δˆOC2 above which collusion on side 2 is sustainable is given
in appendix A.3 and depicted as a function of a for different values of ∆ in figures
2.7 and 2.8.41
As one can see from these figures, the critical discount factor δˆOC2 is increasing in
the total network benefit a. Its behavior with respect to the asymmetry between
both market sides, however, is not as clearcut. For small a, it increases in ∆,
whereas it decreases for larger a. Overall, δˆOC2 might be bigger or smaller than the
critical discount factor for two-sided collusion δˆASE depending on the size of the
model parameters. Hence, one cannot draw the same conclusion as for symmetric
40The Mathematica notebook containing the respective formulas is available from the author
upon request.
41The chosen numerical values for k and t are 50 and 36, respectively.
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Figure 2.8: One-sided collusion on side 2 (∆ = 45)
externalities, i.e. one-sided collusion is not necessarily harder to sustain than two-
sided collusion.
To conclude this subsection, let me consider the case where collusion on side 2 is
not possible, e.g. because of prohibitively high monitoring costs or a severe risk of
revelation by antitrust authorities. This was exactly the case for the three German
newspapers that wanted to collude on job advertisement prices. They thought that
such a form of coordinated behavior would be tolerated by the German antitrust
authority while collusion on cover prices would never have been accepted. Yet,
these newspapers must have believed that such a cooperation on the ad prices
would allow them to increase profits.
To shed some light on the incentives to collude on the less attractive market side,
I will analyze the situation where platforms choose to form a cartel on side 1
although collusive gains will be smaller. In fact, colluding on side 1 by setting
pOC11 = k − t2 + a+∆2 leads to a price of pOC12 = t− (a+∆)t (a−∆ + pOC11 ) on side 2.
Therefore, collusion on side 1 suffers from the fact that supra-competitive profits
earned on side 1 are (partially) competed away by setting prices below pN2 on side
2. In consequence, one-sided collusion in this form is only profitable as long as
∆ < t− a, as one can easily see from the following equation:
piOC1 − piN = (t− a−∆)(2k − 3(t− a)−∆)
4t
This means that only if platforms can demand non-negative Nash prices on side 2,
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i.e. only if the positive network benefits that consumers on side 1 enjoy are not too
large, collusion will be profitable. Thus, in case of an asymmetric network effects
structure and collusion on side 1, Evans and Schmalensee’s (2008) hypothesis that
all supra-competitive profits will be competed away on the non-colluding market
side is true for ∆ ≥ t−a. In other words, if the asymmetry is very large and side-1
customers value the opposing market side much more than vice versa, platforms
will prefer not to collude at all. Furthermore, the gain from colluding increases
in a only if k ≤ 3
2
(t − a) − ∆ and falls in a for k > 3
2
(t − a) − ∆. Hence, the
non-monotonicity property of the collusive gain with respect to a that was found
for symmetric network effects in subsection 2.3.2.1 still holds if platforms cartelize
on side 1.
Lemma 2.6 If a1 = a + ∆ and a2 = a−∆ and platforms collude only on side 1,
some of the supra-competitive profits will be competed away by setting pOC12 < p
N
2 .
Thus, it is only profitable to collude on side 1 if ∆ < t− a.
Suppose from now on that ∆ < t− a. Turning to a platform’s incentive to deviate,
it is never optimal to fully conquer the market on the non-colluding side 2. It
might, however, be optimal to conquer market side 1 when the collusive price is
high enough. If this is the case, the defection price on side 1 will be set such that
demand stays equal to 1 and the optimal reaction on side 2 is adapted accordingly.
In consequence, it might even be the case that deviation demand on side 2 falls to
zero as collusive prices increase and the defecting platform chooses to only serve
consumers on side 1. This result, however, is driven by the fact that both sides
always have an intrinsic motivation k to join one of the platforms even in the
absence of any consumers on the opposite market side. A detailed analysis of
deviation strategies and profits is not displayed at this point, but the resulting
critical discount factor that allows for one-sided price collusion on side 1 is displayed
in appendix A.4. To exemplify its behavior with respect to both the total benefit
a and the asymmetry parameter ∆, the critical discount factor δˆOC1 is depicted in
figures 2.9 and 2.10 for k = 50 and t = 36.42
42The blue line indicates the maximum value of a for which the discount factor is still well
defined given that ∆ needs to be smaller than (t− a) for collusion on side 1 to be profitable.
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Figure 2.9: One-sided collusion on side 1 (∆ = 8)
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Figure 2.10: One-sided collusion on side 1 (∆ = 16)
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Three things are worth noticing in these figures: First, δˆOC1 increases in a. Second,
it is always equal to zero at the lowest possible value of a that still satisfies the
market coverage assumption for given values k, t and ∆ and rises up to 1 for the
maximum level of a under which this one-sided collusion is still profitable. Finally,
δˆOC1 first decreases and then increases in the asymmetry ∆. As a result, collusion
only on side 1 is easier to stabilize than two-sided collusion as long as k < 2(t− a)
while it is harder to sustain for k > 2(t − a). Hence, colluding only on ad prices
is easier for newspapers than colluding on both sides if the intrinsic motivation is
small, e.g. if readers’ valuation for the content is low.
The following proposition sums up the above sustainability analysis of one-sided
price collusion in case of asymmetric externalities:
Proposition 2.4 Suppose that a1 = a + ∆ and a2 = a − ∆ and platforms can
only collude on one of the two sides of the market. Then, ∂δˆOC1
∂a
≥ 0 and ∂δˆOC2
∂a
≥ 0.
The comparison of critical discount factors for one-sided and two-sided collusion
does not lead to clearcut results:
• δˆOC1 < δˆASE if k < 2(t− a) and δˆOC1 ≥ δˆASE if k ≥ 2(t− a)
• δˆOC2 Q δˆASE depending on parameter values of a, t and k
Ultimately, section 2.3.2 refutes Evans & Schmalensee’s hypothesis that one-sided
collusion is never optimal. Although they have been partially right in claiming that
supra-competitive profits earned on the colluding market side will be competed
away on the other, this effect is not strong enough to make one-sided cartelization
unprofitable in general. Instead, platforms might even earn higher additional profits
under one-sided collusion than they do in case of a two-sided cartel if network effects
on the colluding side are strongly negative.
Finally, one-sided collusion has different welfare implications than collusion on both
sides of the market. First, platforms extract all utility from the indifferent consumer
on the colluding market side. Hence, consumer surplus on this side decreases. Mar-
ket participants on the non-colluding side, however, might benefit from the collusive
agreement via a reduction in their membership fees because of the existing exter-
2.4. MULTI-HOMING 45
nalities. In consequence, the distributional effects of collusion differ: consumers
on the colluding side suffer whereas those on the non-colluding side might benefit
from cartelization. Overall, total welfare might therefore actually increase, as it has
been shown in a different media markets model by Dewenter, Haucap, and Wenzel
(2011).
2.4 Multi-Homing
In order to test the robustness of the above results with respect to the form of
competition between platforms, I will now allow for consumers to multi-home. Fur-
thermore, the multi-homing setup might be seen as being better suited for some
of my motivating examples since there is empirical evidence that advertisers place
their ads in several newspapers or TV channels.43
In line with the literature, I will assume that those agents that enjoy higher network
benefits can choose to multi-home, i.e. given that a1 = a + ∆ and a2 = a − ∆,
group-1 consumers are able to join both platforms.44 In this case, a platform’s
Nash profit that will serve as a punishment strategy in case of defection from the
collusive agreement results from maximizing stage game profits pii = p
i
1n
i
1 + p
i
2n
i
2
with respect to prices for each platform i and solving simultaneously. While side-2
demand is still described by equations (2.4) and (2.5), side-1 demand is equal to
equation (2.3). Thus, I obtain the following Nash prices:
pN1 =
k
2
+
a1 − a2
4
; pN2 = t−
a1
t
(a2 + p
N
1 ) (2.23)
Given these symmetric prices, full market coverage on side 2 will be guaranteed
if the indifferent consumer located at 1/2 has a non-negative utility from buying.
Hence, assumption 2.2 has to be re-adjusted:45
43Still, one has to take into account that timing plays an important rule when defining whether
one side actually multi-homes. In case of two newspapers, would this mean that advertisers need
to place their ads in both papers at the same day or would it be enough if they switch between
papers from week to week?
44Armstrong and Wright (2007) actually derive conditions on the relative sizes of transport
costs and network externalities for which one side prefers to multi-home. For details, see p. 356ff.
45Note that if a1 = a+ ∆ and a2 = a−∆, assumption 2.3 simplifies to k ≥ 32 (t− a) + ∆
2
2(t+a) .
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Assumption 2.3 k ≥ 6t2−(a21+4a1a2+a22)
4t+2(a1+a2)
From equation (2.23), one can see that Nash prices on the single-homing side 2
are identical to the ones shown in equation (2.7). Prices on the multi-homing side,
however, neither depend upon the prices set on the opposing market side, nor are
they influenced by the strength of differentiation between the two platforms, i.e.
the transport cost t. Hence, platforms behave as if they are not competing for
type-1 consumers, but instead compete indirectly by attracting side-2 consumers.
Thus, I reproduce the qualitative findings of Armstrong and Wright (2007).
Given the above Nash prices, equilibrium demand on side 1 results to be elastic and
equal to nN1 = (2k+a1 +a2)/4t, while n
N
2 = 1/2. The demand that a platform faces
on the multi-homing side in case of competition is actually rather intuitive, i.e. it
is increasing in the utility that a group-1 agent enjoys when buying from a certain
platform, namely in k and a1, while it decreases both in the price he has to pay
and the transportation costs. Hence, consumers located in the middle between the
two platforms will actually multi-home if transport cost are not too high compared
to the utility to be gained when joining the second platform. More precisely, the
number of multi-homing side-2 agents will be positive if t < k + (a1 + a2)/2. Nash
profits are given by:
piNMH =
1
2
(
t− a1(a1 + 3a2 + 2k)
4t
)
+
(
2k + a1 + a2
4t
)(
k
2
+
a1 − a2
4
)
=
4k2 + 8t2 − a21 − 6a1a2 − a22
16t
(2.24)
It is easy to show that Nash profits fall in the network benefits of the single-homing
side, i.e.
∂piNMH
∂a2
= −(3a1 + a2)/8t < 0 given that a1 > a2. Turning to the impact of
the multi-homing agents’ network benefits a1, I find that
∂piNMH
∂a1
= −(a1 + 3a2)/8t.
Thus, profits fall in a1 if network benefits are positive on both market sides. In
case that the single-homing agents do not benefit from the presence of side-1 agents,
however, the negative externality must be small enough in size for Nash profits to
fall in a1.
46 Finally, one can show that Nash profits in case of multi-homing are
46Formally speaking,
∂piNMH
∂a1
< 0 if |a2| < a1/3.
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always larger than those under two-sided single-homing given that assumptions 2.1
and 2.3 hold true, because platforms do not directly compete for multi-homing
agents.
Let me now turn to the maximum collusive profits that platforms can earn if they
collude on both sides of the market. In this case, they will set pC2 = k + a2n
C
1 −
t/2 and choose pC1 such that it maximizes joint profits on both sides given that
demand on side 1 is elastic. In fact, it turns out that platforms already extract the
monopoly price from side-1 consumers under Nash competition. Thus, prices on
the multi-homing side do not change when allowing for coordination. This result
is not surprising in so far as Armstrong and Wright (2007) have already noted that
platforms hold a monopoly power over allowing interaction with their single-homing
customers (they are so-called ”bottlenecks”).47 Summing up, collusive prices and
profits are given as follows:
pC1 =
k
2
+
a1 − a2
4
; pC2 = k −
t
2
+ a2
(2k + a1 + a2)
4t
(2.25)
piCMH =
(
2k + a1 + a2
4t
)
pC1 +
1
2
pC2 =
(2k + a1 + a2)
2 + 8kt− 4t2
16t
(2.26)
It is clear that collusive profits must be larger than Nash profits given that nothing
changes on the multi-homing side while prices on the single-homing side are in-
creased such that the indifferent consumer located at 1/2 receives a utility of zero.
Hence, platforms always have an incentive to collude. Furthermore, this incentive
is increasing in the single-homing side’s network benefits a2. For the collusive gain
to be a rising function of a1, however, it must be the case that a2 is large enough.
If network benefits on the single-homing side are actually negative and larger than
(k + a1)/2 in absolute value, the gain from colluding falls as a1 increases.
Before summarizing the above findings in a lemma, let me briefly mention that in
case of symmetric externalities a1 = a2 = a, both Nash and collusive profits are
always larger than they were in case of single-homing on both market sides (see
47In consequence, platforms would fully extract the utility of multi-homing consumers if trans-
port costs were zero.
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section 2.3). Furthermore, piNMH is falling in a while pi
C
MH increases in a. Thus,
gains from colluding are getting larger as consumers enjoy higher network benefits.
Lemma 2.7 Suppose that a1 > a2 and consumers on side 1 are allowed to multi-
home. Then, platforms always have an incentive to collude, although profits on the
multi-homing side 1 do not increase. Further,
∂(piCMH−piNMH)
∂a2
> 0, but
∂(piCMH−piNMH)
∂a1
> 0
only if a2 ≥ 0 or if a2 < 0 and |a2| < (k + a1)/2.
A couple of things are worth mentioning with respect to this lemma. First, it turns
out that in case of multi-homing, there is no difference between collusion only on one
side and collusion on both market sides, a result which is in contrast to section 2.3.
This is due to the fact that prices on the multi-homing side are already raised to the
monopoly level under Nash. Second, total welfare does not change when moving
from Nash to monopoly profits although total demand on the multi-homing side is
elastic. This is due to the fact that multi-homing consumers have to pay monopoly
prices anyway, thus their demand stays constant when moving from competition to
coordinated practices. Yet, consumers on the single-homing side suffer from paying
higher prices under collusion implying a decrease in consumer surplus.48 Finally, I
have implicitly assumed that the elastic demand on side 1 is less than one up to
now. Given that the mass of consumers on both sides is equal to one, however,
side-1 demand is bounded from above also under multi-homing:
nN1 = n
C
1 =

2k+a1+a2
4t
if pN1 > k +
a1
2
− t
1 if pN1 ≤ k + a12 − t
In accordance, Nash and collusive profits would have to be adjusted such that side-1
profits simply amount to 1pN1 for all k ≥ 2t − (a1 + a2)/2. I will not analyze this
case in more detail, however, because optimal deviation cannot induce a feedback
loop in this situation. Instead, the maximum attainable number of multi-homing
consumers would have already joined under collusive prices and there would be no
48In general, it is therefore not possible to make any statements concerning total welfare impli-
cations of coordinated pricing behavior within Armstrong’s (2006) framework.
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additional gain from defection by attracting more multi-homing consumers. There-
fore, I will from now on make the following assumption:49
Assumption 2.4 k < 2t− a1+a2
2
In order to investigate platforms’ incentives to deviate from the collusive agreement,
I will proceed similarly to section 2.3. More precisely, set a1 = a+∆ and a2 = a−∆,
such that a platform’s one-time gain from optimal defection can be analyzed as
a function of total network benefits a and an increase in the mean preserving
asymmetry ∆. Then, optimal defection prices as functions of collusive prices pC1
and pC2 are given as follows:
pD1 =

(t2−a2+∆2)(2k+a+∆)−(a+∆)(a−∆)pC1 +t(a+∆)pC2 −2atpD2
2(2t2−a2+∆2) if k < k
∗
1
k + (a+ ∆)nD2 − t if k ≥ k∗1
pD2 =

pC2 +t
2
+
(a−∆)(pC1 −pD1 )
2t
− a+∆
t
(
a−∆+pD1
2
)
if k < k∗2
pC2 − t+ (a+∆)(a−∆)t + (a−∆)t (pC1 − pD1 ) if k ≥ k∗2
with k∗1 =
(8t− a)(t2 − a2) + (4t− a)∆2
2t(t+ a) + 2(t2 − a2 + ∆2) ; k
∗
2 =
7(t2 − a2) + 3∆2
2(t+ a)
; k∗1 < k
∗
2
Note that given these deviation prices, deviation demand on the multi-homing
side becomes equal to one first, i.e. k∗1 < k
∗
2. In this case, platforms will set p
D
1
on the multi-homing side just high enough to fully extract the utility of a multi-
homing consumer located at the opposite end of the Hotelling line, i.e. pD1 =
k + (a + ∆)nD2 − t. The side-2 deviation price will also adjust since the network
benefits of the single-homing consumers do no longer increase because nD1 = 1.
50
Finally, if k ≥ k∗∗2 ≡ 7t2 − 2a− 3(a−∆)(a+∆)2t , then demand on both market sides will
be equal to one. In that case, deviation prices will be given as pD1 = k+ (a+ ∆)− t
49In case that the assumption is not fulfilled, there will be a range of parameters for which the
defector does not gain from lowering prices. Hence, it might be that δˆ = 0. The details on Nash,
collusive and deviation profits as well as the critical discount factor in case that k > 2t−(a1+a2)/2
are found in appendix A.5.
50Precisely, the deviation price on side 2 will be given as pD2 =
pC2 +t
2 − ∆ − (a−∆)(k+a+∆)2t +
(a−∆)pC1
2t if demand on side 1 is equal to one while demand on side 2 is still smaller than one.
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and pD2 = k+ (a−∆)− t− (t2− a2 + ∆2)/2t. The following profit results from the
optimal defection strategy just outlined above:
piDMH =

4k(t2−a2+∆2)(k+t+a)+8k2t(t+a)+(t2−a2+∆2)2
16t(2t2−2a2+∆2) if k < k
∗
1
2t(t2−a2+∆2)(10k+4a−15t)+4t2(2k(k+2t+2a)−(k−2∆)(k+2∆))−(t4−(a2−∆2)2)
16t(2t2−a2+∆2)
if k∗1 ≤ k < k∗∗2
2(k + a− t)− t2−a2+∆2
2t
if k∗∗2 ≤ k
In order to investigate the impact of growing network benefits on platforms’ de-
viation incentives, let me turn directly to the gain of deviation from the collusive
agreement:
piDMH − piCMH =

((2k−3(t−a))(t+a)−∆2)2
16t(2(t2−a2)+∆2) if k < k
∗
1[
(a2−∆2)(5a2−∆2+8ak+4k2)−4(a2−∆2)(2a+3k)t
16t(2t2−a2+∆2)
−2(5∆2+2k2−9a2)t2−4(2a+5k)t3+23t4
16t(2t2−a2+∆2)
]
if k∗1 ≤ k < k∗∗2
(4t−k)(k−t+a)+(t−a)(k−3t+a)−2(t2−a2+∆2)
4t
if k∗∗2 ≤ k
Given that assumptions 2.1 to 2.3 hold true, a,∆ > 0 and taking into account the
boundaries k∗1 and k
∗∗
2 , tedious but straightforward calculations show that (pi
D
MH −
piCMH) is increasing in the total network benefit a. Hence, a result identical to the
one presented in the single-homing setup of section 2.3 can be stated. Turning to
the effect of the mean preserving asymmetry ∆, however, I find that the gain from
defection actually decreases in ∆, because most of the deviation profits are to be
made on the single-homing market side.51 This second finding is best understood
when focusing on the last part of the above equation. In this case, the incentive to
deviate is purely driven by price effects as nD1 = n
D
2 = 1. Starting with collusive
prices, one can see from equation (2.25) that the collusive price on the multi-homing
side is an increasing function of ∆. In other words, the larger the difference between
network benefits that multi-homing and single-homing consumers enjoy, the higher
the additional mark-up to be earned on side 1. Collusive prices on side 2, however,
simply depend on the size of the network effect a2. Thus, the more side-2 consumers
51The derivatives are not depicted for the sake of shortness. The corresponding Mathematica
files, however, are available from the author upon request.
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enjoy the presence of the multi-homing agents, the more they are willing to pay.
In turn, this means that pC2 falls as ∆ increases. Turning to the optimal defection
strategy, it is easy to note that pD1 does neither depend on any collusive prices
nor on side-2 defection prices. Instead, it simply increases in a1 given that all
single-homing consumers join. Thus, it is an increasing function of ∆. Optimal
price defection on side 2, however, depends both on pC1 and p
C
2 as well as on the
willingness-to-pay for the network benefit. Overall, the deviation price on side 2
falls by more than pD1 increases when ∆ goes up. Thus, lower network benefits on
the single-homing side 1 make deviation less attractive even if the network benefits
that the multi-homing consumers enjoy increase by the same amount. Summing
up, I can therefore state the following lemma:
Lemma 2.8 Suppose that a1 = a+∆ and a2 = a−∆, assumptions 2.3 and 2.4 are
fulfilled and consumers on side 1 are allowed to multi-home. Then,
∂(piDMH−piCMH)
∂a
> 0
and
∂(piDMH−piCMH)
∂∆
< 0.
Wrapping up, the two countervailing effects of increasing network effects a that
were found in case of single-homing on both market sides are also present when
agents allowed to multi-home. Basically, exactly the same reasoning as outline in
section 2.3.1.1 applies. Therefore, I expect the gain from deviation to outweigh
collusive gains also in case of multi-homing. Calculating the critical discount factor
as given in equation (2.6), I get the following:
δˆMH =

(t+a)(2k−3t+3a)−∆2
(t+a)(2k−5t+5a)+3∆2 if k < k
∗
1
(a2−∆2)(4t(2a+3k)−(5a2−∆2+8ak+4k2))+2t2(2k2−9a2+5∆2)−4t3(2a+5k)+23t4
(a2−∆2)(7a2−3∆2−4k2+4t(2a+5k))+2t2(2k2−27a2+15∆2−8ak)−4(2a+9k)t3+47t4
k∗1 ≤ k < k∗∗2
a2−2∆2−2a(k−4t)−(k−3t)2
4a2−3∆2−(k−6t)(k−2t)+8at if k
∗∗
2 ≤ k
Taking first derivatives of δˆMH , one can show that the critical discount factor in-
creases in a while it falls in ∆. Hence, I can conclude that the incentive to deviate
always outweighs the incentive to collude as the total network benefit a increases.
For a given total benefit (a1 + a2), however, collusion gets easier the more asym-
metric network effects on both sides become. Figure 2.11 illustrates the behavior
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of δˆMH with respect to a for different values of ∆.
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Figure 2.11: critical discount factor in case of multi-homing on side 1
Two things are worth noticing with respect to these graphs: First, δˆMH is equal
to zero only if assumption 2.3 is binding.53 Second, the critical discount in case of
multi-homing is strictly smaller than 1/2 for all valid parameter ranges. Finally,
turning to figure 2.12, it is easy to see that two-sided collusion is always easier to
sustain under multi-homing than under two-sided single-homing - a finding which
is not surprising given that platforms already charge monopoly prices on the multi-
homing side 1 under Nash.
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Figure 2.12: critical discount factors under single- and multi-homing
I can therefore conclude this section with the following proposition:
Proposition 2.5 Suppose that a1 = a + ∆ and a2 = a − ∆, assumptions 2.3
52Note that both figure 2.11 and 2.12 are drawn for k = 40 and t = 36.
53This corresponds to the vertical green line.
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and 2.4 are fulfilled and consumers on side 1 are allowed to multi-home. Then,
∂δˆMH
∂a
≥ 0 and ∂δˆMH
∂∆
≤ 0. Moreover, δˆMH ≤ δˆASE.
2.5 Conclusion
This paper is a first step in understanding the impact of indirect network external-
ities on the sustainability of collusion in two-sided markets. It shows that collusion
is harder to sustain when network externalities between the two market sides in-
crease. This is the result of two countervailing effects. First, if one side values
members on the other market side more highly, Nash prices fall because competi-
tion for this side gets harsher. As a consequence, punishment profits are a falling
function of increasing network effects. In addition, consumers’ utility from platform
participation increases if they enjoy a larger benefit from the presence of platform
members on the opposing market side. Hence, two-sided platforms can earn larger
collusive profits as network externalities grow. Second and countervailing, however,
platforms also earn larger profits from deviation as network effects become stronger
- a result which is due to the fact that indirect network externalities induce a feed-
back loop which leads to more sensitive demand reactions in response to a price
decrease. Comparing those opposing effects, it can be shown that the latter ef-
fect always dominates in Armstrong’s (2006) model of two-sided competition. The
reason being that collusion does not change market shares of the colluding par-
ties. Instead, supra-competitive profits are the simple consequence of higher prices.
Optimal defection, however, leads to asymmetric platforms sizes on both market
sides. Thus, a platform benefits more strongly from the existence of strong network
effects under defection than it does when sticking to the collusive agreement.
In addition to this main finding, I show that collusion becomes less attractive if
network effects are asymmetric rather than symmetric given that the maximum
external benefit that a platform can possibly extract from consumers on both sides
stays constant if both consumer groups single-home. Deviation profits rise in re-
sponse to growing asymmetries in network externalities while the gain from collud-
ing stays constant. When those consumers with higher network benefits are able
to multi-home, however, this finding is reversed.
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The analysis of partial collusion only on one market side shows that Evans and
Schmalensee (2008) have at most been partially right. When firms have to collude
on the market side where consumers enjoy higher network effects, they compete
away some, but not all, of the supra-competitive profits by setting prices below
the competitive level on the other side. If, however, platforms are able to form a
cartel on the side of the market that suffers from negative externalities, they might
actually make larger additional profits than under cartelization of both market
sides. Finally, one-sided collusion might be harder or easier to sustain than collusion
on both sides of the market, depending on which side platforms collude on and how
big the overall network benefit a is. The general result that collusion becomes
harder as the total network benefit increases still holds true.
Coming back to the motivating examples, my results confirm that profitable collu-
sive behavior can take various forms. Importantly, competition authorities should
recognize that collusion only on one side can actually be more profitable and easier
to sustain than full collusion if one market side imposes negative cross-group ex-
ternalities. In addition, media markets where only one side has to pay access fees
are especially prone to collusion. Finally, evidence for multi-homing indicates that
price coordination will be easier given that platforms already charge monopoly-like
prices on one side anyway.
Although my analysis of collusion in Armstrong’s (2006) often-cited model of com-
petition between two-sided platforms provides interesting insights, it has some
caveats. Most importantly, it limits the scope of analysis by not allowing for plat-
forms to charge transaction-based prices. In addition, its focus is on homogeneous
membership externalities. Although this form of indirect network effects is well
suited to media markets, other two-sided industries might be better described by
other forms of network effects. Finally, the chosen framework has to face the gen-
eral critique addressing Hotelling specifications. In particular, it does not allow
for a normative analysis that focuses on total welfare instead of consumer surplus.
In fact, even in the multi-homing setup with elastic demand, total surplus stays
constant as the platforms already charge monopoly prices from multi-homing con-
sumers in the first place. Thus, future research should focus on generalizations
of the demand setup to provide further robustness checks for its main results and
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derive general welfare implications.
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Chapter 3
Complementary Inputs and the
Incentives for Upstream Firms to
Patent and Innovate
3.1 Introduction
Innovation and imitation go together like a horse and a carriage. It is a well stud-
ied and understood phenomenon that technological advances by one firm that push
the technological boundaries outward garner substantial interest from competitors.
According to Mansfield (1985), it took only about a year for firms to thoroughly
understand a new product or process developed by a competitor in the mid-eighties
and therefore be able to replicate it. In the meantime, the advances in information
acquisition and processing are likely to have sped up the process substantially. Un-
derstanding a process or product in combination with the protective boundaries set
out in the patent document may actually allow competitors to replicate it without
infringing the terms of the patent, so-called “inventing around” existing patents.
This has widely been seen as problematic for investment incentives: For exam-
ple, Gallini (1992) studies the incentives of competitors to invent around existing
patents depending on the duration of patent protection, implicitly assuming that
this behavior should be preempted.
57
58 CHAPTER 3. COMPLEMENTS AND INNOVATION INCENTIVES
With the recent shift from a static to a more dynamic depiction of the innova-
tion and patenting process, for example in the context of patent races or cumula-
tive innovations, economists have started to point out potential benefits of a laxer
patent policy that does not quench imitation (and inventing around patents) com-
pletely. Two studies are particularly important for us in this context: Fershtman
and Markovich (2010) study a setting with two firms involved in an R&D-race
which has different stages. The firms are asymmetric in the sense that their costs
for research differ over the various research stages. In a sense, one could consider
the research technologies to be complementary, in that one firm may be better at
early research, while the other is better at later research. They numerically un-
cover equilibria in which the innovation process is overall faster and total welfare
is increased if intermediate stages cannot be protected, even if voluntary licensing
is possible. Bessen and Maskin (2009) similarly look at innovation processes that
can be considered sequential and complementary: Firms can improve an existing
product and their innovation costs are independently drawn each period, where
they can be either high or low. Complementarity of innovation processes in this
context stems from the fact that the costs of the firms are not perfectly correlated;
therefore, each period one firm may have high and the other may have low costs of
innovation. They find that in this dynamic setting, weakening patent protection can
lead to increased total welfare: Intuitively, the originally unsuccessful firm will still
have an incentive to invest in the future because this has beneficial consequences,
which generally cannot be achieved through licensing because the licensor does not
internalize the full effects. Moreover, if past innovations make future progress more
likely, even the first innovator (the potential blocking patentee) can benefit from
abolishing patent protection.
Our central result is similar to these findings: Ironclad intellectual property right
protection can lead to lower investments and lower surplus in a dynamic setting with
investments by multiple firms. Yet, the mechanism that we consider is very different
to the ones proposed in the two papers above. We show that in a two-period,
vertical setting with complementary inputs (instead of complementary innovation
technologies, as in the previous papers) ironclad patents can lead to a complete
breakdown of upstream investment incentives due to hold-up problems. In the
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setting with the most distinct results – an ex-ante fixed bargaining order after
investments in each period – every firm benefits if first-period patents are no longer
enforced in the second period.1 While in the two papers cited above it is the
originally less lucky firm whose investment incentives wither away with ironclad
patents, in our case it is the upstream firm whose de facto bargaining position is
weaker, despite the fact that in our setting it is always the investing firms that make
take-it-or-leave-it offers, i.e. have full bargaining power. Letting patent protection
on earlier investments lapse (which can be interpreted as the possibility to invent
around the original patents) improves the bargaining position of the non-residual
claimant in the second period. Anticipating this, he also has an incentive to invest
earlier on.
We generate these results in the classic contract-theoretical framework of Grossman
and Hart (1986); Hart and Moore (1990), adding two (substantial) twists to the set-
ting: First, we consider two upstream suppliers who each carry out an investment
into the respective component that they produce. These two components are then
combined by the downstream firm D, who we refer to as an assembler, to form the
final product, generating the surplus v. The two components are perfect comple-
ments in the classical sense: A positive surplus can only be obtained by applying
both of them. It appears natural that the total surplus is increasing in each of the
investment levels, while one might be able to substitute investments to achieve the
same value. Take automobile technology as an example: An interesting exterior
design may make up for shortcomings with respect to fuel efficiency (arguably the
case for the Chrysler PT Cruiser) in the eyes of customers; or when considering
fuel efficiency, the same target can be reached through the newest tire-generation
or better engine-technology.
The second twist that we introduce, in the spirit of non-static innovation incentives,
is a second period in which the upstream firms again carry out investments and then
bargain with D on how the second-period surplus is to be divided. As opposed to
the first period, though, now D can choose whether to use the first-period version of
1Similarly to Bessen and Maskin (2009), some patent protection is required to ensure invest-
ment. In our case, patent protection on investments covers at least the period in which these
investments are carried out.
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the respective component or the new version for the second-period final product.2
To stay within the automobile example: During a facelift of a model (or when
introducing a new model), the manufacturer can decide for each component whether
he wants to employ the latest technology or stick with what was used in the old
model. In this context, we can also be more clear about the meaning of ironclad
patents vs. knowledge diffusion. Under ironclad patents, the brake producer has the
final say both over whether first-generation and whether second-generation brakes
are built into the new model. Under knowledge diffusion, a competitive fringe of
firms has “invented around” the patents on the first generation brakes, which gives
the downstream firm an endogenous outside option.
This second twist of endogenously arising competition for a technology leader over
time is perhaps most clearly exemplified in the pharmaceutical industry: Pharma-
ceutical companies invest to develop prescription drugs, which they aim to protect
through patents, in order to be sold via pharmacies after being prescribed by physi-
cians, if necessary. Once a patent expires, generic medication enters the market,
usually at a substantially reduced price. To continue to obtain profits, the pharma-
ceutical companies therefore continuously have to develop and improve products.
The trade-off involved in this context is that better “early” products pose a more
serious competitive threat to later inventions, which could hamper the follow-up
drug’s profitability. A first-generation drug which causes no side-effects leaves little
room for improvement along this dimension.
What our model enables us to explore is the interaction of incentives arising from (i)
the complementarity of inputs and the resulting hold-up problem, and (ii) endoge-
nously arising future competition, which clearly affects the original investment in-
centives. We believe that this setting is applicable to many different industries. The
automobile industry as discussed, but also the computer (with Intel and Microsoft
as technology leaders, and large downstream assemblers such as Dell), aerospace,
and biotechnology industries. A common feature of all these examples is the cen-
tral importance of innovation activity at the upstream level, despite the fact that
standard theory tells us that both the existence of strong downstream firms and
the development of competing new product generations degrade initial investment
2In this sense, there exist two overlapping product generations available to D in the second
period.
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incentives.3
Our central results concern the investment incentives of upstream firms in such
industries under different intellectual property right protection regimes: We show
that investment breaks down completely under ironclad patents. As opposed to
this, under imperfect patent protection with knowledge diffusion, both upstream
firms invest a strictly positive amount in both periods. Hence, all firms are better
off with weaker patent protection. Next, we consider different remedies for these
distorted incentives. With respect to the structure of the bargaining game, we re-
place the predetermined bargaining sequence with a stochastic bargaining schedule.
Stochastic bargaining alleviates the holdup-problem in the permanent IP setting
and leads to positive investment levels in each period. Incentives to invest in pe-
riod 2, however, are larger under knowledge diffusion than they are under ironclad
patents. Moreover, even period 1 incentives might be larger under knowledge dif-
fusion if the investment incentives of the residual claimant are not distorted too
much. Then, we show that partial vertical integration does not resolve the problem
of zero innovation in case of ironclad patents. Yet, in case of knowledge diffusion,
vertical integration of the downstream firm with one of its suppliers results in higher
investment levels than non-integration. Finally, we show that the only situation
leading to first-best investment levels is when both upstream suppliers merge and
first-period innovations are protected by long-lasting IP rights, a solution which
resembles the classical result of Grossman and Hart (1986).
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section shortly dis-
cusses the related literature. Section 3.3 describes our theoretical model and derives
first-best investment levels. Then, we investigate investment incentives under non-
integration when patents are ironclad as well as when they expire after period 1 (see
section 3.4). As a robustness check of our findings, we allow for different bargaining
procedures. Next, section 3.5 studies the impact of partial vertical integration as
well as horizontal upstream integration on upstream innovation incentives. Section
3.6 compares investment levels and profits under all ownership scenarios and derives
3The latter argument is known since Coase (1972) and has more recently been studied in the
context of innovation incentives by Fishman and Rob (2000) or Nahm (2004), for example. For
a comprehensive review of the first argument, namely the effects of buyer power, see e.g. Inderst
and Mazzarotto (2008).
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policy implications. Section 3.7 concludes.
3.2 Related Literature
In addition to the research described in the introduction, our paper is related to
two different strands of literature. First, it is in line with standard contract theory
in the sense of Grossman and Hart (1986); Hart and Moore (1990). In their sem-
inal article, Grossman and Hart (1986) analyze a static model with two players,
each making one relationship-specific investment and owning control over their re-
spective asset. Ex-ante, only ownership is contractible, but assets are contractible
ex-post and renegotiation is allowed. In contrast to our setup, Grossman and Hart
(1986) assume that there exists a competitive market of potential trading part-
ners at date zero, which determines the ex-ante division of the surplus. Given this
generally distortive setup, they show that player 1 should own both assets if his
ex-ante investment is much more important than firm 2’s, i.e. in case that firm 2’s
under-investment is relatively unimportant and over-investment by player 1 is less
severe than under-investment by player 1 in case of non-integration would be. In
contrast, non-integration, i.e. the situation where each agent owns his asset, will
be desirable if both investments are important because this leads to intermediate
investments undertaken by both agents. Based on these results, Hart and Moore
(1990) enrich the setup to treat an arbitrary number of agents and assets. Each
of the agents makes an investment before production and trade occur. Assuming
cooperative bargaining over the surplus realization, gains will be split according to
the Shapley value. To determine an agent’s marginal return on investment, Hart
and Moore (1990) assume that investments are complementary at the margin and
that the marginal return on investment increases both with the number of other
agents and assets in the coalition that an agent belongs to. They show that strictly
complementary assets should always be owned together – a result which is repro-
duced in our model only if IP rights are ironclad. Moreover, they demonstrate that
partial integration in a setup with 3 agents and assets might increase or decrease the
incentives to invest of the stand-alone agent depending on how the surplus depends
on individual investments. For example, agent 3 will have a greater investment
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incentive under integration of 1 and 2 if either 1 and 3 obtain limited synergy in
the absence of 2 or if 2 and 3 obtain limited synergy in absence of 1.4
Given that the above seminal articles boosted research in contract theory, we limit
our attention to those papers that focus on applications to innovation incentives
within a (vertical) industry setup. Aghion and Tirole (1994) consider a setup with
two players, one research unit and one customer, that both undertake relationship-
specific investments into one asset (the innovation). They show that the Grossman-
Hart result is still valid, i.e. there will be under-investment by both parties. More-
over, they show that the allocation of property rights is always efficient when the
research unit has ex-ante bargaining power, whereas the fact that the research
unit is cash constrained might lead to an inefficient ownership structure when the
customer has ex-ante bargaining power. Moreover, there are several papers inves-
tigating two sequential investments and showing that simple option contracts solve
the hold-up problem in these settings if renegotiation is allowed before the sec-
ond investment takes place (see No¨ldeke and Schmidt (1998), Lu¨lfesmann (2001)).
Smirnov and Wait (2004a) show that sequencing can allow some projects to proceed
that would not have been feasible with simultaneous investments. Yet, sequencing
might disadvantage some parties leading to lower investments. In consequence,
the possibility of sequencing might reduce welfare or even discourage investment of
the first-mover completely, thus preventing trade from occurring. In line with this
finding, Smirnov and Wait (2004b) show that the timing of investment can act as
an additional form of hold-up if investing parties choose a welfare-reducing time
regime. Our main result is related to these findings in the sense that investment
levels are distorted in case of overlapping product generations and bargaining after
each period.
Finally, our paper also relates to the recent industrial organization literature on
the impact of vertical integration (VI) and buyer power on upstream innovations.
Inderst and Wey (2003) investigate different mergers in an industry setup with two
innovating upstream suppliers and two downstream retailers operating in different
regional markets. Assuming that industry profits are split up between all indepen-
4Note, however, that the bargaining setup in Hart and Moore (1990) avoids any over-investment
by assumption. Thus, there will be some under-investment for any ownership structure (see their
proposition 1).
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dent suppliers and retailers according to a multilateral bargaining procedure that
results in Shapley values, they derive conditions under which up- and downstream
firms choose to merge. In case of linear cost and demand functions, upstream incen-
tives to adopt a new low-cost technology are higher if upstream firms are separated
while downstream firms merge. Thus, an increase in buyer power increases overall
welfare. In our paper, we show that a higher outside option of the downstream firm
in the second period leads to positive upstream investments in case of knowledge
diffusion. When buyer power stays constant at zero because of ironclad patents,
however, there will be no investments at all. In contrast to Inderst and Wey (2003),
who focused on upstream process innovation, Ishii (2004) allows for both upstream
and downstream innovation. In particular, he analyzes the effects of cooperative
R&D in vertically related duopolies with knowledge spillovers. He shows that tech-
nological improvement is accelerated by vertical research joint ventures. Thus, so-
cial welfare is largest if vertically related firms can coordinate their R&D decisions
and/or fully share useful knowledge. This is in line with our finding that partial
VI of the downstream firm with one of its suppliers increases investment levels un-
der knowledge diffusion as compared to those under non-integration. Buehler and
Schmutzler (2008) examine endogenous VI and cost-reducing downstream R&D
in a linear Cournot model. They find that VI has an intimidation effect, i.e. it
increases own investment and decreases competitor investment. Hence, complete
vertical separation is less likely in presence of R&D investments than in a bench-
mark without investments. This is in line with our finding that partial VI increases
innovation incentives and profits of both the remaining independent supplier and
the merged entity, given that the ”solo” supplier still has full bargaining power
when selling his investment.
Turning to the relation between buyer power and innovation incentives, the tradi-
tional view has been that increased buyer concentration reduces upstream invest-
ment incentives. Inderst and Wey, however, have qualified these findings in a series
of papers inspecting both process and product innovation (see Inderst and Wey
(2005, 2007, 2011)). In Inderst and Wey (2005), they show that powerful buyers
might induce a supplier to invest more into cost reductions because this increases
his fraction of incremental profits and at the same time reduces the attractiveness
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of a large buyer’s outside options. In a follow-up paper, Inderst and Wey (2007)
show that if a supplier faces large buyers, his bargaining position depends crucially
on how well he can deal with the loss of market share after disagreement leading
to a strong incentive to flatten his cost function or increase his capacity via in-
vestments. In fact, such an investment might lead to more output and increased
welfare. What our paper has in common with these findings is once again that
increased downstream buyer power due to knowledge diffusion in period 2 leads to
higher investment levels than an outside option of zero in case of ironclad patents,
as long as investments are carried out by two distinct upstream parties. Finally,
we would like to mention that an advantage of our approach as compared to the
IO papers mentioned above is that our general results hold true for both process
and production innovations.
3.3 The Model
Structure and Timing We consider a simple two-period game with overlapping
product generations. For a depiction of the timeline, see figure 3.1. In each
period, a single downstream firm D sells a product which is composed of two
components (or requires two inputs), each of which is produced by an upstream
firm. In period one, the two upstream firms, each of whom produces one of the
components j ∈ {1, 2}, simultaneously carry out investments i1, i2 at costs c(i). For
simplicity, we assume that the marginal costs for each type of investment in both
periods are constant and equal to c > 0. These investments can be interpreted,
e.g., as the innovative effort spent on designing the component that the supplier
produces. If the two components are combined, this results in the period one
total value (or revenues) v(i1, i2), which is twice differentiable, strictly concave and
strictly increasing in ij. On its own, each input is useless and has a value of 0.
Thus, the downstream firm requires both components and has an outside option of
0. Their period one innovations grant the suppliers full bargaining power vis-a`-vis
D: A potential interpretation is that they are able to fully protect their investments
through patenting and therefore own the property rights of their inventions in the
sense of Grossman and Hart (1986).
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Period 2
upstream firms bargaining
choose i1, i2 over V (i1, i2, I1, I2)
upstream firms
choose I1, I2
Period 0 Period 1
ownership
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is fixed
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over v(i1, i2)
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Figure 3.1: timing of the game
In the second period, the proceedings from the first period are basically repeated,
but with an important difference. The upstream firms again invest into a new
generation of components, simultaneously choosing investment levels I1, I2.
5 If
both new components are employed, this results in the period two total value
V (i1, i2, I1, I2), which is twice differentiable, strictly concave and strictly increasing
in each of the arguments ij, Ij. Further, we assume that a modified Inada-condition
on the limit of the first partial derivatives with respect to both inputs holds true:6
Assumption: limii,Ii→0 V
′(.) =∞ if ij > 0 or Ij > 0 with i 6= j; i, j ∈ {1, 2}
Given that the two inputs are complements, it is natural to assume that the
marginal product of the first unit of investment into component i is very large
as long as a positive level for any of the two product generations of the other input
j exists.
The fundamental difference to the previous period is that now two generations of
each component exist (if both i and I are strictly positive): To produce a product
in the second period, D can therefore choose between the new and the old input
5Throughout, we use lowercase variables for the first, and uppercase variables for the second
period.
6Note that we do not make any assumptions concerning the cross-derivatives of V (.). Coming
back to our automotive example given in the introduction, a plausible assumption would be that
∂Ii
∂Ij
< 0, ∂Ii∂ij < 0, but
∂Ii
∂ii
> 0, with i 6= j; i, j ∈ {1, 2}. Another interesting, yet very restrictive,
assumption is ∂Ii∂ij = 0. In this case, the second period investment of supplier 1 would not depend
on the prior investment of the complementary supplier 2. If this latter assumption is fulfilled, the
first-order conditions on investment incentives to be derived in sections 3.4 and 3.5 would simplify
substantially.
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of both products. One of our central interests is how intellectual property rights
affect the incentives of the firms to invest in innovation. For this, we consider two
regimes:
1. On the one hand, a setting which we refer to as technology or knowledge
diffusion: Imagine that between the periods a competitive fringe of suppliers
has managed to reproduce the period one inventions, while circumventing the
existing patents. As a result, the downstream firm can appropriate the rents
resulting from the use of the old technology. In other words, its period two
outside option is endogenously given by V (i1, i2, 0, 0).
2. On the other hand, a setting in which the patents protecting the period
one investments are ironclad, which we refer to as permanent intellectual
property (IP) rights. As a result, each firm remains the only one to offer
components of its type and the outside option of the downstream firm stays
equal to zero in period two.
In either IP-setting, after their investment, the upstream firms bargain with D
regarding the application of period one or period two technology, with the upstream
firms making “take-it-or-leave-it” offers. Finally, we solve the above described two-
stage game for subgame-perfect Nash equilibria by backward induction.
We present the model in detail as follows: First we analyze the case in which all
three firms (upstream firms 1 and 2 and the downstream firm D) are independent
entities, which we refer to as the assembler-case, because all that firm D does is buy
the two components and assemble them to a final product, without any relevant
investment decision on its part. Contract-theoretically, this setting resembles the
case of a buyer of two products that are perfect complements, whose quality depends
on the investments of their producers. This case is interesting in itself, as we
will see that first-best cannot be achieved in the (simple) sequential three party
bargaining setting which we impose, despite the fact that the investing players have
full bargaining power in the sense of take-it-or-leave-it offers. As a first important
result, we show that investment even breaks down completely under the permanent
IP rights regime, while both upstream firms invest a strictly positive amount in
both periods under technology diffusion. Next, we consider different remedies for
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(iii) horizontal upstream integration(ii) partial vertical integration(i) non-integration
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Figure 3.2: possible industry structures
the distorted incentives encountered in the assembler case. The first is with respect
to the structure of the bargaining game, replacing the predetermined bargaining
sequence with a stochastic bargaining schedule.7 In addition to the robustness of
the bargaining game, we also analyze two different ownership settings, as depicted
in figure 3.2. We show that under partial upward integration of D, which we call
the manufacturer case, investment still breaks down under permanent IP rights,
while under knowledge diffusion, investment levels increase over the ones in the
assembler case. Finally we show that first-best investment can only be achieved
under horizontal upstream integration with permanent IP rights, which resembles
the classical result of Grossman and Hart (1986). As a benchmark for our analysis,
however, let us start by stating first-best investment levels of the above described
game.
First-best investment levels A social planner maximizes total surplus with
respect to first and second period investments:
max
i1,i2,I1,I2
v(i1, i2)− c(i1)− c(i2)
+β[V (i1, i2, I1(i1, i2), I2(i1, i2))− c(I1(i1, i2))− c(I2(i1, i2))] (3.1)
First-best investments in period 2 for a given investment choice in period 1 are
therefore given by the levels IFB1 and I
FB
2 that satisfy the following first-order
7This can be seen as the more general case, for which the non-stochastic order is a subcase.
We proceed as described both for expositional simplicity and because one may think of cases in
which it is hard to find an interpretation for the stochastic setting.
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conditions, respectively:
∂V (i1, i2, I1, I2)
∂I1
= c (3.2)
∂V (i1, i2, I1, I2)
∂I2
= c (3.3)
Turning to first-period investments given IFB1 (i1, i2) and I
FB
2 (i1, i2), we can apply
the envelope theorem to obtain the following first-order conditions that implicitly
define iFB1 and i
FB
2 :
∂v(i1, i2)
∂i1
+ β
[
∂V (i1, i2, I
FB
1 (i1, i2), I
FB
2 (i1, i2))
∂i1
]
= c (3.4)
∂v(i1, i2)
∂i2
+ β
[
∂V (i1, i2, I
FB
1 (i1, i2), I
FB
2 (i1, i2))
∂i2
]
= c (3.5)
3.4 The Assembler Case
In order to investigate the setup with two suppliers and one downstream firm, we
first need to fix a non-cooperative bargaining procedure for the three players that
are involved. The upstream firms make sequential take-it-or-leave-it offers to D.
We first present the regime in which the order of offers is fixed, with firm 1 making
the first offer in each period, before generalizing to a stochastic order of offers, in
which firm i correctly perceives the probability of itself making the first offer in
period t as pti ∈ (0, 1) at the time of the investment decision.
3.4.1 Fixed Order Sequential Bargaining
Technology Diffusion We first turn to the IP-rights setting in which there is
diffusion of knowledge, so that the upstream firms do not have sole ownership of
their period 1 investments in period 2. In each period, upstream firms 1 and 2
make simultaneous investments. After this, first firm 1 makes a take-it-or-leave-it
offer to D, then firm 2 makes such an offer. When bargaining takes place in period
2, all investments i1, i2, I1, I2 are fixed. Therefore, the total period 2 revenues to be
distributed amount to V (i1, i2, I1, I2), withD able to obtain V (i1, i2, 0, 0) on its own.
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The lemma below provides the equilibrium outcome for the period 2 negotiations
(see appendix B.1 for proof).
Lemma 1: The following is the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of se-
quential bargaining in period 2 under knowledge diffusion: Firm 1 demands B1 =
V (i1, i2, Ij, 0)− V (i1, i2, 0, 0), firm 2 demands B2 = V (i1, i2, I1, I2)− V (i1, i2, Ij, 0)
with j = 1 and D accepts both offers.
There is an intuitive interpretation for this result: In the first negotiation, success
leads to the formation of a coalition of supplier 1 and D. This coalition generates
the value V (i1, i2, I1, 0) on its own, while failure of negotiations would lead to D
realizing V (i1, i2, 0, 0). Therefore the upstream firm making the take-it-or-leave-it
offer can (and does) request V (i1, i2, I1, 0) − V (i1, i2, 0, 0). Similarly, the second
negotiation with firm 2 decides whether the coalition producing the good in the
second period is composed of {D, 1}, or {D, 1, 2}. If the negotiation is successful,
the surplus V (i1, i2, I1, I2) is generated. Without 2, on the other hand, the surplus
is V (i1, i2, I1, 0). The difference between the two is the sum that 2 can request in
its take-it-or-leave-it offer.
Next, we turn to bargaining in the first period. Again, assume that after simulta-
neous investments firm 1 makes the first take-it-or-leave it offer to D, followed by
firm 2. It is worthwhile to note that investments i1, i2 are sunk at this point in time
and that V (.) depends on the investment levels in the first period, but not on the
bargaining outcome.8 The following lemma then provides the equilibrium outcome
for the period 1 negotiations (see appendix B.2 for proof):
Lemma 2: The following is the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of se-
quential bargaining in period 1 under knowledge diffusion: Firm 1 demands b1 = 0,
firm 2 demands b2 = v(i1, i2) and D accepts both offers.
We get this relatively extreme result due to the structure of the bargaining game
with the two firms demanding fixed-sum payments from D and because of the
assumption that both inputs are required to generate a positive value – in a sense,
8Subgame-perfection allows us to abstract from punishment strategies contingent on bargaining
outcomes.
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firm 2 is able to exploit this and hold-up both D and firm 1.9 Given these bargaining
outcomes, we are able to spell out the profit functions of the three firms under non-
integration and sequential bargaining:
pi1 = −c(i1) + β[V (i1, i2, I1, 0)− V (i1, i2, 0, 0)− c(I1)] (3.6)
pi2 = v(i1, i2)− c(i2) + β[V (i1, i2, I1, I2)− V (i1, i2, I1, 0)− c(I2)] (3.7)
piD = βV (i1, i2, 0, 0) (3.8)
Turning to the investment decisions, we first focus on whether an equilibrium can
arise in which no investments whatsoever are carried out. Firm 1’s period 2 invest-
ment problem immediately reveals that I1 = 0 must be chosen whenever i2 = 0,
while a positive level is chosen if ∂V (i1,i2,0,0)
∂I1
> c, which is assured by the Inada-type
assumption regarding V (.). Analogously, firm 2 invests a positive amount in the
second period whenever i1 > 0 or I1 > 0. Now consider firm 2’s investment incen-
tives in the first period, starting with the worst case, i.e., the reaction to i1 = 0,
with all incentives to invest being exerted by potential earnings in period 2: firm 2
anticipates that a positive investment level in period 1 will give firm 1 a reason to
invest in the second period, which in turn allows it to earn a positive profit then.10
Therefore, the Inada-conditions on V allow us to focus on interior solutions for
which the first-order conditions hold.
We derive upstream investments by backward induction in two steps. First, we
solve for profit maximizing investment levels in the second period given i1, i2:
∂V (i1, i2, I1, 0)
∂I1
= c (3.9)
∂V (i1, i2, I1, I2)
∂I2
= c (3.10)
Given period one investments i, it is immediately apparent that firm 2 has socially
9The following subsection which allows for stochastic bargaining orders can be seen as a natural
robustness analysis.
10The same reasoning holds for i1, in turn.
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efficient investment incentives, maximizing V in its decision.11 This is associated
with the insight from Lemma 2 that firm 2, making the last offer in the sequential
bargaining game, can be considered the residual claimant given the three-player
bargaining structure that we impose. With respect to I2, the payment that firm
1 obtains is a lump-sum payment, that does not distort the investment incentives
of firm 2. On the other hand, the investment incentives of firm 1 are distorted
downwards compared to the social optimum. Intuitively, firm 1 only internalizes
the gains to the smaller coalition including itself and D.
Given these implicitly defined optimal investment levels I∗1 (i1, i2) and I
∗
2 (i1, i2),
we turn to the profit-maximizing first period investments, given by the following
first-order conditions on i1, i2:
FOCI1: β
[
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),0)
∂i1
− ∂V (i1,i2,0,0)
∂i1
]
= c (3.11)
FOCI2:
∂v(i1,i2)
∂i2
+ β
[
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),I
∗
2 (i1,i2))
∂i2
− ∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),0)
∂i2
+
(
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),I
∗
2 (i1,i2))
∂I1
− ∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),0)
∂I1
)
∂I1
∂i2
]
= c (3.12)
It is straightforward to see that firm 1’s investment will be lower than the social
optimum. Since it does not receive any surplus in the first period, it only internalizes
the increase in the share of period 2 surplus which it can claim on its own. On the
other hand, since firm 2 can be seen as a kind of residual claimant in both periods,
its period 1 investment incentives are relatively close to the optimum. It obtains
the entire period 1 surplus, and with regard to the second period it internalizes
firm 1’s reaction to its higher investment.
Permanent IP rights Now consider the analogous setting under the perma-
nent IP rights regime. Now, each firm has sole control over the utilization of the
component that it produces, no matter which period. This simplifies the game
substantially: Lemma 2 is unchanged as the patenting regimes in the first period
are identical. Only the second period bargaining game is affected. By a parallel
11See Section 3.3 for the social optimum.
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argument to above, firm 2 will demand the entire surplus V (i1, i2, I1, I2), while firm
1 cannot achieve a positive payout with D accepting the offer. Backward induction
shows that investment incentives break down completely in this setting: Neither
firm invests a positive amount in either period.12 We consolidate these results in
the proposition below:
Proposition 1: Consider the assembler case with two upstream firms investing in
consecutive periods into components that resemble perfect complements for a final
product offered by a downstream firm. Given the assumptions on V(.), in the fixed
order sequential bargaining setting no positive investment can be achieved under
permanent intellectual property rights, while under knowledge diffusion strictly pos-
itive investments are carried out by both firms in each period, which constitutes a
Pareto-improvement.
Note that this result can easily be generalized to n upstream firms: Under know-
ledge diffusion, each firm would receive the marginal benefit it generates for the
respective coalition it joins in the second period, while first period investments (ex-
cept for the firm that is the last in the bargaining sequence) are solely motivated
by the prospect of benefiting in the second period.
3.4.2 Stochastic Order Sequential Bargaining
While in the previous section we studied a case of bargaining in which the order of
offers is fixed, we now turn to a setting in which there is uncertainty regarding the
order of bargaining at the time that investments are made. While under the fixed
order, given our assumptions, the last firm to bargain can be considered critical and
is able to hold-up both other parties, in a stochastic setting it is unclear ex-ante
12Note that this result hinges on the fact that firm 1 is the first to bargain in both periods. If
bargaining order would reverse in the second period, both firms would choose positive investment
levels in period 1. In particular, if firm 1 goes first in period 1 and firm 2 bargains first in period
2, the following investment levels will be chosen: I1 will be such that
∂V (i1,i2,I1,0)
∂I1
= c, I2 = 0, i1
satisfies β
[
∂V (i1,i2,I1,0)
∂i1
]
= c and i2 satisfies
∂v(i1,i2)
∂i2
= c. Note, however, that all investment levels
except for i1 will be unambiguously higher under knowledge diffusion than under permanent IP
even with this alternating bargaining procedure. Moreover, also i1 will be higher under knowledge
diffusion if:
∂V (i1,i2,I1,I2)
∂i1
− ∂V (i1,i2,0,I2)∂i1 +
(
∂V (i1,i2,I1,I2)
∂I2
− ∂V (i1,i2,0,I2)∂I2
)
∂I2
∂i1
> ∂V (i1,i2,I1,0)∂i1
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who will be the one to wield the most influence. One can interpret the fixed-order
case as one with a strong hierarchy among suppliers, while the stochastic approach
would apply to a more symmetric setting.
Recall that we defined the probability of firm i making the first offer in a given
period, perceived at the time of investment, i.e. ex ante, as pti ∈ (0, 1). Therefore
pt2 = 1−pt1. Further, take the offers b and B from Lemmas 1 and 2, which resemble
the offers that a firm makes when making its offer first or second, respectively.13
Again, we begin with the knowledge diffusion IP right setting. Then, the firms’
expected profits are given as follows:
pi1 = (1− p11)b2 − c(i1) + β[p21B1 + (1− p21)B2 − c(I1)] (3.13)
pi2 = (p
1
1)b2 − c(i2) + β[p21B2 + (1− p21)B1 − c(I2)] (3.14)
piD = βV (i1, i2, 0, 0) (3.15)
From these profit functions, we derive optimal investments analogously to the pre-
vious section. We obtain I∗1 and I
∗
2 as the investment levels that solve the following
first-order conditions:
p21
∂V (i1, i2, I1, 0)
∂I1
+ (1− p21)
∂V (i1, i2, I1, I2)
∂I1
= c (3.16)
p21
∂V (i1, i2, I1, I2)
∂I2
+ (1− p21)
∂V (i1, i2, 0, I2)
∂I2
= c (3.17)
Based on I∗1 (i1, i2) and I
∗
2 (i1, i2), we can derive the first-order conditions that im-
plicitly characterize i∗1 and i
∗
2:
(1− p11)∂v(i1,i2)∂i1 + β
[
p21
(
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),0)
∂i1
− ∂V (i1,i2,0,0)
∂i1
)
+(1− p21)
(
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),I
∗
2 (i1,i2))
∂i1
+
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),I
∗
2 (i1,i2))
∂I2
∂I2
∂i1
−∂V (i1,i2,0,I∗2 (i1,i2))
∂i1
− ∂V (i1,i2,0,I∗2 (i1,i2))
∂I2
∂I2
∂i1
)]
= c (3.18)
13Note that this notation is a little sloppy for the sake of short notations. It is crucial to
understand that j = 1 in lemma 1 only if firm 1 makes the first offer, while j = 2 if firm 2 makes
the first offer.
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p11
∂v(i1,i2)
∂i2
+ β
[
(1− p21)
(
∂V (i1,i2,0,I∗2 (i1,i2))
∂i2
− ∂V (i1,i2,0,0)
∂i2
)
+p21
(
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),I
∗
2 (i1,i2))
∂i2
+
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),I
∗
2 (i1,i2))
∂I1
∂I1
∂i2
−∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),0)
∂i2
− ∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),0)
∂I1
∂I1
∂i2
)]
= c (3.19)
It is straightforward to see that each of these conditions on i∗1 and i
∗
2 is a convex
combination of equations (3.11) and (3.12). The probabilities p shift the likelihood
that a firm will be the one to be able to hold up the others, which increases (or
decreases) the incentives to invest in either period.
Given the stochastic problem, it is a natural extension to consider how the levels
of p are determined in each period. Imagine that D, who is buying the two compo-
nents in order to assemble them, can act as an agenda-setter and choose the order
of bargaining in both periods. Also note that apart from being able to decline
any given offer, this is the only choice that D can actively make in this setting.
Therefore, we are able to define D’s problem as:
max
p
βV (i∗1, i
∗
2, 0, 0) (3.20)
As D’s period 2 outside option is the only source of rents to the firm, it will
attempt to maximize the value created by period 1 investments of the upstream
firms, while disregarding the effects on period 2 investments. In general, this will
induce additional distortions, so that we can straightforwardly state the following
proposition:
Proposition 2: Consider the assembler case with stochastic bargaining and know-
ledge diffusion. If D can set the bargaining agenda, second-best is not achieved
unless:
arg max
p
βV (i∗1, i
∗
2, 0, 0) = arg max
p′
v(i∗1, i
∗
2) + βV (i
∗
1, i
∗
2, I
∗
1 , I
∗
2 ) (3.21)
Next, we consider the alternative IP rights setting with permanent patents. We
derive the expected profit functions of the firms as well as the resulting first-order
conditions in appendix B.3. From these, it is immediately clear that, all else given,
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incentives for period 2 investments are higher under knowledge diffusion. The
intuition for this is that firms have efficient investment incentives if they are the
residual claimant in either setting, while their incentives are strictly higher under
knowledge diffusion in the case that the opposite firm is the residual claimant.
Both firms’ investment incentives increase when the hold-up potential via period 1
patents is diffused in the second period.
What is more surprising are the trade-offs involved between the settings regarding
period 1 investment incentives. One might have expected that strict protection
unanimously increases period 1 investments given an interior solution. In fact,
the intuition just discussed partially carries over. If the firm is not the residual
claimant in the second period (i.e., if the firm has to make the first offer), then
the fact that it can still make some profit in the knowledge diffusion case will also
increase its incentive to invest in the first period. What is now different, though,
is that investments are distorted downwards under knowledge diffusion in the case
that the firm is the residual claimant: In their first period decisions, the upstream
firms anticipate that the bargaining position of the firm moving first is affected by
their period 1 decision, which cuts into its own profits. We can derive the differences
between the first-order conditions for the two firms in case of knowledge diffusion
versus ironclad patents. Given supermodularity, i.e. if ∂
2V (.)
∂ij∂Ij
> 0 for j ∈ {1, 2},
both period 1 and period 2 investment incentives are stronger under knowledge
diffusion if the following conditions are fulfilled:
∆FOC1: p
2
1
(
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),0)
∂i1
− ∂V (i1,i2,0,0)
∂i1
)
(3.22)
−(1− p21)
(
∂V (i1,i2,0,I∗2 (i1,i2))
∂i1
+
∂V (i1,i2,0,I∗2 (i1,i2))
∂I2
∂I2
∂i1
)
> 0
∆FOC2: (1− p21)
(
∂V (i1,i2,0,I∗2 (i1,i2))
∂i2
− ∂V (i1,i2,0,0)
∂i2
)
(3.23)
−(p21)
(
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),0)
∂i2
+
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),0)
∂I1
∂I1
∂i2
)
> 0
We can therefore summarize the above findings in the following proposition:
Proposition 3: Consider the assembler case with stochastic bargaining. Positive
investment levels will be achieved under both IP rights regimes. Given the assump-
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tions on V(.) and assuming supermodularity of first and second period investments,
investment incentives will be higher under knowledge diffusion than under perma-
nent IP rights if conditions (3.22) and (3.23) are fulfilled.
Finally, it is important to point out the source of profits for the downstream firm
as an assembler. It can only achieve a positive rent under the knowledge diffusion
setting, as only then its period 2 outside option is greater than zero. The thought
experiment that leads to Proposition 2 clearly demonstrates the incentives of the
otherwise passive assembler: He tries to push for a large amount of early innovation
in order to profit from it later on. Our results would also predict an inclination
of assemblers to try to undermine the intellectual property rights of suppliers to
induce knowledge diffusion. Coming back to the automotive industry example
given in the introduction, a famous case in point would be the spread of the ESP-
technology developed by Bosch, which was accelerated by German downstream
manufacturers.14
3.5 Alternative Ownership Settings
To complete our analysis, we compare the assembler case with overlapping product
generations to two other ownership settings. This demonstrates the trade-offs in
detail and relates it to more well-known contractual settings. In particular, we
analyze the situation in which D has merged with one of the suppliers and the
situation in which the two upstream suppliers have merged horizontally.
14Note that the German automobile industry is a good example of our assembler setup given that
more than 75% of total value creation and the larger share of innovation activities is carried out by
suppliers (see Verband der Automobilindustrie (2011)). Bosch is the largest automobile supplier
worldwide based on revenues, with a particular knowledge in brake systems. In 2010, the Bosch
Group invested more than 3.8 billion euros into R&D and applied for more than 3,800 patents
worldwide (see http://www.bosch.de/start/content/language2/html/867.htm). Other com-
plementary and also highly innovative upstream suppliers of German automotive manufacturers
are, for example, ZF Friedrichshafen AG (driveline and chassis technology), Mahle Group (engine
systems and filtration) and Continental (tires, interior and safety).
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3.5.1 Vertical Integration: The Manufacturer Case
First, we analyze the case in which D merges with one of the upstream firms,
calling the remaining upstream entity ”firm 1”. In this case, we are in a more
standard two-player bargaining setting. As before, we assume that the upstream
firm, as the owner of a critical patent, has full bargaining power in the sense that it
makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer. Note that proposition 1 carries over immediately,
i.e. the merged entity will have no incentive to invest under permanent IP rights.
Therefore, we only study the knowledge diffusion case.
First, consider the period 2 bargaining stage where all investment levels are fixed.
Given that the vertically integrated firm can realize profit V (i1, iD, 0, ID) on its own,
the stand-alone upstream firm 1 will make a take-it-or-leave-it offer demanding
B1 = V (i1, iD, I1, ID) − V (i1, iD, 0, ID) and D accepts. In period 1, firm 1 will
make D indifferent between accepting and declining its offer in the first period
by demanding the entire period 1 surplus through b1 = v(i1, iD) and D accepts.
Therefore we obtain the following profit functions for the two firms:
pi1 = v(i1, iD)− c(i1) + β[V (i1, iD, I1, ID)− V (i1, iD, 0, ID)− c(I1)] (3.24)
piD = −c(iD) + β[V (i1, iD, 0, ID)− c(ID)] (3.25)
The solution is analogous to the procedure in section 3.4. We start by solving for
profit maximizing second period innovation levels I∗1 and I
∗
D given i1 and iD:
∂V (i1, iD, I1, ID)
∂I1
= c (3.26)
∂V (i1, iD, 0, ID)
∂ID
= c (3.27)
We find that D’s second period investment incentives are identical to those of the
firm making the first offer in section 3.4.1. The upstream firm, as the residual
claimant, has identical period 2 incentives to the firm making the last offer in 3.4.1.
The period-2 distortions arising in the manufacturer case are therefore identical to
those in the fixed order sequential assembler case.
Next, we turn to the first period decisions and derive the first-order conditions that
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implicitly characterize i∗1 and i
∗
D:
FOCII1 :
∂v(i1,iD)
∂i1
+ β
[
∂V (i1,iD,I
∗
1 (i1,iD),I
∗
D(i1,iD))
∂i1
− ∂V (i1,iD,0,I∗D(i1,iD))
∂i1
+
(
∂V (i1,iD,I
∗
1 (i1,iD),I
∗
D(i1,iD))
∂ID
− ∂V (i1,iD,0,I∗D(i1,iD))
∂ID
)
∂ID
∂i1
]
= c (3.28)
FOCIID : β
[
∂V (i1,iD,0,I
∗
D(i1,iD))
∂iD
]
= c (3.29)
Again, the upstream firm has identical incentives to the assembler case. What
changes is the investment incentive of the merged firm as opposed to the separate
upstream firm: Since D now internalizes the improved outside option in the second
period completely, it has a stronger incentive to invest in the first period than in
the assembler case. A vertical merger therefore increases the investment incentives
of the upstream firm being acquired, while it does not directly affect the incentives
of the remaining firm, if this firm has full bargaining power.15
Thus, we can state the following proposition:
Proposition 4: Consider the manufacturer case with the stand-alone firm 1 hav-
ing full bargaining power. Then, permanent IP rights lead to zero investments in
both periods. Under knowledge diffusion, the vertically merged entity has higher
investment incentives than under non-integration, while investment levels of the
stand-alone firm stay constant.
3.5.2 Horizontal Upstream Integration: The Distributor
Case
Finally, we turn to the case in which both upstream firms are integrated. In this
scenario, all investment decisions are made by the single supplier U . In both peri-
ods, U makes a take-it-or-leave-it offer to D after choosing innovation levels 1 and
2. Given that the downstream firm cannot make any profit without both invest-
15Clearly, we hereby disregard potential increases in bargaining power of the merged entity,
which might be expected in reality.
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ments in period one, its outside option is zero and U will demand bU = v(i1, i2).
In the second period, however, the downstream firm has a positive outside option
V (i1, i2, 0, 0), given that patents on the old innovations have expired in case of
knowledge diffusion. Thus, U can only demand the additional surplus generated
with the second period innovations: BU = V (i1, i2, I1, I2) − V (i1, i2, 0, 0).16 Given
these bargaining outcomes, profit functions are as follows:
piU = v(i1, i2)− c(i1)− c(i2) (3.30)
+β[V (i1, i2, I1, I2)− V (i1, i2, 0, 0)− c(I1)− c(I2)]
piD = βV (i1, i2, 0, 0) (3.31)
In order to derive investment incentives of the horizontally integrated upstream
supplier, we proceed once again in two steps. It turns out that for given first period
investments i1, i2, second period investments will be efficient, that is I
∗
1 (i1, i2) and
I∗2 (i1, i2) are given by the following first-order conditions:
∂V (i1, i2, I1, I2)
∂I1
= c (3.32)
∂V (i1, i2, I1, I2)
∂I2
= c (3.33)
First period investment levels maximize upstream profits taking into account that
second period investments are ex-post efficient. Hence, we derive the following
implicit functions of i∗1 and i
∗
2:
FOCIII1 :
∂v(i1,i2)
∂i1
+ β
[
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),I
∗
2 (i1,i2))
∂i1
− ∂V (i1,i2,0,0)
∂i1
]
= c (3.34)
FOCIII2 :
∂v(i1,i2)
∂i2
+ β
[
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),I
∗
2 (i1,i2))
∂i2
− ∂V (i1,i2,0,0)
∂i2
]
= c (3.35)
It is straightforward to see that period one investment incentives are distorted. In
fact, U internalizes the improved bargaining position of D in period 2 that would
result from higher investment levels i1 and i2.
17
16Note that the assumption that V (i1, i2, I1, I2) strictly increases in each of the arguments
guarantees that U ’s profit is maximized for positive levels of both second period innovations, i.e.
V (i1, i2, I1, I2) > V (i1, i2, Ii, 0) with i ∈ {1, 2}.
17This result is in fact very close to the durable goods monopolist problem, only extended to
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Comparing the above first-order conditions with those of section 3.4.1, we find that
second period investment levels are higher than in the assembler case. Moreover,
the period-1 investment incentive of the upstream firm that was first to bargain
in the assembler case increases after a horizontal upstream merger. Turning to
the supplier that is the residual claimant under sequential bargaining in 3.4.1, its
incentives to invest will only be higher under horizontal integration if the following
holds true.
FOCIII2 -FOC
I
2:
(
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),0)
∂i2
− ∂V (i1,i2,0,0)
∂i2
)
(3.36)
−
(
∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),I
∗
2 (i1,i2))
∂I1
− ∂V (i1,i2,I∗1 (i1,i2),0)
∂I1
)
∂I1
∂i2
> 0
Finally, let us check what happens under horizontal upstream integration when
patents are ironclad. In this case, D will have an outside option of zero in both
periods, because he cannot generate any positive surplus without buying from the
integrated upstream supplier. Thus, investment incentives are not distorted by the
endogenous outside option of D. Thus, this setup implements first-best investments
as given in section 3.3.
We can therefore state the following:
Proposition 5: Consider the distributer case. Then, permanent IP rights lead
to first-best investments in both periods. Under knowledge diffusion, horizontal
upstream integration leads to first-best investment incentives in period 2. Incentives
to invest in period 1 also increase above those under non-integration if condition
(3.36) is fulfilled.
3.6 Comparison of Investment Incentives and Prof-
its
Table 3.1 summarizes our findings for the different industry structures.
two ”goods” or innovations (see Coase (1972)).
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(i) non-integration (ii) partial (iii) horizontal
(fixed-order bargaining) vertical integration upstream integration
knowledge 0 < iIj , I
I
j < i
FB
j , I
FB
j I
I
1 = I
II
D , I
I
2 = I
II
1 ; I
III
j = I
FB
j ;
diffusion iI2 = i
II
1 ; i
I
1 < i
II
D i
I
1 < i
III
1 ; i
I
2 Q iIII2
ironclad iIj , I
I
j = 0 i
II
j , I
II
j = 0 i
III
j = i
FB
j ; I
III
j = I
FB
j
IP rights with j = {1, 2} with j = {1, D} with j = {1, 2}
Table 3.1: Investment incentives
It is straightforward to see that first-best investment can only be achieved with
ironclad patents and upstream horizontal integration - a finding which is in line with
standard contract theory (Grossman and Hart (1986)). When horizontal upstream
integration is not possible, however, e.g. because of antitrust concerns, it is Pareto-
superior to have knowledge diffusion instead of permanent IP rights in our model.
While no investment will be made under ironclad IP rights in settings (i) and (ii),
knowledge diffusion leads to positive investments by both firms in each period.
Moreover, D always prefers technology diffusion as this is the only way to earn
positive profits V (i1, i2, 0, 0). Turning to the question which industry setup yields
the highest surplus for D, we find that if condition (3.36) is fulfilled, D will prefer
to have one integrated instead of two independent and complementary suppliers.
Comparing settings (i) and (ii), upstream firm 1 always chooses a higher first-
period investment under horizontal integration than under non-integration, while
firm 2 will do so only if the indirect effect that his investment i2 has on its second
period surplus via I1 is smaller than the direct effect of i2 on the surplus of its
competitor firm 1 in case (i). Finally, it is not clear if D prefers vertical integration
over the other two setups without making additional assumptions on profit sharing
within the vertically merged entity. Yet, we know that the investment incentives
of the vertically merged entity are higher than the incentives of the non-integrated
upstream firm 1 in the assembler setup. Thus, it follows right away that joint
profits of the vertically merged manufacturer are larger than the sum of profits of
D and firm 1 under non-integration.
A final interesting observation with respect to table 3.1 concerns the choice of
industry structure. If condition (3.36) holds and (FOCIII2 -FOC
II
2 )> 0, then letting
firm 1, who is first to bargain under non-integration, decide if and to whom to
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propose a merger will always lead to the highest possible investment levels both
under permanent IP rights and under knowledge diffusion.
3.7 Concluding Remarks
In this paper, we study a contract theoretic setting in which two upstream firms
make investments into components that are perfect complements to produce a final
product in two periods. As a new twist, in the second period, the final product
can be composed of one of each components from either period - that is, a new
component of one type can be substituted by the old component of the same type.
We show that this introduces distortions to the investment incentives in the spirit
of a durable goods monopolist: Suppliers anticipate that they will be competing
against their old product in the next period if patents are not ironclad. On the
other hand, it is exactly this structure that can contribute to the hold-up problem
being alleviated: If an endogenous outside option exists in the second period, then
each of the upstream firms can claim a part of the total surplus that corresponds
to the value of their contributions to the respective coalition with D. The ability
of the residual claimant to exploit the hold-up situation is thereby reduced. We
also show that this attribute translates to the more general case of stochastic-order
bargaining under certain conditions. Finally, we show how our setting with two
complementary investments in two periods relates to more “standard” cases by
studying the effects of both vertical and horizontal integration.
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Chapter 4
The Compromise Effect in Action:
Lessons from a Restaurant’s Menu
4.1 Introduction
Standard discrete choice analysis assumes that consumers behave rationally when
choosing an option from a given choice set. More precisely, they maximize their
utility of consumption by picking the option that is ranked highest given their
individual preference structure (see e.g. Luce (1959), McFadden (1973)). Hence, a
crucial assumption of rational choice theory is that consumers have a well-defined
preference structure over all possible choice alternatives. This implies that a change
in choice set composition does not lead to choice reversal between options available
in both sets.
However, many laboratory experiments, mostly in psychology and marketing re-
search, but also in experimental economics, have shown that individuals do not
necessarily behave according to standard theory when facing changes in the choice
set.1 In particular, a number of ”context effects” have been documented repeat-
edly (see e.g. Simonson (1989), Kahneman, Knetsch, and Thaler (1991), Tversky
1For a summary of recent developments in non-standard decision making, see e.g. DellaVigna
(2009), Section 4. An excellent review of the history of choice theory, refinements of the basic
model, the psychology of choice and applicable statistical methods is given by McFadden in his
Nobel lecture (McFadden (2001)).
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Figure 4.1: Attraction vs. compromise effect
and Simonson (1993) and Sheng, Parker, and Nakamoto (2005)).2 Context effects
imply that individuals’ preferences are not fixed but dependent upon the context
of choice. In other words, the utility that a decision maker assigns to an option
depends not only on its own characteristics, but is the result of considering the
properties of all options in the choice set.
One of the most well-known context effects is the so-called ”compromise effect”,
documented first by Simonson (1989). It refers to a situation where a choice al-
ternative gains market share when it moves from being an extreme option to a
compromising or middle option with respect to all relevant choice attributes. In
an example with 3 options and 2 attributes as depicted in Figure 4.1, this means
that y’s choice probability increases if an option in the vertically hatched area (e.g.
option z) enlarges the choice set {x, y}.3 As a possible explanation for the com-
promise effect, Simonson (1989) states that ”[...] choice behavior under preference
2Please note that the theory of context effects has to be distinguished from the literature on
pure ”framing effects” (see e.g. Salant and Rubinstein (2008); Salant (2011)). In all the above
mentioned studies as well as in our data (see Section 4.3), the actual composition of the choice set
varies, whereas a change in the ”framing” of a choice situation refers to a variation of the ordering
or presentation of elements in the choice set without changing the elements and their attributes
themselves.
3The compromise effect has to be distinguished from the related but not identical observation
of an attraction or asymmetric dominance effect. According to Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982),
the latter describes the observation that adding a new option which is strictly dominated by one
but not all other options already in the choice set leads to an increase in the choice probability
of the dominating option. In Figure 4.1, this corresponds to the addition of z′ to a set consisting
of x and y, where z′ has to lie in the diagonally hatched rectangle. As y strictly dominates z′, its
choice probability increases according to the attraction effect.
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uncertainty may be easier to explain by assuming that consumers select the alter-
native supported by the best reasons”, such as the enhancement of self-esteem or
the anticipation of possible regret. As a consequence, individuals prefer an option
whose attribute levels lie in between those of the remaining choices, because it is
the easiest to justify under uncertainty about attribute importance.4
Several authors proved the robustness of Simonson’s observation by enrichment of
the basic experimental setup. Variations in the experimental design included the
complexity of the choice set, the familiarity with the product or the influence of time
pressure (Lehmann and Pan (1994), Kivetz, Netzer, and Srinivasan (2004a), Sheng,
Parker, and Nakamoto (2005), Dhar, Nowlis, and Sherman (2000)). However, all
evidence so far has been obtained from laboratory experiments. The question
whether compromise effects manifest in purchase decisions in the field is more
difficult to answer and has so far not been investigated.5
This article contributes to the existing literature by being the first to provide ”real
world” evidence for the existence of a compromise effect. To this end, we construct a
completely new and unique data set from raw data provided by a German specialties
restaurant. Overall, we observe more than 88,000 individual choices of main courses
from 21 different menus offered over a period of more than 7 years. In these menus,
main dishes are grouped into 6 categories such as fish, steaks or vegetarian food, and
are listed within each category in an ascending-price order. Hence, we can easily
classify choice options as being on the extreme end or serving as a compromise
along a price-quality trade-off line.6 Variation in price, position and number of
4de Clippel and Eliaz (2010) propose a nice formalization of the reason-based choice argument
made by Simonson (1989). According to their model, a decision maker has several ”inner selves”
that represent the different attributes of the available options. These conflicting inner selves will
reach a compromising choice as the unique solution of a standard bargaining process.
5There are, however, two studies checking the existence of an attraction effect in field decisions
(see Doyle, O’Connor, Reynolds, and Bottomley (1999) and Josiam and Hobson (1995)). Both
studies find mixed evidence. In consequence, they argue that for the attraction effect to work
in reality, the seller has to signal convincingly that one option is definitely inferior to another -
a requirement that might be hard to fulfill in more complex and uncertain choice situations in
natural, non-laboratory, environments. Furthermore, there exists a large literature on extremeness
aversion in survey design, i.e. with respect to the use of Likert scales (see e.g. O’Muircheartaigh,
Krosnick, and Helic (2000)).
6In line with many experimental studies (e.g. Simonson, Nowlis, and Lemon (1993), Dhar,
Nowlis, and Sherman (2000), Lehmann and Pan (1994)), we claim that a product’s characteristics
can be subsumed under the notion of overall quality and price. According to Green and Srinivasan
(1978) and others, customers often face market choices with a trade-off between price and several
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items within these 6 different dish category choice sets from one menu to another
allows us to investigate the effects of several ”pure” cases of choice set expansion
as well as to estimate various discrete choice models.
Our findings indicate that the compromise effect prevails both in descriptive and
regression analyses. It is more pronounced when an alternative switches from being
the most expensive item (instead of being the lowest-price item) in the choice set
to being a compromise option. Moreover, our results indicate that controlling for
confounding factors such as the background context of individual decision makers
is important, as it can change the size of the compromise effect, without however
changing its sign or statistical significance.
Our results are relevant in at least two respects. First, they are of interest to the-
oretical researchers, who aim at building empirically accurate models for economic
choice behavior. Second, they are important to practitioners and marketers, who
may exploit the compromise effect to construct choice sets strategically, such that
the attractiveness and purchase likelihood of designated (high-margin) options is
maximized. Our empirical investigation of compromise effects in real purchases
thus has significant implications for the positioning and branding of products, as
well as for competitive strategies in general.7
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 formally defines
the concept of a compromise effect and reviews the most important theoretical
explanations for this phenomenon. Section 4.3 shortly presents the new data set
we constructed, while Section 4.4 describes our empirical strategy. Our results are
discussed in Section 4.5 and Section 4.6 concludes with implications and limitations
of this study.
quality related dimensions that are highly correlated. Customers are then likely to simplify such
choices by making their decision on the basis of price versus overall product quality. While the
attribute ”price” is well-defined in our data set, we claim that the quality dimension of a main
dish is highly correlated with its price. Accordingly, a dish with a lower price must be of lower
quality than another one exhibiting a higher price. This seems to be reasonable as price setting,
according to the owner of the restaurant, is based on a cost-plus-markup method. Hence, more
expensive ingredients as well as more sophisticated preparation - both being indicators of higher
quality - determine higher prices.
7For anecdotal evidence that this type of choice behavior is already exploited by some compa-
nies, see the advertisements posted in Kivetz, Netzer, and Srinivasan (2004a), p. 239.
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4.2 Theoretical Framework
This section first defines the notion of a compromise effect within the standard
choice framework and derives implications that are testable using aggregate data.
Then, it shortly summarizes the theoretical literature on compromise effects.
According to most standard (probabilistic) choice models (see e.g. Luce (1977), Mc-
Fadden (1973)), a rational decision maker bases his choice on utility maximization
over a finite choice set containing all available options. In consequence, observable
choices should be congruent with certain axioms of rational choice. Let us define
T = {x, y, z...} as the finite set of all options and let C be a choice function asso-
ciating with any offered set S ⊂ T , i.e any nonempty subset of T .8 Then, C(S)
includes all options in S that are chosen by the decision maker. Utility maximiza-
tion implies that there exists a function v assigning a real value to each x in T such
that x ∈ C(S) if and only if v(x) ≥ v(y) for all y ∈ S. This implies that the order-
ing of options will be independent of the choice set, i.e. if x ∈ C(S) and x ∈ R ⊂ S
then x ∈ C(R). In other words, a non-preferred option cannot become preferred
when new options are added to the choice set, a property that is commonly known
as ”independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA)” (Luce (1959)).
It is important to note that the axioms of rational choice, such as the above de-
scribed IIA, cannot always be tested when only aggregate choice measures such
as market shares are available. There are, however, two conditions applicable to
aggregate data whose violation would indicate that individuals behave irrationally:
a stronger one based on absolute choice probabilities and a weaker one based on
relative probabilities. The first one is the so-called ”regularity condition” (see e.g.
Luce (1959), Huber, Payne, and Puto (1982)). Let P (x;S) be the proportion of
people for whom x ∈ C(S) and assume that ties between values of different choice
options are excluded.9 Then, the regularity condition is fulfilled if x ∈ R ⊂ S
implies that P (x,R) ≥ P (x, S). Hence, the market share of an option does not
increase after an expansion of the choice set. This can easily be verified using ag-
gregate data. The second and much weaker condition in terms of irrational behavior
is based on relative choice probabilities. It was derived by Tversky and Simonson
8This and the following notation is borrowed from Tversky and Simonson (1993).
9For the ease of notation, we will write P (x; y) for P (x; {x, y}) and P (x; y, z) for P (x, {x, y, z}).
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(1993) under some additional structural assumptions and is commonly known as
”betweenness inequality”.10 Assuming that a choice option is described by a vector
of distinct attributes such as price and quality and that preferences are monotonic
and separable in attributes, they define an option y to lie between x and z if and
only if for every attribute i it holds that xi ≤ yi ≤ zi or xi ≥ yi ≥ zi. Then, utility
maximization implies that the middle option y becomes less popular relative to x
if an additional option z is introduced. Formally, Tversky and Simonson (1993)
define the market share of y relative to x as
Pz(y;x) =
P (y;x, z)
P (y;x, z) + P (x; y, z)
(4.1)
Hence, if xi ≤ yi ≤ zi or xi ≥ yi ≥ zi for all i, then utility maximization11 implies
that P (y;x) ≥ Pz(y;x).
As already explained in the introduction, several experimental studies have shown
that the implications of utility maximization are often violated in actual choice
situations. Choice set expansions often lead to unpredicted choice behavior due
to the compromise effect (see e.g. Simonson (1989); Gaertner and Xu (1999)).
More precisely, the introduction of a new choice option leads to a violation of the
betweenness inequality or even the regularity condition for those alternatives in the
original choice set that become a compromising option after the set expansion. In
response to the recurrent documentation of the effect, psychologists have come up
with many reasons for compromising behavior, e.g. the avoidance of regret in case
of choice uncertainty, prevention and promotion motivations, group acceptance or
loss aversion. While most of these arguments are made informally, some studies in
marketing research and behavioral economics present theoretical models for choice
behavior leading to a violation of the IIA property.
Following his seminal paper in 1989, Itamar Simonson develops a formal model of
context-dependent preferences joint with Amos Tversky (see Simonson and Tversky
10Note that in terms of a logical test of individual rationality, betweenness inequality would be
seen as a stronger criterion than the regularity condition. It is the condition that is more easily
violated if individuals do not behave according to rational choice theory.
11In addition to the above restrictions, another assumption called ranking condition is needed
to prove betweenness inequality. According to most authors, the ranking condition is fulfilled in
most applications. See the appendix in Tversky and Simonson (1993) for more details.
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(1992); Tversky and Simonson (1993)). They propose that the context of choice
influences decision making via two different channels. First, according to the ”lo-
cal trade-off contrast hypothesis”, the addition of a new option might increase the
market share of the existing option with the highest relative advantage: If peo-
ple compare each option to all other available alternatives and make their choice
based on the aggregate relative advantage of each option, then this trade-off con-
trast behavior implies a violation of betweenness inequality. Second, Simonson and
Tversky (1992) extend the concept of loss aversion such that advantages and disad-
vantages are no longer defined with respect to a choice-neutral reference point, but
in relation to the context of choice, i.e. the available alternatives. This is what the
authors call ”extremeness aversion”. Consider once again the example of a choice
set with three options characterized by a two-dimensional attribute space as given
in Figure 4.1. If y lies in between the options x and z, it offers only small advan-
tages and disadvantages in relation to the two extreme alternatives. Options x and
z, on the other hand, exhibit large advantages on one attribute dimension, while
being highly unattractive on the other dimension when compared to one another.
In comparison with the middle option y, both extremes have a small advantage on
one dimension as well as a small disadvantage on the other. Aggregation of pair-
wise comparisons under the assumption that relative disadvantages are weighted
more highly than the corresponding advantages leads to a preference of the com-
promising middle option when all three are available. Formally, Px(y; z) > P (y; z)
and Pz(y;x) > P (y;x).
12 Hence, extremeness aversion is inconsistent with utility
maximization and the resulting betweenness inequality. Yet, it does not necessarily
violate the regularity condition.
Formalizing the above arguments, let CB(.) be the choice function associated with
local context B.13 Then, CB(S) = x means that, given B, x is chosen from choice
12Simonson and Tversky (1992) further distinguish between compromise and polarization ef-
fects. A compromise effect is given when both inequalities hold, i.e. when loss aversion is true
with respect to both attributes. In contrast, they speak of polarization when only one dimension
is prone to loss aversion and henceforth only one of the two inequalities holds true.
13In addition to the local context, Tversky and Simonson (1993) also include the background
context into their model indicating that even prior choice situations might influence a decision
maker’s actual choice from the target set. As we have no information on former individual
choice situations in our data set, we abstract from this component of the model (see Tversky and
Simonson (1993), p. 1184ff for details.)
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set S. Given this notation, an option x will be chosen if its utility as derived from
the following context dependent, additive function VB(x, S) is larger than the utility
of any other alternative in the choice set, whereby:14
VB(x, S) = v(x)︸︷︷︸
context-
free
value
+ θg(x, S)︸ ︷︷ ︸
impact of
the choice
set
with θ ≥ 0 (4.2)
Tversky and Simonson (1993) expect θ to be positive when choice is difficult or
uncertain. In order to derive the compromise effect, some further assumptions are
made. First, the binary preference order between two options x and y is additive in
all n attributes, i.e. x  y if and only if v(x) = ∑ni=1 vi(xi) > ∑ni=1 vi(yi) = v(y).
Second, the choice set S influences the value of x via pairwise comparisons of the
advantages A(x, y) and disadvantages D(x, y) of x with respect to all y ∈ S.15
Hence, the second component of equation (4.2) will be a function of the relative
advantage of x over all other options available whenever there are more than two
alternatives in the choice set. Formally, Tversky and Simonson (1993) define:
g(x, S) =

∑
y∈S
R(x, y) if s > 2
0 if s ≤ 2
(4.3)
with R(x, y) =
A(x, y)
A(x, y) +D(x, y)
where s denotes the number of alternatives in S. Given this additional structure,
14Note that this equation reduces to standard utility maximization if θ = 0.
15The advantage of x over y for a given attribute i is defined as:
Ai(x, y) =
{
vi(xi)− vi(yi) if vi(xi) ≥ vi(yi)
0 otherwise.
The overall advantage follows by adding up the attribute-wise advantages, i.e. A(x, y) =∑n
i=1Ai(x, y). The disadvantage Di(x, y) of x over y is defined as an increasing convex func-
tion δi of Ai(y, x) with δi(t) ≥ t.
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equation (4.2) can be rewritten as the following ”componential context model”:
VB(x, S) =
n∑
i=1
vi(xi) + θ
∑
y∈S
R(x, y) (4.4)
Using the latter component of the model, the authors show that an individual
who is indifferent between x and y in a binary choice set might choose the middle
option y from {x, y, z} if R(y, z) > R(x, z), that is if the relative advantage of y
over z is larger than the one of x over z. In the aggregate measure, this ”trade-off
contrast” leads to a violation of regularity. In a similar manner, one can show that
extremeness aversion leads to a preference for the compromise option even if the
context-free values of x, y and z are identical.16
Another argument explaining the existence of the compromise effect is choice un-
certainty. Wernerfelt (1995) claims that most consumers are uncertain about their
exact valuation for a certain choice option although they are able to rank their
valuation within the population of decision makers. If the available choice set re-
flects the taste distribution within this population at least to some degree, then
a consumer may use observable market data to infer his own valuation for a cer-
tain option. Accordingly, he should pick the option that consumers with his taste
rank would buy. Following such behavior can lead to a violation of regularity if
consumers that first face a small and then a larger choice set are uncertain about
the population ranking in the smaller choice set. In contrast, Sheng, Parker, and
Nakamoto (2005) hypothesize that consumers have to make a decision under un-
certainty about the performance of a product. This asks for a choice process that
accounts for the risk of disappointment. Sheng, Parker, and Nakamoto (2005) pre-
sume that decision makers pick the option that minimizes the expected loss with
respect to a certain reference point. If a consumer is uncertain about his correct
reference point, i.e. the alternative that yields the highest utility, it might be op-
timal for him to choose the compromise option. Last, an alternative approach to
explain compromise effects is presented in Bordalo (2010). He shows that if decision
makers focus only on salient attributes and these salient attributes depend on the
choice set, then compromise effects can arise.
16For the detailed derivation of these results, see Tversky and Simonson (1993), p.1186-87.
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Finally, there exists one study that compares the performance of different context-
dependent choice models including the one by Tversky and Simonson (1993) pre-
sented above. Kivetz, Netzer, and Srinivasan (2004a) present four different predic-
tive models. They all describe a constructive decision making process based on a
relative and an absolute utility component, thereby allowing for standard utility
maximization as a special case of the respective model when the context-dependent
relative component vanishes. In two empirical applications, they test which of
the four models performs best to predict the observed compromise effect in their
choice experiments. To this end, they calibrate the models to match individual-
level attribute valuations and weights, which have been elicited from questionnaires
handed out to participants before the choice experiment. Results indicate that nor-
malized single-reference point models have superior aggregate predictive validity17
and yield bigger improvements with respect to the standard utility maximization
model than the model of Tversky and Simonson (1993). In addition, these mod-
els outperform Tversky and Simonson’s (1993) model with respect to model fit as
measured by the Schwarz Bayesian information criterion. Hence, the authors con-
clude that single-reference point models are superior to the tournament-like model
proposed by Tversky and Simonson (1993), in which each option in the set serves
as a reference point for all other options. A possible drawback of all tested models,
however, is that they are of a cardinal nature and assume additivity as well as
a particular functional structure for the calculation and aggregation of individual
attribute levels (de Clippel and Eliaz (2010)).
Summing up, several authors have proposed explanations for the compromise effect
observed in laboratory experiments. Many theoretical models have been devel-
oped in which individuals behave according to a new form of constructive, context-
dependent preferences and in which at least some uncertainty is involved in the
choice process. Concerning the empirical identification of the best-fitting theory,
there is only one paper indicating that single-reference point models that account
for the local context of choice might be most appropriate to explain the compromise
effect. Yet, not all arguments outlined above have been tested against one another.
Further evidence is needed about which models provide the best explanation for
17This validity is measured by the mean absolute deviation of the observed shares in the vali-
dation sample from the predicted choice shares based on the calibration sample.
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”irrational” choice behavior observed in reality. Yet, no single model is likely to
capture reality to the fullest. Therefore, it is useful to keep all possible explana-
tions in mind when turning to the empirical analysis in the following sections as this
might help us to understand the sensitivity of results with respect to the inclusion
of different covariates. Or, as Dekel and Lipman (2010) point out: ”Intuitively,
a given model is like a particular explanation of the behavior it generates. It is
unsurprising that at least some choice behaviors may have multiple explanations.
Furthermore, multiple explanations may be useful. Different explanations will sug-
gest different intuitions, different questions to consider, different comparatives that
might be useful.”
4.3 The Data
Our final choice dataset consists of three different sources that were merged after
a thorough data cleaning process.18 In detail, we use:
1. Electronic cashier system data from 01/05/2002 until 05/29/2009
2. Pdf-files of all menus handed out during the above period
3. Official data on local weather conditions, unemployment rates, price indices
and data from the CESIfo Group Munich on the ”Ifo Business Climate Ger-
many”
The German specialties restaurant, which kindly provided us with the first two data
sets, is located in a rural area of North-Eastern Germany.19 Data source 1 includes
all the restaurant’s bills. Extractable information comprises alternative-specific
data, such as the amount and exact prices of dishes ordered as well as individual-
specific data such as the total billing amount, date and time, table number and
waiter name of each bill. From these data we use a sample of almost 90,000 customer
18For a step-by-step description of data collection and cleaning, we refer the reader to appendix
C.1.
19The exact name and location is not disclosed in agreement with the restaurant’s owner.
Aggregation of the available data could otherwise allow local competitors to take advantage of
financial figures.
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choices of main dishes made at the restaurant between January 2002 and May 2009.
The second data source provides first-hand information on which dishes and drinks
were offered to customers at which point in time. Overall, we observe 21 different
menus, offering between 24 and 30 main dishes grouped in six separate categories:
traditional, fish, venison, steaks, poultry and vegetarian. In total, 75 different
main dishes are included in our final choice set defined over all menus. Within
each category, the available dishes are ordered according to prices, starting with
the cheapest item.20 Encoding the information from these menus, we can measure
changes in the choice set that result from dish replacements across menus. As
one can see from the example pages reprinted in Figure 4.2, a large number of
modifications might arise: the total number of dishes within a category changes
due to the addition or deletion of items, dish prices increase or fall and dishes
are replaced by new items. To measure these choice set expansions, attritions
and modifications, we manually construct variables that capture which choices are
available and how the information is displayed to the customer. In particular, we
are interested in the effect of the positioning of an alternative within a certain
category on its market share. To this end, we code various dummy variables that
indicate if a dish is listed at the first, last or median position within a certain
category.21
Finally, we use official data from the State Office of Statistics as well as the CESIfo
Group Munich to control for outside factors that might influence consumers’ choice
of products. More precisely, we use detailed regional weather data (daily infor-
mation on temperature, height of precipitation and sunshine duration), as well as
macroeconomic indicators (monthly unemployment rate on rural district level and
an index measuring the business climate on national level).22
The final data set thus contains 88,113 individual choices of main dishes during the
observational period from January 5th, 2002 until May 29th, 2009.
20For detailed listings of the number of observations and available dishes per menu, see Tables
C.3 and C.4 in the appendix.
21We also constructed variables that indicate if a dish was mentioned first on a page as well as
indicators for dishes that were highlighted as being a ”specialty of the house” or ”home-made”.
None of those had a significant impact on choice, such that we abstract our further analysis from
them.
22We also included a price index to control for inflation. As results do not change significantly
with inflation-adjusted prices, we will stick to the original menu prices during the analysis.
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Example page from menu 7: 
 
 
 
 
Example page from menu 14: 
                        
Figure 4.2: Examples of menu pages
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Table 4.1 summarizes the main variables of interest as well as the most important
controls.23 The average price of a chosen main dish is EUR 10.05, with a standard
deviation of about EUR 2.60. About 38% of the chosen items are located at a
middle position within their menu category while only less than 25% are either
on the first or last position.24 The average individual choosing a main dish comes
in a group of three or four (no maindish= 3.62). The facts that more than half
of the customers find their way to the restaurant on a weekend and almost 30%
ordered while sitting at an outside table indicate that the restaurant is a day-trip
destination for tourists.
Table 4.1: Summary statistics of the main explanatory variables
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
price item 10.05 2.63 3.5 17.8
sum category 4.92 1.44 2 8
first pos 0.23 0.42 0 1
last pos 0.22 0.42 0 1
mid pos 0.38 0.49 0 1
adav median 1.16 0.85 0 3.5
no maindish 3.62 2.24 1 15
outside 0.29 0.46 0 1
business climate 96.69 7.04 82.3 108.9
evening 0.28 0.45 0 1
public holiday 0.05 0.22 0 1
weekend 0.57 0.49 0 1
N 88113
Concerning the distribution of prices and position characteristics within the dis-
tinct menu categories (see Table 4.2), we find that the average price of venison is
more than twice the price of an average vegetarian dish. Hence, price seems to be
an important covariate when investigating the positional effects. Overall, variation
across categories is substantial for all position dummies. Nevertheless, we do not
find that individuals pick first position items, i.e. the cheapest options, more often
in high price categories like venison and fish than they do in the low price segment
vegetarian.25 Finally, between 28% to 54% of the customers chose the middle posi-
23For an explanation of the variable names, see Table C.5 in the appendix. Moreover, a summary
statistic for all variables included in the data set is given in Table C.1. We have run regressions
with all covariates displayed in Table 4.1. The final specifications shown in Appendix C.3 include
only the most important control variables.
24The middle position variable (mid pos) is defined such that it equals the median whenever
there is an unequal number of items. When there is an equal number of items within a category,
the two middle items are both defined to be at the mid pos.
25Note that the frequency of choosing the first or last position also depends on the overall
number of items within a category. Furthermore, the cheapest vegetarian option is probably
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tion from a category. This is notable since there are on average around five dishes
per category. In consequence, the median and therefore compromising options have
a disproportiately high market share in all categories.
Table 4.2: Summary statistics by category
price item first pos last pos mid pos adav median
N Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
traditional 24,689 8.85 2.01 0.14 0.35 0.31 0.46 0.25 0.43 1.69 1.08
fish 13,568 11.07 1.64 0.19 0.40 0.18 0.38 0.37 0.48 0.99 0.62
venison 13,763 12.95 1.82 0.25 0.43 0.16 0.37 0.54 0.50 0.94 0.52
steak 19,402 10.75 1.58 0.23 0.42 0.19 0.39 0.44 0.50 0.94 0.68
poultry 7,436 9.51 2.34 0.32 0.47 0.26 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.71 0.56
vegetarian 9,255 6.36 2.00 0.42 0.49 0.17 0.38 0.28 0.45 1.16 0.67
Finally, note that the choice situations that we investigate originate from table-wise
restaurant bills, i.e. in most of the cases they reflect individual choices made in
the presence of a certain group.26 Thus, group effects might influence individual
choices. Due to the nature of our data set, we do not know anything about these
groups except for their approximate size as measured by the total number of main
dishes listed on a bill. Hence, we cannot distinguish a family from a group of col-
leagues or friends. Furthermore, we cannot identify who paid the bill and we do not
know if the total sum was split up between the participants or if one person paid
for all.27 Therefore, we can only speculate about the effect of the presence of other
people on the individual choices. There exist several papers in consumer behavior
and social psychology showing that individual decisions depend upon the decisions
and judgements made within a group. While most evidence indicates that group-
influence leads to convergence in choices (see e.g. Levine and Moreland (1998)), a
study by Ariely and Levav (2000) finds that sequential choice in group settings leads
to more varied choice. The authors perform a field experiment in a Chinese restau-
rant and find that group presence induces individuals to make choices that produce
higher variety at the group level than expected under randomization. Claiming
that people’s choices result from balancing different individual-alone (satisfying
one’s taste) versus individual-group goals (self-representation, minimizing regret
chosen very frequently because it is not only the cheapest option in that category, but also the
cheapest overall.
26Note that only 7.13% of all observations are from a bill that contained a single main dish, our
indicator for group size.
27Splitting up the bill is a common phenomenon in Germany, especially amongst colleagues and
friends.
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and information-gathering), they conclude that the observed group variety must
come at the expense of personal taste satisfaction. On the other hand, Simonson
and Nowlis (2000) have shown that being evaluated enhances group members’ sus-
ceptibility to the compromise effect. In consequence, authors like Kivetz, Netzer,
and Srinivasan (2004b) claim that group decision making will reinforce context ef-
fects. Hence, larger groups should increase the size of compromise effects instead
of balancing out choice behavior. In order to control for group effects in our data,
we investigate if choice patterns differ significantly for different group sizes.
4.4 Empirical Strategy
In this section, we will first state our testable hypotheses. Then, we briefly define
three different descriptive measures of the compromise effect. Finally, we outline
the discrete choice models used in our regressions.
4.4.1 Testable Hypotheses
As shown in Section 4.2, the compromise effect manifests itself if a choice set mod-
ification leads to a violation of the regularity condition. Moreover, even a violation
of the weaker condition described as betweenness inequality confirms its existence.
Hence, we test for the following correlation between choice set modification and
choice probabilities:
Hypothesis 1 If a dish moves from an extreme to an intermediate position
within a menu category, then its absolute market share increases
(violation of the regularity condition).
Hypothesis 2 If a dish moves from an extreme to an intermediate position
within a menu category, then its market share relative to the
other option(s) in the original choice set increases (violation of
the betweenness inequality).
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To test whether these conditions are violated in our data, we proceed in two steps.
First, we present changes in market shares for all pure choice set expansions avail-
able in our data. Second, we proceed by modeling individual choice behavior using
discrete choice models that allow us to test for position effects using all of the
available variation in our data.
4.4.2 Descriptive Measures
In order to test the above hypotheses, we will identify all cases of pure choice set
expansions, i.e. all situations were the introduction of a new menu increases the
number of dishes within a category by exactly one. Moreover, the added alternative
has to be on the upper or lower boundary of the price range, such that one of the
existing options moves from being an extreme to being a compromise. Besides
the addition of such an extreme choice option, no other characteristic is allowed
to change. In other words, prices and positions of all other alternatives have to
stay constant. Overall, we find nine pure cases in our data set. In three out of
these cases, a low-price option is added. Investigating each case separately, we
will compare market shares before and after the menu change. Total demand in
each case is set equal to the number of individuals having chosen a dish from the
respective category, such that the shares of all alternatives in the respective category
add up to 1.
Our first measure is the difference in unconditional absolute market shares for the
option that switches from being the extreme to being a more moderate choice:
Px(i) − P (i) (=compromise effect measure I). Here, i refers to the option that we
are investigating, whereas the subscript x indicates that the additional new option
is present in the choice set. According to Hypothesis 1, this difference should be
larger than zero, indicating a violation of regularity.
The second indicator measures the change in the market share of the option of
interest relative to the option at the opposite end of the ascending-price ordering.
It is defined as Px(i, {i, j}) − P (i, {i, j}) (=compromise effect measure II), with j
being equal to the lowest-price option in the category if a new highest-price option
is added and j being equal to the highest-price option if the new alternative enters
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the list at the low-price end. In line with Hypothesis 2, this difference should be
larger than zero, indicating a violation of the betweenness inequality.
Finally, we introduce a third relative measure to account for the fact that most
of our choice sets contain more than three alternatives.28 Instead of comparing
the market share variation relative to one other option in the original set, we now
measure the difference in the market share of the option of interest relative to the
complete original choice set before and after the set expansion. Hence, we compute
Px(i|{.})−P (i|{.}) (=compromise effect measure III) with x being the alternative
that is added to the choice set after the menu change and {.} containing all options
available in both menus. Once again, we expect the difference to be positive in line
with Hypothesis 2.
4.4.3 Regression Analysis
In order to control for other alternative-specific as well as individual-specific factors
that might have influenced the choice of our individual decision makers, we run a
conditional logit model for each of the nine pure cases.29 Let us assume that, for in-
dividual i and dish choice k, the utility Uik is additively separable in a deterministic
component Vik and a random component ik:
Uik = Vik + ik ∀ k = {1, ..., K}
In our data, we only observe the choice that yields the highest utility:
Pr(yi = k) = Pr (Uik ≥ Uil) , ∀ l 6= k ∈ K,
= Pr(il − ik ≤ Vik − Vil), ∀ l 6= k ∈ K,
28This is in sharp contrast to most of the lab experiments. In these artificial setups, the original
choice set consists only of two alternatives. Hence, changes in the relative market share can only
be measured with respect to the one other alternative that stays at the extreme end of the price-
quality trade-off line.
29See, for example, Train (2003) or Cameron and Trivedi (2009) for detailed descriptions of
the following discrete choice models. Note that the estimation of a conditional logit might seem
controversial at first sight as this model explicitly assumes that the IIA is fulfilled. However, this
assumption has to hold true only conditional on the included regressors. Hence, controlling for
compromise effects measures is vital for the IIA assumption to hold.
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where the deterministic part of this utility is explained by alternative specific re-
gressors (Xik) such as the price and case-specific regressors (Zi) such as the table
size, the weather or the overall economic situation:
Vik = X
′
ikβ + Z
′
iγk
X also contains an alternative-specific intercept that captures time-invariant, un-
explained utility similar to a fixed effect. Finally, according to the compromise
effect theory, an individual’s utility from a certain choice will be influenced by the
addition of a new ”extreme-position” dish. The introduction of this item will be
measured by a dummy indicating a change of menus. Hence, the utility specification
for each of the nine pure cases is given as follows:
Uik = β0 + β1 price item ik + γ1k menu change i + Z
′
iγk + ik (4.5)
The probability of choosing k conditional on all observables can then be written as:
pik = Pr(yi = k|Xik, β, Zi, γk) = Fk(Xik, β, Zi, γk)
and the individual likelihood contribution follows to be:
Li(yi|Xik, β, Zi, γk) =
K∏
k=1
pik
Under the assumption that, conditional on the position in the menu and other ob-
servables, independence of irrelevant alternatives holds, we can write choice prob-
abilities as:
pik =
exp(X ′ikβ + Z
′
iγk)∑m
l=1 exp(X
′
ilβ + Z
′
iγl)
Turning to the coefficients’ interpretation, note first that the alternative-specific
intercepts reflect the desirability of each alternative due to its unmeasured time-
invariant attributes. The coefficients of alternative-specific regressors, such as the
price of a dish, can be interpreted very easily. A positive coefficient means that if
the respective regressor increases for one of the choice options, then that item is
chosen more often and all other dishes together are chosen less often. Case-specific
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regressors, on the other hand, are to be interpreted as parameters of a binary logit
model against the base alternative. In our pure cases, this base alternative will
correspond to option j as described in 4.4.2. Hence, relative to the probability of
the base alternative, an increase of the regressor leads to an increase in the choice
probability of the alternative under consideration if the respective coefficient has a
positive sign. In order to give a meaning to the choice probability of the compromise
option, we calculate the marginal effect at the mean of the ”menu change” dummy.
We thus test the effect of a one-unit increase in the respective regressor on the
choice probability of an option for a fictional decision maker, while keeping all
other variables at their mean values.
As these nine pure cases correspond only to a small fraction (29.3%) of the complete
data set, we run additional regressions in order to exploit all menu changes, even
if they induce multiple and simultaneous modifications of the category-wise choice
sets. To this end, we coded several alternative-specific dummies (see Section 4.3 for
details), indicating the location of an alternative within the respective category. In
particular, we are interested in the coefficients of the following exogenous variables:
first pos, last pos, mid pos and adav median. Under the above hypotheses, all signs
except for the one of mid pos should be negative.30
We proceed with these full sample regressions in two steps: First, we estimate
conditional logits as well as mixed logits for all menu categories separately. This
allows us to find out whether or not the compromise effect is present in all distinct
menu categories. Second, we use a random draw of the complete menu including all
six categories and run both conditional logit as well as mixed logit regressions.3132
Using the entire sample, we can also control for the possibility that changing the
choice set within a certain category might lead customers to switch to a completely
30The utility specification described in equation (4.5) will thus change to be equal to
Uik = β0 + β1 price itemik + β2 position dummy ik + Z
′
iγk + ik
31Due to computational restrictions, we reduce the sample size by randomly drawing a subsam-
ple of observations. As we have 75 alternatives in the full menu sample, the simulations would
otherwise take too long. In both steps, we have to estimate the models using an unbalanced choice
set as the number of available alternatives varies across individual observations.
32In order to reduce computation time, we used the bwGRiD (http://www.bw-grid.de/) cluster
server MA/HD for our full menu sample estimations.
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different category.33
Estimating mixed logits in both steps enables us to further relax the IIA assumption
by introducing normally distributed coefficients on price and item position, i.e.
βi = β + vi (with vi ∼ N(0,Σβ)), thereby introducing an error correlation across
choices. Conditional on the unobservable random part (vi), choice probabilities are
thus given by:
pik|vi = exp(X
′
ikβ +X
′
ikvi + Z
′
iγk)∑m
l=1 exp(X
′
ilβ +X
′
ilvi + Z
′
iγl)
(4.6)
The unobserved component vi is integrated out by numerical simulation using a
sequence of Halton draws to simulate the probabilities.34
We conclude this section with a final remark concerning the possible endogeneity
of the price variable. Oftentimes, it is necessary for prices to be instrumented in
structural demand analysis. In our case, we think this is not necessary. First, we
use individual choice data rather than aggregated demand observations. Second, we
know from data inspection (see Section 4.3 and Appendix C.1) and interviews with
the owner that the restaurant mostly serves occasional walk-in customers, while
the number of regular customers, who might think that their individual demand is
able to influence the composition of menus, is very small. Therefore, we assume
that consumers take menu prices as given when choosing their dish. As far as the
restaurant’s pricing strategy is concerned, we know from several interviews with the
owner that prices of the restaurant are calculated exclusively based on a cost-plus-
markup method. Besides, over the year, the menu is changed mainly in response
to a change of the season. Seasonal changes of menu items, however, are clearly
exogenous to individual customer choice. 35
33Unfortunately, we cannot separately test for the effect of being the cheapest (or most expen-
sive) item within categories and overall, because the cheapest and most expensive items remain
in the same categories over time.
34Halton draws are a way of systematic sampling that ensures a good coverage of the underlying
distribution even with a limited number of draws.
35Unfortunately, we cannot test this assumption because we have no data on input costs for
each dish or on local competitors’ prices for similar dishes that might serve as valid instruments
for prices.
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4.5 Results
In the following, we will first present the descriptive measures as well as the regres-
sion results for the nine pure cases of choice set expansion before turning to the full
sample analysis.
4.5.1 Pure Cases
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 present the descriptive measures as defined in the previous
section. Table 4.3 shows that all cases except for case 4 provide evidence for the
existence of a compromise effect. First, the difference in absolute market shares
Px(i)−P (i) for the compromise option (printed in bold letters) is positive for eight
out of the nine cases. Due to the rather small increases (between .92 and 7.78
percentage points), however, only one of the differences is significant. Turning to
the change in market share relative to the most extreme alternative in the original
set, Px(i, {i, j}) − P (i, {i, j}), we find that all choice set expansions except for
case 4 lead to a violation of the betweenness inequality. In line with the fact
that this measure refers to the rationality condition that is more easily violated,
five of the measures are significantly positive. This result is confirmed by our
third compromise effect measure Px(i|{.}) − P (i|{.}). Overall, we conclude that
there is evidence for the compromise effect, although the changes in market shares
are quite small. Two other things are worth noticing: First, the effect is more
significant in small choice sets (cases 5, 6 and 7), a result which is consistent
with previous findings in lab experiments (see e.g. Kivetz, Netzer, and Srinivasan
(2004a)).36 Second, turning to Table 4.4, we see that the compromise effect is not
necessarily the consequence of a substitution away from the extreme option to the
now more compromising alternative. Instead, relative market shares indicate that
customers might also switch away from other options in the choice set. Therefore, it
seems useful to investigate the robustness of the effect by controlling for alternative-
36Note that these three cases all correspond to a set expansion by addition of a new highest-
price item. Thus, we cannot say if the addition of a new cheapest-price item would also lead to
more significant measures in smaller choice sets.
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specific constants as well as other case-specific control variables.37
Table 4.3: absolute market shares and descriptive compromise effect measures I
and II
case 1 case 2 case 3
position menu I menu II position menu I menu II position menu I menu II
A 12.03 A 8.68 6.47 A 11.09
B 7.65 8.58 B 37.19 33.81 B 23.71 25.50
C 22.06 15.08 C 28.51 20.14 C 38.26 26.16
D 28.83 25.73 D 7.02 6.47 D 19.69 23.01
E 15.66 15.35 E 18.60 20.14 E 18.34 14.24
F 25.80 23.24 F 12.95
N obs. 562 723 N obs. 242 139 N obs. 447 604
Pearson chi2(5) = 1.2e+03 Pr = 0.000 Pearson chi2(5) = 173.7027 Pr = 0.000 Pearson chi2(4) = 437.1481 Pr = 0.000
PA(B)− P (B) = 0.92 PF (E)− P (E) = 1.55 PA(B)− P (B) = 1.78
PA(B, {B,F})− P (B, {B,F}) = 4.08 PF (E, {A,E})− P (E, {A,E}) = 7.49 PA(B, {B,E})− P (B, {B,E}) = 7.78∗
case 4 case 5 case 6
position menu I menu II position menu I menu II position menu I menu II
A 13.38 A 26.66 24.84 A 25.00 8.54
B 20.82 16.56 B 46.26 36.87 B 55.73 25.20
C 32.39 30.57 C 27.08 28.77 C 19.27 24.39
D 30.85 28.03 D 9.52 D 41.87
E 15.94 11.46
N obs. 389 157 N obs. 4,265 5,367 N obs. 192 492
Pearson chi2(4) = 265.6338 Pr = 0.000 Pearson chi2(3) =1.4e+03 Pr = 0.000 Pearson chi2(3) = 445.5654 Pr = 0.000
PA(B)− P (B) = −4.26 PD(C)− P (C) = 1.69∗∗ PD(C)− P (C) = 5.12∗
PA(B, {B,E})− P (B, {B,E}) = −2.45 PD(C, {A,C})− P (C, {A,C}) = 3.27∗∗∗ PD(C, {A,C})− P (C, {A,C}) = 30.54∗∗∗
case 7 case 8 case 9
position menu I menu II position menu I menu II position menu I menu II
A 27.68 17.20 A 45.00 48.06 A 44.79 36.71
B 50.87 38.53 B 16.50 17.95 B 17.35 17.72
C 21.45 23.39 C 28.50 10.17 C 13.88 12.03
D 20.87 D 10.00 12.76 D 12.62 5.70
E 11.07 E 11.36 14.56
F 13.29
N obs. 289 436 N obs. 200 1,003 N obs. 317 158
Pearson chi2(3) = 226.8622 Pr = 0.000 Pearson chi2(4) = 264.3349 Pr = 0.000 Pearson chi2(5) = 249.0974 Pr = 0.000
PD(C)− P (C) = 1.94 PE(D)− P (D) = 2.76 PF (E)− P (E) = 3.20
PD(C, {A,C})− P (C, {A,C}) = 13.97∗∗∗ PE(D, {A,D})− P (D, {A,D}) = 2.80 PF (E, {A,E})− P (E, {A,E}) = 8.17∗
All market shares are given as percentages. Differences between absolute or relative market shares are in percentage points.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Significance levels refer to one-sided t-tests (H0: difference in shares < 0).
Source: Own Data, 2002-2009.
Table C.6 in the appendix shows the results of a conditional logit regression with
intercepts, but excluding further case-specific controls. The coefficients displayed
for the case-specific regressor ”menu change” refer to the coefficient of the com-
37The case-specific control variables that are included in all of the following regressions were
chosen after thorough inspection of all possible controls. In order to reduce model complexity, we
only included business climate, weekend, public holiday, evening and no maindish as these were
the ones with significant coefficients for a wide range of alternatives. All other tested control
variables (see Table C.1 for a complete list of all case-specific variables) proved insignificant for
the most part and their inclusion in the model does not affect the results.
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Table 4.4: relative market shares and descriptive compromise effect measure III
case 1 case 2
position menu I menu II position menu I menu II
P (i|{B,C,D,E, F}) PA(i|{B,C,D,E, F}) Diff P (i|{A,B,C,D,E}) PF (i|{A,B,C,D,E}) Diff
A A 0.0868 0.0744 -.0124 (0.6565)
B 0.0765 0.0975 .0210 (0.1003) B 0.3719 0.3884 .0165 (0.3801)
C 0.2206 0.1714 -.0493 (0.9842) C 0.2851 0.2314 -.0537 (0.8616)
D 0.2883 0.2925 .0042 (0.4366) D 0.0702 0.0744 .0041 (0.4430)
E 0.1566 0.1745 .0179 (0.2027) E 0.1860 0.2314 .0455 (0.1549)
F 0.2580 0.2642 .0061 (0.4047) F∑
1.0000 1.0000
∑
1.0000 1.0000
case 3 case 4
position menu I menu II position menu I menu II
P (i|{B,C,D,E}) PA(i|{B,C,D,E}) Diff P (i|{B,C,D,E}) PA(i|{B,C,D,E}) Diff
A A
B 0.2371 0.2868 .0496** (0.0394) B 0.2082 0.1912 -.0170 (0.6642)
C 0.3826 0.2942 -.0883 (0.9983) C 0.3239 0.3529 .0290 (0.2684)
D 0.1969 0.2588 .0620** (0.0108) D 0.3085 0.3235 .0150 (0.3725)
E 0.1834 0.1601 -.0233 (0.8330) E 0.1594 0.1324 -.0270 (0.7744)∑
1.0000 1.0000
∑
1.0000 1.0000
case 5 case 6
position menu I menu II position menu I menu II
P (i|{A,B,C}) PD(i|{A,B,C}) Diff P (i|{A,B,C}) PD(i|{A,B,C}) Diff
A 0.2666 0.2745 .0079 (0.1980) A 0.2500 0.1469 -.1031 (0.9977)
B 0.4626 0.4075 -.0551*** (0.0000) B 0.5573 0.4336 -.1237 (0.9961)
C 0.2708 0.3180 .0471*** (0.0000) C 0.1927 0.4196 .2269*** (0.0000)
D D∑
1.0000 1.0000
∑
1.0000 1.0000
case 7 case 8
position menu I menu II position menu I menu II
P (i|{A,B,C}) PD(i|{A,B,C}) Diff P (i|{A,B,C,D}) PE(i|{A,B,C,D}) Diff
A 0.2768 0.2174 -.0594 (0.9584) A 0.4500 0.5404 .0904** (0.0104)
B 0.5087 0.4870 -.0217 (0.7065) B 0.1650 0.2018 .0368 (0.1178)
C 0.2145 0.2957 .0811** (0.0101) C 0.2850 0.1143 -.1707 (1.0000)
D D 0.1000 0.1435 .0435* (0.0523)∑
1.0000 1.0000 E∑
1.0000 1.0000
case 9
position menu I menu II
P (i|{A,B,C,D,E}) PF (i|{A,B,C,D,E}) Diff
A 0.4479 0.4234 -.0246 (0.6855)
B 0.1735 0.2044 .0309 (0.2179)
C 0.1388 0.1387 -.0001 (0.5013)
D 0.1262 0.0657 -.0605 (0.9716)
E 0.1136 0.1679 .0543* (0.0573)
F∑
1.0000 1.0000
Diff= Px(i|{.})− P (i|{.}) with x being the alternative that is added to the choice set in menu II.
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. Significance levels refer to one-sided t-tests (H0: Diff > 0). p-values in parentheses.
Source: Own Data, 2002-2009.
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promising choice option. The same applies to the presented marginal effect at the
mean. In accordance with our hypotheses, we expect a positive sign. In line with
the descriptives, our hypotheses are mostly confirmed, although only the coefficients
for cases with small choice sets are significant. Taking case 6, for example, we see
that the menu change/choice set expansion leads to a highly significant increase in
alternative C’s market share in comparison to the market share of alternative A
by 1.31. Including case-specific controls that account for the individual purchase
background changes the size of the coefficients, but not their significance (see Ta-
ble C.7 in the appendix). Inspecting the likelihoods with and without additional
controls as well as the chi-square statistic of the likelihood ratio test for the joint
significance of coefficients (Prob > chi2), we conclude that the second specification
is preferred.
4.5.2 Complete Sample Evidence
Turning to the regression results for the full data set, we first present category-
wise estimations and then turn to the estimations over all alternatives. Tables
C.8 - C.13 show different conditional logit specifications, while Tables C.14 - C.19
present mixed logit estimations for the same variable specifications. First, we find
that the price has a significantly negative coefficient for all categories except veg-
etarian both in all conditional logit and all mixed logit specifications. A reason
for the positive price coefficient in the vegetarian category might be that it is the
cheapest category within the menu. Hence, once people have decided to go for a
vegetarian dish, they might be less price sensitive knowing that they already chose
a rather cheap option as compared to the other categories’ price levels. Turning to
the dummy variables capturing the existence of a compromise effect, we conclude
that in both multinomial models, first pos and last pos have a significantly negative
sign in most categories. This means that being an extreme option within a certain
category decreases the choice probability of the respective alternative significantly.
Being the low-price, low-quality item within a category has a positive impact on the
probability of being chosen only in category 3 (venison). A possible explanation for
this exception might once again be the overall price level of the category. As can
be seen in Table 4.2, venison is the menu category with the highest average price
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level.38 In consequence, customers might pick the lowest price alternative, because
they know that it is still a medium-price, medium-quality option with regard to the
complete menu. Another unexpected sign is found for the dummy last pos in cat-
egory 1 (traditional dishes). Unfortunately, we do not have an explanation for this
result.39 The coefficients of the dummy mid pos that indicates if a dish is located
at the median position within a category are in general positive and significant,
confirming hypothesis 1. The conditional logit estimates for category 3 as well as
the mixed logit estimates for categories 1 and 6, however, are insignificant. Finally,
the variable ”adav median” measures the absolute distance from the median posi-
tion. The coefficients in the conditional logits are significantly negative (as implied
by the compromise effect) only for category 2, 4 and 5, while they are positive but
insignificant for the remaining menu categories. Looking at the mixed logit regres-
sions, the significantly negative coefficients for the former categories are confirmed.
For the three remaining categories, the respective coefficients are insignificant both
with and without controls. Summing up, our category-wise regressions support the
evidence found in the nine pure cases. A compromise effect seems to be present in
all of the categories. Yet, we find that overall price levels also matter.
We conclude the analysis by estimating a set of full menu multinomial models. As
already said in the data section, there are 75 different alternatives that were offered
over the course of the observational period. Out of these alternatives, about a third
was listed in each of the respective menus. Hence, we use an unbalanced choice set
in the estimations. In order to keep running times for the computations tractable,
we included only alternative-specific constants and no maindish as controls. Tables
C.20 and C.21 show the results. The price coefficient is significantly negative in
all specifications. Turning to the position dummies, however, we find that the only
significant effect is found for last pos. Hence, if a dish is the highest-price, highest-
38We also tested for the influence of category-wise price levels on consumer choices using a
two-level nested logit model with prices as explanatory variable on the first-level. Category price
coefficients were not significant. This shows that the beliefs of consumers about the average price
of a respective category are fixed and not reestimated at every restaurant visit.
39Our hypothesis that the large variety in dishes subsumed under category 1 would explain this
anomaly was not confirmed in robustness checks. More precisely, category 1 includes a variety
of dishes ranging from simple and low-price soups to homemade roasts. We included respective
dummies (homemade, soup) in our regressions to control for these exceptions. In contrast to our
hypothesis, however, these dummies were neither significant nor did they have any impact on the
coefficient of last pos.
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quality option of a category, this reduces its choice probability. In contrast, being
the lowest-price, lowest-quality option as well as being at the compromising middle
position does not have a significant impact on market shares. This stands in con-
trast to experimental findings indicating that the low-quality, low-price alternative
is relatively less popular in choice sets with a price-quality trade-off, while this is
not true for the high quality, high price alternative (see e.g. Simonson and Tversky
(1992)). In consequence, our customers might be seen as more extremeness averse
in the price dimension than they are with respect to dish quality.40 In a recent
experimental study with highly different product segments, Gierl and Stiegelmayr
(2010) confirm the result by Simonson and Tversky (1992) for high price product
categories. Yet, they also show that the opposite holds true for products with low
absolute price levels. In these latter segments, the high-quality, high-price option
within the choice set looses the most after introducing a compromise option - a
result which confirms our findings. Turning to the two remaining regressors, our
regressions for the entire sample provide mixed evidence. While mid pos is sig-
nificantly positive in the conditional logit model, it is insignificant in the mixed
logit model. On the other hand, adav median has a significantly negative impact
on choice probabilities according to the mixed logit model, while its coefficient in
the conditional logit is insignificant. Turning to model fit, we see that the mixed
logit specifications have substantially higher log likelihoods than the conditional
logits. Moreover, the fact that at least some of the alternative-specific regressors of
the mixed logits have a standard deviation that is significantly different from zero
indicates that we should prefer the more flexible random parameters model to the
conditional logit.
4.6 Conclusion
In this paper, we provide evidence for the existence of a compromise effect in nat-
ural choice situations by means of a newly generated data set comprising more
than 88,000 individual choices of main courses from 21 different restaurant menus
40This implication holds true if we believe Tversky and Simonson (1993)’s explanation for the
compromise effect.
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offered over a period of more than 7 years. Two sets of results are presented: First,
we inspect all menu changes where an extreme option within a main dish category
becomes a compromising option and investigate the existence of compromise ef-
fects by means of the regularity condition and betweenness inequality. Second, we
conduct regression analyses for each sub-category of menu items, as well as for the
entire list of main dishes on the menu. To this end, we estimate conditional and
mixed logit models, where in the latter we allow for heterogeneous coefficients and
correlated unobserved heterogeneity across choices.
We find that the compromise effect prevails in both types of analysis as well as in all
sub-categories of main dishes. The effect, however, is stronger if an item moves from
being an item at the top end, rather than the bottom end, of the price spectrum
to being a compromise option. Furthermore, our results are robust to controlling
for weather effects, business cycle climate as well as the weekday or time. Yet,
controlling for confounding factors such as the background context of individual
decision makers is important, as it can change the size of the compromise effect
substantially. Besides, group size seems to matter in some specifications although
the direction of the effect is ambivalent. This paper is thus the first to provide ”real-
world” evidence for the existence of the compromise effect that may be valuable
both to economic theorists and practitioners.
The results of this paper are relevant for future research purposes, applications
and policy making. First, theoretical researchers might want to rely on them when
building models for economic choice behavior, whenever compromise effects are of
importance. Second, our results are relevant to natural settings where choice sets
are of strategic importance, such as in marketing or Internet applications. In fact,
choices from ordered lists, where consumers have to weight alternatives with respect
to several choice attributes are omnipresent. Examples are Internet shops where
alternatives are listed with respect to price or product characteristics, Likert scales
in surveys or even ballot papers where parties are ordered with respect to their
(left-to-right) political orientation. Third, for policy makers and regulators, it is
important to know to what extent firms can deceive customers by introducing very
extreme, overpriced options to make other menu items seem more attractive.
Nevertheless, the present study faces several limitations. First, our data set does not
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contain customer-specific information. Hence, although unlikely a problem in our
setting, we are not able to control for a changing customer base across menu periods.
Second, any variation on extreme and compromise options that we exploit comes
exclusively from the 21 menu changes observed in the data. Thus, the variability
in the data is rather low, which leads to numerical problems in the estimation of
sophisticated models with many parameters. Third, although the customers in
the data are price-takers, we cannot completely rule out that menus changed in
response to previous customer decisions. This could potentially introduce spurious
correlation, although it is not clear why this should influence compromise options
differently from extreme options. Finally, all our evidence is generated using data
on one specific restaurant and results may differ in different choice settings or
locations. Sheng, Parker, and Nakamoto (2005), for example, investigate the effect
of certain consumer characteristics on the compromise effect. They focus on product
familiarity and attribute-importance structure. Furthermore, they show that other
factors such as the availability and quantity of information on the product as well
as the product category itself might have an influence. Hence, the compromise
effect may not necessarily prove valid in different settings or for different agents.
Future research is needed in two respects. First, the present analysis should be
replicated in different settings, countries and sales environments to see if our results
persist among a different customer base. Second, there is a need for data analysis on
natural choice situations for which customer-specific information is available. Such
data could provide answers as to which types of customers are particularly sensi-
tive to the compromise effect and provide valuable information for practitioners,
regulators and policy makers.
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Appendix A
Appendix of Chapter 2
A.1 Partial Derivatives of piDASE
∂piDASE
∂∆
=

∆
8(t+a) if k <
7
2 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a)
−(2k−7(t−a)−∆)
16t if
7
2 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a) ≤ k < 72 (t− a) + ∆2
0 if 72 (t− a) + ∆2 ≤ k
∂piDASE
∂a
=

1
16
(
4k2−(t−a)2
(t−a)2 − ∆
2
(t+a)2
)
if k < 72 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a)
14k−t+49a−7∆
16t if
7
2 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a) ≤ k < 72 (t− a) + ∆2
3 if 72 (t− a) + ∆2 ≤ k
∂piDASE
∂t
=

1
16
(
−(4k2−(t−a)2)
(t−a)2 − ∆
2
(t+a)2
)
if k < 72 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a)
− (2k+7a−7∆)232t2 − 4732 if 72 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a) ≤ k < 72 (t− a) + ∆2
−3 if 72 (t− a) + ∆2 ≤ k
∂piDASE
∂k
=

k
2(t−a) +
1
4 if k <
7
2 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a)
2k+9t+7a−∆
8t if
7
2 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a) ≤ k < 72 (t− a) + ∆2
2 if 72 (t− a) + ∆2 ≤ k
It is easy to show that
∂piDASE
∂∆
,
∂piDASE
∂a
,
∂piDASE
∂k
≥ 0 and ∂piDASE
∂t
≤ 0 given that a, t,∆ > 0
by assumption and assumptions 2.1 and 2.2 imply that t > a as well as k ≥
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3
2
(t−a)+ ∆
2
. Furthermore, k has to lie between the thresholds defining the respective
part of the deviation profit.
A.2 Partial Derivatives of piDASE − piDSE
∂(piDASE − piDSE)
∂∆
=

∆
8(t+a) if k <
7
2 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a)
−(2k−7(t−a)−∆)
16t if
7
2 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a) ≤ k < 72 (t− a) + ∆2
0 if 72 (t− a) + ∆2 ≤ k
∂(piDASE − piDSE)
∂a
=

− ∆216(t+a)2 if k < 72 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a)
− k24(t−a)2 + 7(7a−∆+2k)16t if 72 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a) ≤ k < 72 (t− a)
7(2k−7(t−a)−∆)
16t if
7
2 (t− a) ≤ k < 72 (t− a) + ∆2
0 if 72 (t− a) + ∆2 ≤ k
∂(piDASE − piDSE)
∂t
=

− ∆216(t+a)2 if k < 72 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a)
1
32 (
8k2
(t−a)2 − (2k+7a−∆)
2
t2 − 49) if 7(t−a)2 − ∆(t−a)2(t+a) ≤ k < 7(t−a)2
1
32 (49− (2k+7a−∆)
2
t2 ) if
7
2 (t− a) ≤ k < 72 (t− a) + ∆2
0 if 72 (t− a) + ∆2 ≤ k
∂(piDASE − piDSE)
∂k
=

0 if k < 72 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a)
1
8 (7− 4kt−a + 7a−∆+2kt ) if 72 (t− a)− ∆(t−a)2(t+a) ≤ k < 72 (t− a)
2k−7(t−a)−∆
8t if
7
2 (t− a) ≤ k < 72 (t− a) + ∆2
0 if 72 (t− a) + ∆2 ≤ k
It is easy to show that
∂(piDASE−piDSE)
∂∆
≥ 0, ∂(piDASE−piDSE)
∂a
≤ 0, ∂(piDASE−piDSE)
∂k
≤ 0 and
∂(piDASE−piDSE)
∂t
Q 0 given that a, t,∆ > 0, t > a as well as k ≥ 3
2
(t − a) + ∆
2
by as-
sumption. Furthermore, k has to lie between the thresholds defining the respective
part of the difference in deviation profits.
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A.3 Critical Discount Factor for Collusion only
on Side 2
If ∆ < t+ a:
δˆOC2 =

(i) (2k−3(t−a)+∆)(t
2−a2+∆2)
5a3+∆3+∆2(2k−3t)+9∆t2+t2(2k+5t)−a2(9∆+2k+5t)+a(3∆2−5t2)
if k < 72 t− 32a− ∆2 − 4a∆tt2−a2+a∆
(ii)
(a−∆)
2(3a+ ∆ + 2k)2 − 2(7a− 3∆)(a−∆)(3a+ ∆ + 2k)t
+(7a− 3∆)2t2 + 8(3a+ ∆ + 2k)t3 − 40t4

 (a−∆)
2(3a+ ∆ + 2k)2 − 2(7a− 3∆)(a−∆)(3a+ ∆ + 2k)t
+(25a2 − 2a(13∆ + 8k) + ∆(17∆ + 16k))t2 + 8(9a−∆ + 4k)t3 − 64t4

if 72 t− 32a− ∆2 − 4a∆tt2−a2+a∆ ≤ k and[(
k < −3a
2+2a∆+∆2+7at−3∆t+4t2
2(a−∆) ∧∆ < a
)
∨
(
k < (3a+∆−4t)(t−a+∆)2(a−∆) ∧∆ ≥ a
)]
(iii) (a−∆)(3a+∆+2k)+2(−2a+2∆+k)t−7t
2
2(a+∆+2k−5t)t) if
−3a2+2a∆+∆2+7at−3∆t+4t2
2(a−∆) ≤ k ∧∆ < a
(iv) (a−∆)(3a+∆+2k)−2(5a−∆+k)t+7t
2
2(a−∆)(3a+∆+2k)−4(4a−∆+k)t+10t2 if
(3a+∆−4t)(t−a+∆)
2(a−∆) ≤ k ∧∆ ≥ a
and if ∆ ≥ t+ a:
δˆOC2 =

(i) (2k−3(t−a)+∆)(t
2−a2+∆2)
5a3+∆3+∆2(2k−3t)+9∆t2+t2(2k+5t)−a2(9∆+2k+5t)+a(3∆2−5t2)
if k < 32 (t− a)− ∆2 + 2(t
2−a2)
∆
(ii) 25a
2+9∆2+10∆(2k−3t)+6a(5∆+2k−3t)+(2k−7t)(2k+t
a2+17∆2+36∆k+4k2−46∆t+4kt−31t2+a(46∆−4k+30t)
if 32 (t− a)− ∆2 + 2(t
2−a2)
∆ ≤ k < 72 (t− a)− ∆2
(iii) (a−∆)(3a+∆+2k)−2(5a−∆+k)t+7t
2
2(a−∆)(3a+∆+2k)−4(4a−∆+k)t+10t2) if
7
2 (t− a)− ∆2 ≤ k
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A.4 Critical Discount Factor for Collusion only
on Side 1
Note that collusion on side 1 alone is only profitable if ∆ ≤ t− a. Then,
δˆOC1 =

(i)
(2k−3(t−a)−∆)(t2−a2+∆2)
(a+∆)(5a2+4a∆−∆2−2ak+2∆k)−(5a2+3∆2)t+(−5a−9∆+2k)t2+5t3
if k < 7
2
t− 3
2
a+ ∆
2
− 4a∆t
t2−a2+a∆
(ii)
(a+ ∆)
2(−3a+ ∆− 2k)2 − 2(a+ ∆)(7a+ 3∆)(3a−∆ + 2k)t
+(7a+ 3∆)2t2 + 8(3a−∆ + 2k)t3 − 40t4

 (a+ ∆)
2(−3a+ ∆− 2k)2 − 2(a+ ∆)(7a+ 3∆)(3a−∆ + 2k)t
+(25a2 + 26a∆ + 17∆2 − 16(a+ ∆)k)t2 + 8(9a+ ∆ + 4k)t3 − 64t4

if 7
2
t− 3
2
a+ ∆
2
− 4a∆t
t2−a2+a∆ ≤ k < 4t
2−3a2−2a∆+∆2+7at+3∆t
2(a+∆)
(iii)
(a+∆)(3a−∆+2k)+2(k−2(a+∆))t−7t2
2(a−∆+2k−5t)t if
4t2−3a2−2a∆+∆2+7at+3∆t
2(a+∆)
≤ k
A.5 Collusion under Multi-Homing in case that
k ≥ 2t− a
Under this assumption, all consumers on side 1 will multi-home, i.e. nA1 = n
B
1 = 1
under Nash competition and price coordination. This will simplify demand on side
2 to be equal to ni2 = 1/2 + (p
j
2 − pi2)/(2t) with i ∈ {1, 2}, i 6= j. Hence, Nash
prices and profits result from extracting all utility from the consumer located at
the opposite end of the Hotelling line on side 1, i.e. setting pi1 = k + a1n
i
2 − t, and
maximizing profits piiMH = 1p
i
1 + n
i
2p
i
2 with respect to p
i
2. Thus,
pN1 = k +
a1
2
− t ; pN2 = t− a1 ; piNMH = k −
t
2
(A.1)
Hence, Nash profits do not depend on network effects if k ≥ 2t− a, because all the
additional profits that can be earned on the multi-homing side are given away to
attract single-homing consumers on side 2.
Turning to price coordination, platforms will agree to extract all surplus from the
indifferent side-2 consumer located at 1/2, while prices on side 1 cannot increase
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any further. In detail, collusive prices and profits are given as follows:
pC1 = k +
a1
2
− t ; pC2 = k + a2 −
t
2
; piCMH =
3
2
k +
a1 + a2
2
− 5
4
t (A.2)
The collusive profit increases in both network effects a1 and a2, which is the result
of pure price effects. Demand does not change when moving from Nash to collu-
sion, but platforms are able to set higher prices on the single-homing side. The
willingness-to-pay on side 2 increases with both network benefits. Thus, platforms
can demand a higher collusive price pC2 if a1 and/or a2 increase. It is therefore
straightforward that the gain from collusion also increases in the network benefits
given that Nash profits are independent of a1, a2.
Let me now turn to optimal defection and assume once again that a1 = a+ ∆ and
a2 = a − ∆. As already pointed out in section 2.4, defection is not as attractive
if k ≥ 2t − a than it is if nN1 = nC1 < 1. This is due to the fact that deviation
cannot increase demand on side 1 any further. In consequence, lowering prices on
side-2 will not induce a positive feedback loop as it was the case in sections 2.3
and 2.4. Instead, it might even be the case that there is no profitable deviation
from collusive prices at all, namely when k < (3t2 − a2 + ∆2 − 4at)/(2t). Thus, if
this condition holds true, prices and profits are identical to the ones given in (A.2)
and the critical discount factor is equal to zero. If k ≥ (3t2 − a2 + ∆2 − 4at)/(2t),
however, optimal defection actually increases deviation profits over piCMH . In detail,
deviation prices are identical to the ones outlined in section 2.4 given that nD1 = 1
or even both deviation demands are equal to one. Thus, deviation profits are as
follows:
piDMH =

3
2
k + a− 5
4
t if k < 3t
2−a2+∆2−4at
2t
2t(t2−a2+∆2)(10k+4a−15t)+4t2(2k(k+2t+2a)−(k−2∆)(k+2∆))−(t4−(a2−∆2)2)
16t(2t2−a2+∆2)
if k∗1 ≤ k < k∗∗2 ∧ k ≥ 3t
2−a2+∆2−4at
2t
2(k + a− t)− t2−a2+∆2
2t
if k∗∗2 < k ∧ k ≥ 3t
2−a2+∆2−4at
2t
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A platform’s gain from deviation (piDMH − piCMH) is therefore given as:
piDMH − piCMH =

0 if k < 3t
2−a2+∆2−4at
2t
(a2−∆2+4at+(2k−3t)t)2
16t(2t2−a2+∆2) if k
∗
1 ≤ k < k∗∗2 ∧ k ≥ 3t
2−a2+∆2−4at
2t
2a2−2∆2+4at+2kt−5t2
4t
if k∗∗2 < k ∧ k ≥ 3t
2−a2+∆2−4at
2t
and one can easily show that it is increasing in a given assumption 2.3, k ≥ 2t− a
and the above boundaries. Moreover, (piDMH − piCMH) falls in ∆. Thus, the same
results as in section 2.4 prevail. Let me finally state the critical discount factor
above which collusion upon monopoly prices will be an equilibrium of the repeated
game:
δˆMH =

0 if k < 3t
2−a2+∆2−4at
2t
(a2−∆2+4at+(2k−3t)t)2
(a2−∆2)2−4(a−∆)(a+∆)(2a+k)t+2(11a2−3∆2+8ak+2k2)t2+4(2a+k)t3−15t4
if k∗1 ≤ k < k∗∗2 ∧ k ≥ 3t
2−a2+∆2−4at
2t
1− (2k−3t+4a)t
2(a2−∆2+4at+2(k−2t)t) if k
∗∗
2 < k ∧ k ≥ 3t
2−a2+∆2−4at
2t
Analyzing this discount factor with respect to a and ∆, I confirm the results of
section 2.4, namely that collusion becomes harder when total network benefits a
increase, while it becomes easier to sustain monopoly prices when network effects
are more asymmetric.
Appendix B
Appendix of Chapter 3
B.1 Proof of Lemma 1
Consider the bargaining situation in period 2, in which all investments i1, i2, I1, I2
are fixed. Therefore, the total period 2 revenues to be distributed amount to
V (i1, i2, I1, I2), with D able to obtain V (i1, i2, 0, 0) on its own.
Lemma 1: The following is the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of
sequential bargaining in period 2 under knowledge diffusion: Firm 1 demands B1 =
V (i1, i2, Ij, 0)− V (i1, i2, 0, 0), firm 2 demands B2 = V (i1, i2, I1, I2)− V (i1, i2, Ij, 0)
with j = 1 and D accepts both offers.
Proof: Consider firm 2’s situation given that D has accepted B1. If it demands
any B′2 > B2, then D will reject the offer. For any B
′′
2 < B2, raising the demand
to B2 increases firm 2’s payoff. D is indifferent between accepting and rejecting
B2. By the same arguments, if D has rejected B1 previously, then firm 2 demands
B−2 = V (i1, i2, 0, I2)−V (i1, i2, 0, 0), instead, and D accepts. It is helpful to note that
B2 does not depend on B1, apart from the success of the first stage of negotiation.
Now consider firm 1’s offer to D. If it offers B1, D anticipates B2 and is indifferent
between accepting and rejecting the offer. For B′1 < B1, firm 1 could increase its
profits by demanding B1. If firm 1 demands B
′′
1 > B1, then D faces the following
problem. If it accepts, then firm 2 will demand B2 and D makes overall profits
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below V (i1, i2, 0, 0) – it would be better off rejecting B1 and accepting B
−
2 , or
rejecting all offers. The equilibrium outlined in the Lemma is unique.
B.2 Proof of Lemma 2
Consider the bargaining situation in period 1, in which the investments i1, i2 are
fixed. The period 1 revenues to be distributed amount to v(i1, i2), with D able to
obtain 0 on its own.
Lemma 2: The following is the unique subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of
sequential bargaining in period 1: firm 1 demands b1 = 0, firm 2 demands b2 =
v(i1, i2) and D accepts both offers.
Proof: If D has rejected b1, then there is no surplus to be shared. Consider firm
2’s offer, given that D has accepted b1. If D rejects firm 2’s offer, its period 1
surplus is −b1. Therefore firm 2 optimally makes an offer such that D is indifferent
between accepting and rejecting, by demanding v(i1, i2). Anticipating this, the only
non-negative offer by firm 1 that D is willing to accept is 0, as it can achieve 0 on
its own by rejecting all offers.
B.3 Stochastic Order Bargaining under Perma-
nent IP Rights
Under permanent IP rights, the upstream firm who makes the second offer is the
residual claimant with the outside option of the other parties equal to 0, so that
there is a complete hold-up. With the entire surplus of the respective period being
allocated according to the shares (pt1, 1−pt1), the outcome resembles Nash bargaining
over the generated surplus between the upstream firms with the bargaining power
parameter p. We can therefore derive the expected profit functions:
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pi1 = (1− p11)v(i1, i2)− c(i1) + β[(1− p21)V (i1, i2, I1, I2)− c(I1)] (B.1)
pi2 = (p
1
1)v(i1, i2)− c(i2) + β[p21V (i1, i2, I1, I2)− c(I2)] (B.2)
piD = 0 (B.3)
This gives us the following first-order conditions for second-period investments:
(1− p21)
∂V (i1, i2, I1, I2)
∂I1
= c (B.4)
p21
∂V (i1, i2, I1, I2)
∂I2
= c (B.5)
For the first period investments, the following must hold:
(1− p11)
∂v(i1, i2)
∂i1
+ β[(1− p21)(
∂V (i1, i2, I
∗
1 (i1, i2), I
∗
2 (i1, i2))
∂i1
(B.6)
+
∂V (i1, i2, I
∗
1 (i1, i2), I
∗
2 (i1, i2))
∂I2
∂I2
∂i1
)] = c
p11
∂v(i1, i2)
∂i1
+ β[p21(
∂V (i1, i2, I
∗
1 (i1, i2), I
∗
2 (i1, i2))
∂i2
(B.7)
+
∂V (i1, i2, I
∗
1 (i1, i2), I
∗
2 (i1, i2))
∂I1
∂I1
∂i2
)] = c
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Appendix C
Appendix of Chapter 4
C.1 Generating the Data Set
Data Sources We assembled the final data from various data sources that were
merged after a thorough data cleaning process. We use:
1. Electronic cashier system data from a German restaurant from 10/24/2001
until 05/31/2009.
2. PDP-files of all menus handed out during the above period.
3. Official data on local weather conditions, unemployment rates, price indices
and data from the CESIfo Group Munich on the ”Ifo Business Climate Ger-
many”.
The first data source supplies us with text files of all bills issued during the period.
Those bills in raw format include information on the number and prices of dishes
and drinks ordered, the total billing amount, exact date and time, table number
and waiter name. The second data set, namely the original menu copies, provides
information on which dishes and drinks were offered during a specific menu period.
Moreover, the original menu files allow us to manually construct variables that
measure how the information is displayed to the customer. Third, we use supple-
mentary official data to control for outside factors that might influence consumers’
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choice of products. In particular, we merge detailed regional weather data, such as
daily information on temperature, height of precipitation and sunshine duration.1
Furthermore, we attach measures for macroeconomic conditions, such as the unem-
ployment rate on rural district level and an index measuring the business climate
on national level to the final data set.2 Last, we collect information about public
holidays and school vacations.
Sample Selection To guarantee a clean analysis and proper identification, we
drop several observations. First, we exclude all observations that were recorded
before the introduction of the EURO. This ensures that there are no structural
breaks in the data and that all changes in choice probabilities relate to changes in
menu and not currency. Second, we drop bills of waiters for whom the data contain
very few observations to make sure that our results are representative of a typical
restaurant choice situation and not flawed by inexperienced waiter types. Third,
we exclude all price-dish combinations that were chosen less than 10 times over the
sample period. This includes special holiday offers and one-time price reductions,
amounting to 9% of the overall sample. For the same reason we also exclude special
group menus, wedding or all-you-can-eat buffets. Last, we exclude all items where
prices were obviously misreported, i.e. where prices were different from any price
recorded in the menu or where the price of an item is completey missing.
Menu Choice Variables Information about consumer choices and the corre-
sponding menu design lies at the heart of this study. First, we manually group all
chosen dishes as reported on their corresponding bills into the corresponding menu
categories: starters, main dishes, children’s dishes, desserts and drinks. Second, we
sort all main dishes into the sub-categories defined in the menus. Sub-categories are
traditional dishes, fish, venison, steaks, poultry and vegetarian dishes. Third, we
account for the fact that 4 dishes were listed twice in the same menu (most of them
both as a starter and as a main dish) by creating respective dummies. Last, we
1Source: Deutscher Wetterdienst (German weather forecast services), www.dwd.de.
2Regional unemployment rates have been obtained from Bundesagentur fu¨r Arbeit: Arbeits-
lose nach Kreisen, http://statistik.arbeitsagentur.de. The business climate index can
be obtained from CESifo GmbH: ifo Gescha¨ftsklima fu¨r die Gewerbliche Wirtschaft, http:
//www.cesifo-group.de.
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generate indicator variables for dishes that were sold at a lower price as an elderly
person’s portion.
Price and Position Indicators Position indicators provide information about
how the menu design influences choice. First and most importantly, we generate
variables that contain information on the position of a certain dish within its cat-
egory, where we alternatively assign low or high numbers to the first or to the
last positions. Second, to account for possible nonlinearities, we include indicator
variables for the first and last position in each group. Third, we generate indicator
variables for whether a dish was recently added to the menu as a new item. Besides,
we generate variables for whether an item was the first listed on a respective’s menu
page and whether it was highlighted ”specialty of the house” or ”home-made”. Last,
we include variables on how many items have been listed within a certain menu
category.
In the data, an item’s price and position in the menu are strongly correlated, such
that price effects have to be carefully disentangled from position effects. Hence,
next to the price information obtained from the restaurant bills, we also generate
a second order price variable to account for nonlinear price effects. Moreover, we
generate an indicator for dishes that cost more than 10 Euros, which might function
as a psychological boundary.
Control Variables To make sure that choice situations are comparable over
time, we control for the external setting in which the choice situations took place.
First, we generate table fixed effects, indicating whether a table is located outside,
on the ground floor level or on the first floor of the restaurant. We drop all bills for
which the table number is missing. Second, we generate an indicator variable that
equals one if a table was shared by more than one party, identified by whether two
bills were issued on the same table at overlapping time periods.3 Third, we include
information on the overall business climate prevailing on a particular day. Fourth,
we generated indicator variables for weekend days, public holidays, school vacation
3We also generated several variables that provide more detailed waiter information, such as a
waiter sex, tenure or experience. These variables, however, proved to be largely unimportant for
dish choice and were thus excluded from the analysis.
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times, as well as variables that capture the day of the week and time of the day.
Last, we coded a variable for the number of main dishes per bill, as a proxy of the
number of customers sharing the same table.
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C.2 Data Summary Tables
Table C.1: Summary statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min. Max.
price item 10.05 2.63 3.5 17.8
sum category 4.92 1.44 2 8
rel position 0.58 0.27 0.13 1
first pos 0.23 0.42 0 1
last pos 0.22 0.42 0 1
mid pos 0.38 0.49 0 1
adav median 1.16 0.85 0 3.5
smaller median 0.53 0.5 0 1
bigger median 0.6 0.49 0 1
evening 0.28 0.45 0 1
full emp 0.71 0.46 0 1
trainee 0.19 0.39 0 1
temp emp 0.11 0.31 0 1
ground 0.22 0.41 0 1
first 0.49 0.5 0 1
outside 0.29 0.46 0 1
double sit 0.01 0.09 0 1
tm 11.56 7.11 -12.9 29.1
so 5.88 4.41 0 15.9
rr 1.26 3.51 0 46.4
unemp rate 16.35 2.55 11.3 22.8
business climate 96.69 7.04 82.3 108.9
no maindish 3.62 2.24 1 15
no drink 5.16 4.35 0 63
hr day 15.08 3.13 10 23
weekend 0.57 0.49 0 1
evening 0.28 0.45 0 1
public holiday 0.05 0.22 0 1
trad 0.28 0.45 0 1
fish 0.15 0.36 0 1
venison 0.16 0.36 0 1
steak 0.22 0.41 0 1
poultry 0.08 0.28 0 1
veggie 0.11 0.31 0 1
bison 0.2 0.4 0 1
asparagus 0.18 0.38 0 1
canarian 0.17 0.38 0 1
hiking 0.29 0.45 0 1
N 88113
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Table C.2: Summary statistics by categories
traditional fish venison steak poultry vegetarian
Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev Mean StdDev
price item 8.85 2.01 11.07 1.64 12.95 1.82 10.75 1.58 9.51 2.34 6.36 2.00
sum category 6.71 1.06 4.46 0.70 4.10 0.30 4.45 1.05 3.43 0.54 4.23 0.84
rel position 0.61 0.29 0.59 0.26 0.59 0.26 0.56 0.25 0.60 0.25 0.52 0.29
first pos 0.14 0.35 0.19 0.40 0.25 0.43 0.23 0.42 0.32 0.47 0.42 0.49
last pos 0.31 0.46 0.18 0.38 0.16 0.37 0.19 0.39 0.26 0.44 0.17 0.38
mid pos 0.25 0.43 0.37 0.48 0.54 0.50 0.44 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.28 0.45
adav median 1.69 1.08 0.99 0.62 0.94 0.52 0.94 0.68 0.71 0.56 1.16 0.67
smaller median 0.63 0.48 0.51 0.50 0.46 0.50 0.50 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.41 0.49
bigger median 0.49 0.50 0.62 0.48 0.56 0.50 0.67 0.47 0.73 0.44 0.70 0.46
no maindish 3.32 2.04 3.76 2.29 3.95 2.32 3.72 2.32 3.77 2.35 3.41 2.21
outside 0.34 0.47 0.27 0.45 0.21 0.41 0.29 0.45 0.18 0.38 0.41 0.49
business climate 97.01 6.85 96.82 7.04 96.30 6.86 96.93 7.16 94.35 6.75 97.65 7.39
evening 0.17 0.37 0.29 0.45 0.25 0.44 0.34 0.48 0.32 0.47 0.39 0.49
public holiday 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.22 0.06 0.23 0.05 0.22 0.05 0.23 0.05 0.21
weekend 0.56 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.62 0.48 0.55 0.50 0.61 0.49 0.53 0.50
Table C.3: Observations for each menu period by dish category
dish category
traditional fish venison steak poultry vegetarian Total
menu 1 433 243 320 361 289 160 1,806
menu 2 1,975 1,303 1,424 1,538 743 647 7,630
menu 3 513 339 407 368 436 120 2,183
menu 4 816 420 505 622 451 179 2,993
menu 5 2,024 1,104 1,171 1,376 901 659 7,235
menu 6 879 557 600 729 526 239 3,530
menu 7 2,702 1,330 1,396 1,639 679 679 8,425
menu 8 1,110 615 645 775 492 279 3,916
menu 9 2,026 868 946 1,247 463 686 6,236
menu 10 912 410 548 530 192 246 2,838
menu 11 619 395 447 447 310 200 2,418
menu 12 3,219 1,533 1,427 2,434 0 1,342 9,955
menu 13 849 576 604 688 693 346 3,756
menu 14 1,948 1,088 749 1,476 0 1,003 6,264
menu 15 723 355 353 639 0 326 2,396
menu 16 562 410 420 683 539 313 2,927
menu 17 1,509 924 666 1,890 0 856 5,845
menu 18 743 357 389 659 0 317 2,465
menu 19 380 360 342 527 436 261 2,306
menu 20 263 139 157 317 124 158 1,158
menu 21 484 242 247 457 162 239 1,831
Total 24,689 13,568 13,763 19,402 7,436 9,255 88,113
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Table C.4: Number of available choices for each menu by dish category
dish category
traditional fish venison steak poultry vegetarian Total
menu 1 7 4 4 3 3 3 24
menu 2 7 4 4 3 3 3 24
menu 3 7 4 4 3 4 3 25
menu 4 7 4 4 3 4 3 25
menu 5 7 4 4 3 3 4 25
menu 6 7 4 4 4 3 3 25
menu 7 8 4 4 4 3 3 26
menu 8 8 4 4 4 4 4 28
menu 9 8 4 4 4 3 4 27
menu 10 8 5 4 4 3 5 29
menu 11 8 5 4 4 4 4 29
menu 12 6 5 4 5 0 4 24
menu 13 6 5 5 4 4 4 28
menu 14 6 5 4 5 0 5 25
menu 15 6 5 4 6 0 5 26
menu 16 5 5 4 5 4 5 28
menu 17 5 5 4 6 0 5 25
menu 18 5 5 4 6 0 5 25
menu 19 5 6 5 5 4 6 31
menu 20 5 6 5 6 4 6 32
menu 21 5 5 5 6 4 5 30
Total choices 14 23 9 6 8 16 76
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Table C.5: Variable names and explanations
variable name variable label
price item price of item (per unit)
sum category total number of dishes in the respective dish category
rel position relative position within dish category
first pos first position within dish category
first maindish cross term measuring interaction of first pos*no maindish
last pos last position within dish category
last maindish cross term measuring interaction of last pos*no maindish
mid pos median position within dish category
mid maindish cross term measuring interaction of mid pos*no maindish
adav median absolute value of the absolute deviation from median position
smaller median dummy indicating if the position is lower than median position
bigger median dummy indicating if the position is higher than median position
evening dummy indicating that the dish was ordered past 5 pm.
full emp waiters with full employment
trainee waiters that are trainees
temp emp waiters with temporary/seasonal employment
ground bills on ground floor
first tables on first floor
outside outside table
double sit tables with multiple parties
tm average temperature 2m above ground
so daily hours of sunshine
rr daily precipitation height
unemp rate monthly unemployment rate at community level
business climate monthly business climate indicator (national level)
no maindish total number of main dishes on the bill - group size proxy 1
no drink total number of drinks on the bill - group size proxy 2
hr day hour of the day when the bill was issued
weekend dummy indicating that the dish was ordered on a weekend day
evening dummy indicating that the dish was ordered past 5 pm.
public holiday dummy indicating that the dish was ordered on a public holiday
trad traditional dishes category
fish fish dishes category
venison venison dishes category
steak steak dishes category
poultry poultry dishes category
veggie vegetarian dishes category
bison dummy indicating that Bisonbraten was listed as a specialty on a separate page
asparagus dummy indicating the presence of an extra asparagus menu
canarian dummy indicating the presence of an extra Canarian Islands specialties menu
hiking dummy indicating the presence of an extra menu with dishes for hikers
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C.3 Regression Results
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Table C.8: Conditional logit category 1 (traditional dishes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
choice
lprice item -0.241*** -0.434*** -0.0618* -0.0724* -0.0655* -0.0844**
(0.00) (0.00) (0.08) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02)
first pos -0.0807* -0.0949*
(0.08) (0.06)
last pos 0.795*** 0.981***
(0.00) (0.00)
mid pos 0.0370 0.0421
(0.14) (0.11)
adav median 0.0247 -0.0103
(0.14) (0.59)
c* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
business climate No Yes No Yes No Yes
weekend No Yes No Yes No Yes
evening No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 165571 165571 165571 165571 165571 165571
Log lik. -44441.1 -43837.9 -44699.8 -44142.7 -44699.8 -44143.8
AIC 88914.2 87811.9 89429.5 88419.4 89429.6 88421.6
BIC 89074.5 88493.0 89579.8 89090.5 89579.8 89092.7
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
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Table C.9: Conditional logit category 2 (fish)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
choice
lprice item -0.119*** -0.0508 -0.225*** -0.186*** -0.216*** -0.191***
(0.00) (0.30) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
first pos -0.0781* -0.114**
(0.07) (0.03)
last pos -0.426*** -0.485***
(0.00) (0.00)
mid pos 0.285*** 0.304***
(0.00) (0.00)
adav median -0.240*** -0.257***
(0.00) (0.00)
c* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
business climate No Yes No Yes No Yes
weekend No Yes No Yes No Yes
evening No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 61560 61560 61560 61560 61560 61560
Log lik. -19208.2 -18843.7 -19222.6 -18862.3 -19214.7 -18853.4
AIC 38464.4 37903.5 38491.2 37938.6 38475.4 37920.8
BIC 38681.1 38878.5 38698.9 38904.5 38683.0 38886.8
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
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Table C.10: Conditional logit category 3 (venison)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
choice
lprice item -0.460*** -0.178*** -0.326*** -0.383*** -0.323*** -0.381***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
first pos 0.516*** 0.386***
(0.00) (0.00)
last pos -1.818*** -2.066***
(0.00) (0.00)
mid pos -0.0321 0.0136
(0.24) (0.71)
adav median 0.00628 -0.0148
(0.82) (0.69)
c* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
business climate No Yes No Yes No Yes
weekend No Yes No Yes No Yes
evening No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 56402 56402 56402 56402 56402 56402
Log lik. -17986.2 -17668.1 -18829.9 -18605.7 -18830.5 -18605.7
AIC 35994.5 35422.2 37679.7 37295.4 37681.0 37295.4
BIC 36092.8 35806.6 37769.1 37670.9 37770.4 37670.9
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
C.3. REGRESSION RESULTS 139
Table C.11: Conditional logit category 4 (steaks)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
choice
lprice item -0.376*** -0.262*** -0.357*** -0.243*** -0.409*** -0.321***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
first pos -1.931***
(0.00)
last pos -0.0324
(0.40)
mid pos 0.115*** 0.113***
(0.00) (0.00)
adav median -0.185*** -0.214***
(0.00) (0.00)
c* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
business climate No Yes No Yes No Yes
weekend No Yes No Yes No Yes
evening No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 86387 86387 86387 86387 86387 86387
Log lik. -26999.6 -26654.4 -26991.5 -26647.7 -26989.7 -26644.9
AIC 54013.3 53360.8 53997.1 53349.3 53993.5 53343.9
BIC 54078.8 53604.4 54062.7 53602.2 54059.0 53596.8
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
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Table C.12: Conditional logit category 5 (poultry)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
choice
lprice item -0.125* -0.104 -0.105 0.0122 -0.105 0.0122
(0.09) (0.28) (0.14) (0.90) (0.14) (0.90)
first pos -0.822*** -0.800***
(0.00) (0.00)
last pos -0.813*** -0.779***
(0.00) (0.00)
mid pos 0.160*** 0.0999
(0.01) (0.12)
adav median -0.160*** -0.0999
(0.01) (0.12)
c* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
business climate No Yes No Yes No Yes
weekend No Yes No Yes No Yes
evening No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 24928 24928 24928 24928 24928 24928
Log lik. -8081.3 -7983.8 -8173.5 -8065.3 -8173.5 -8065.3
AIC 16182.6 16043.6 16365.0 16204.5 16365.0 16204.5
BIC 16263.9 16352.3 16438.2 16505.1 16438.2 16505.1
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
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Table C.13: Conditional logit category 6 (vegetarian dishes)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
choice
lprice item 0.150* 0.396*** 0.246*** 0.459*** 0.307*** 0.537***
(0.07) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
first pos -0.267*** -0.154*
(0.00) (0.06)
last pos -0.0181 -0.0141
(0.78) (0.84)
mid pos 0.0944** 0.113**
(0.04) (0.02)
adav median 0.0181 0.104*
(0.67) (0.05)
c* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
business climate No Yes No Yes No Yes
weekend No Yes No Yes No Yes
evening No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 39134 39134 39134 39134 39134 39134
Log lik. -12028.2 -11703.1 -12035.5 -11702.3 -12037.7 -11703.0
AIC 24092.4 23562.1 24105.1 23558.7 24109.3 23559.9
BIC 24246.7 24231.0 24250.9 24218.9 24255.1 24220.2
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
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Table C.14: Mixed logit category 1
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean
lprice item 0.0985*** -0.613*** 0.165*** -0.0666* 0.239*** -0.0682*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.05)
first pos -0.241*** -2.262***
(0.00) (0.00)
last pos 0.143*** 1.161***
(0.00) (0.00)
mid pos 0.0477 -0.0137
(0.54) (0.75)
adav median -0.245*** 0.0315*
(0.00) (0.08)
SD
lprice item 0.433*** 0.814*** 0.523*** -0.0571 0.765*** -0.0200
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.37) (0.00) (0.66)
first pos -0.0787 2.705***
(0.72) (0.00)
last pos 0.00677 0.0166
(0.96) (0.89)
mid pos 1.161*** -0.499***
(0.00) (0.00)
adav median 0.0810 0.218***
(0.26) (0.00)
c* No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 165571 165571 165571 165571 165571 165571
Log lik. -46153.1 -44004.3 -46054.7 -44341.4 -46006.7 -44341.1
AIC 92318.3 88072.6 92117.3 88742.7 92021.4 88742.1
BIC 92378.4 88393.2 92157.4 89043.3 92061.5 89042.6
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
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Table C.15: Mixed logit category 2
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean
lprice item -0.0790*** -0.0678 -0.0398*** -0.252*** -0.0496*** -0.221***
(0.00) (0.25) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
first pos -0.516*** -0.124**
(0.00) (0.03)
last pos -0.716*** -0.548***
(0.00) (0.00)
mid pos 0.173*** 0.259***
(0.00) (0.00)
adav median -0.267*** -0.248***
(0.00) (0.00)
SD
lprice item 0.000900 0.256** -0.000300 -0.000210 -0.000335 -0.0963
(0.95) (0.03) (0.98) (1.00) (0.98) (0.44)
first pos 0.0290 0.143
(0.86) (0.70)
last pos 1.219*** 0.315
(0.00) (0.40)
mid pos -0.253 0.507**
(0.27) (0.05)
adav median 0.00228 0.199
(0.95) (0.24)
c* No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 61560 61560 61560 61560 61560 61560
Log lik. -20100.9 -19164.8 -20337.6 -19178.6 -20185.6 -19171.3
AIC 40213.8 38425.5 40683.3 38449.2 40379.3 38434.5
BIC 40268.0 38858.8 40719.4 38864.4 40415.4 38849.8
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
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Table C.16: Mixed logit category 3
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean
lprice item -0.0513 -0.344*** -0.101*** -0.329*** -0.122*** -0.327***
(0.15) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
first pos -1.612*** 0.104**
(0.00) (0.04)
last pos -39.61***
(0.00)
mid pos 0.273*** -0.0295
(0.00) (0.30)
adav median -0.350*** 0.00164
(0.00) (0.96)
SD
lprice item -1.390*** 0.0302 0.0847 0.0427 0.234*** 0.0633
(0.00) (0.67) (0.12) (0.59) (0.00) (0.47)
first pos 3.253*** -0.172
(0.00) (0.67)
last pos 32.04***
(0.00)
mid pos 0.398 0.0737
(0.11) (0.69)
adav median -0.0177 -0.0152
(0.85) (0.89)
c* No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 56402 56402 56402 56402 56402 56402
Log lik. -18144.1 -18793.8 -19103.6 -18796.5 -19071.9 -18797.1
AIC 36300.3 37627.5 38215.3 37633.0 38151.8 37634.2
BIC 36353.9 37806.3 38251.1 37811.8 38187.5 37813.0
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
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Table C.17: Mixed logit category 4
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean
lprice item -0.140*** -0.403*** -0.147*** -0.442*** -0.143*** -0.414***
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
first pos -1.273***
(0.00)
last pos -0.468*** -3.823***
(0.00) (0.00)
mid pos 0.257*** 0.194***
(0.00) (0.00)
adav median -0.238*** -0.213***
(0.00) (0.00)
SD
lprice item 0.00226 -0.131 0.00196 0.129 0.00285 0.130
(0.93) (0.25) (0.91) (0.14) (0.89) (0.22)
first pos 2.215***
(0.00)
last pos 0.000464 7.513***
(1.00) (0.00)
mid pos -0.00278 1.240***
(0.97) (0.00)
adav median -0.00122 0.605***
(0.97) (0.00)
c* No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 86387 86387 86387 86387 86387 86387
Log lik. -27273.9 -26818.8 -27542.8 -26889.8 -27461.6 -26895.2
AIC 54559.7 53665.6 55093.5 53807.7 54931.2 53818.4
BIC 54615.9 53796.7 55131.0 53938.8 54968.6 53949.5
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
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Table C.18: Mixed logit category 5
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean
lprice item -0.209*** -0.0908 -0.205*** -0.112 -0.207*** -0.112
(0.00) (0.21) (0.00) (0.12) (0.00) (0.12)
first pos -0.755*** 0.0108
(0.00) (0.93)
last pos -152.3
(0.35)
mid pos 0.845*** 0.158***
(0.00) (0.01)
adav median -0.860*** -0.159***
(0.00) (0.01)
SD
lprice item 0.00143 0.00745 0.519*** 0.00800 0.519*** 0.00789
. (0.87) (0.00) (0.87) (0.00) (0.87)
first pos 0.00279 0.00651
(0.98) (0.97)
last pos 155.5
(0.35)
mid pos 1.833*** -0.0460
(0.00) (0.92)
adav median 2.033*** 0.0454
(0.00) (0.92)
c* No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 24928 24928 24928 24928 24928 24928
Log lik. -8156.5 -8167.2 -8402.5 -8163.8 -8402.1 -8163.8
AIC 16322.9 16370.3 16813.0 16363.6 16812.3 16363.6
BIC 16363.6 16516.6 16845.5 16509.8 16844.8 16509.8
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
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Table C.19: Mixed logit category 6
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean
lprice item -0.393*** 0.120 -0.278*** 0.196* -0.277*** 0.185*
(0.00) (0.33) (0.00) (0.06) (0.00) (0.08)
first pos -0.417*** -0.314**
(0.00) (0.02)
last pos 0.0442 -0.100
(0.50) (0.32)
mid pos -0.0411 -0.0330
(0.29) (0.63)
adav median 0.0176 0.0425
(0.62) (0.50)
SD
lprice item 0.505*** -0.0359 0.388*** -0.0167 0.385*** -0.0152
(0.00) (0.71) (0.00) (0.81) (0.00) (0.82)
first pos 0.583 0.610
(0.23) (0.23)
last pos -0.0292 -0.0102
(0.91) (0.98)
mid pos -0.0280 -0.0122
(0.90) (0.95)
adav median 0.0241 0.0188
(0.81) (0.86)
c* No Yes No Yes No Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 24509 24509 24509 24509 24509 24509
Log lik. -7440.9 -7370.1 -7455.7 -7376.3 -7456.1 -7376.2
AIC 14893.7 14788.3 14919.3 14796.7 14920.2 14796.4
BIC 14942.4 14982.8 14951.8 14975.0 14952.6 14974.8
p-values in parentheses
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01
Source: Own data, 2002-2009.
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Table C.20: Conditional logit full choice set
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
choice
lprice item -0.204∗∗ -0.208∗∗∗ -0.205∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.209∗∗∗ -0.213∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
first pos 0.0612 0.0558
(0.53) (0.57)
last pos -0.200∗∗∗ -0.198∗∗∗
(0.01) (0.01)
mid pos 0.0306 0.0287
(0.61) (0.63)
adav median -0.0338 -0.0326
(0.45) (0.47)
c* Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
no maindish No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 82100 82100 82100 82100 82100 82100
Log lik. -9969.7 -9900.8 -9973.5 -9904.5 -9973.4 -9904.3
AIC 20093.5 20103.6 20099.0 20108.9 20098.7 20108.6
BIC 20810.8 21510.3 20807.0 21506.3 20806.7 21506.0
p-values in parentheses
Source: Own data, random draw, 2002-2009.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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Table C.21: Mixed logit full choice set
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Mean
lprice item 0.00230 -0.216∗∗∗ -0.0261∗∗∗ -0.210∗∗∗ -0.0200∗∗∗ -0.212∗∗∗
(0.77) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
first pos 0.0743 0.0494
(0.18) (0.64)
last pos -0.568∗∗∗ -0.447∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
mid pos -0.0409 0.0268
(0.81) (0.66)
adav median -0.0539∗∗ -0.0343
(0.04) (0.45)
SD
lprice item 0.0892∗∗∗ -0.0922 0.0542 -0.0133 0.0534 -0.0121
(0.00) (0.40) (0.12) (0.88) (0.13) (0.89)
first pos 0.142 0.173
(0.75) (0.73)
last pos 0.773∗∗∗ 1.124∗∗∗
(0.00) (0.00)
mid pos -1.122 -0.116
(0.12) (0.78)
adav median 0.443∗∗∗ 0.129
(0.00) (0.55)
c* No Yes No Yes No Yes
group size proxy No Yes No Yes No Yes
N 82100 82100 82100 82100 82100 82100
Log lik. -10268.2 -9896.3 -10300.8 -9904.4 -10296.8 -9904.2
AIC 20548.4 20100.7 20609.6 20112.8 20601.6 20112.4
BIC 20604.3 21535.3 20646.8 21528.8 20638.8 21528.4
p-values in parentheses
Source: Own data, random draw, 2002-2009.
∗ p < 0.10, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.01
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